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Abstract 
This thesis aims at giving a plausible account of education from the perspective of John 
Rawls’ theory of political liberalism. Despite the fact that an immense amount of literature 
has been written on both Rawls’ work in general and political liberal theory in particular, 
this still seems to be a worthwhile task, for two reasons. The first reason is that the current 
discussion of liberal neutrality in the philosophy of education frequently engages with 
Rawlsian liberalism, despite the actual lack of an adequately refined Rawlsian account of 
liberal education. The second reason is that political liberal theory itself leans more toward 
the side of ideal political theory, provoking the question whether it has any application 
value for real politics. A sufficiently developed account of political liberal education would 
demonstrate that practical guidelines can indeed be generated from political liberal 
principles. 
After providing a comprehensive overview over the few explicit claims about education 
Rawls made himself, and over the parts of his theory indicating further educational 
requirements for citizens of a liberal society, the thesis splits into two parts. The first part 
analyses the relation between core concepts of political liberalism (political virtues, 
autonomy, and rights) and education. Next to engaging with objections against neutrality-
based restrictions in the context of education, this part also highlights the shortcomings of 
political liberalism when faced with the concrete requirements of education and proposes 
suitable revisions. The second part of the thesis picks out a number of concrete topics of 
education that are discussed in contemporary liberal theory. It analyses the questions to 
what extent religious beliefs entitle parents to determine the education of their children, to 
what degree same-sex relations should be part of a liberal sex-education curriculum, and 
what challenges migration might pose for political liberal education. For each case, the 
account of political liberal education presented here can provide guidelines based on the 
insights gained in the first part of this thesis. 
Together, the mainly theoretical first and the more practical second part shape the outlines 
for a political liberal account of education which, albeit sketchy, provides a useful 
contribution to the current debates about liberalism and education in a way which has not 
been done in the literature on political liberalism so far. 
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1 Introduction 
Education cannot be value-neutral. Even if it tried to be, the choices made in the design of 
a curriculum, of what to teach and what not, and by what means, are choices which involve 
evaluative judgements. These judgements about what to teach, and in which way, are also 
normative choices – each of us thinks that children ought to know this, they should be 
capable to doing that, they need to grow up to be persons of a certain kind. It is quite 
probable that each of us has different ideas about what exactly this and that are, as each of 
us will have slightly different ideas of what kind of persons children should grow up to be. 
Our differing judgements about the right kind of education is one aspect of what John 
Rawls calls “the fact of pluralism” in modern liberal democratic societies. Citizens of the 
same nation-state have different ideas about what makes a life meaningful and which 
goods are necessary for human flourishing. For this reason, Rawls remade his political 
theory and turned to a “political” approach to liberalism, summarised in his Political 
Liberalism.1 In contrast to other forms of liberalism which are resting on substantial ethical 
assumptions about the human good, political liberalism is supposed to rest only on values 
which can be equally shared by all reasonable citizens in a pluralist society. Decisions 
about constitutional essentials and the basic structure of society ought only to be based on 
values that are political, i.e., can be affirmed by all reasonable citizens, in contrast to 
particular ethical values that have the support of some, but not all reasonable citizens in a 
society. 
School education is part of the basic structure of society. In a just society, the restraints of 
political liberalism apply to decisions about the education system of a society as well. On 
the one hand, this implies that a political liberal state cannot design its education system to 
teach children to become autonomous individualists in a Millian fashion, or Kantian moral 
rationalists. On the other hand, education is not completely up for grabs either. As Rawls 
himself notes, now and then, throughout his corpus of work, a just society, even a political 
liberal one, needs to bring up its future citizens in certain ways and inculcate a certain 
range of values and dispositions. Education is a necessary building block to secure the 
continuity of a just liberal society over generations. 
                                                 
1 Rawls 1993. 
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Neither Rawls’ Political Liberalism, nor his other works provide much more detail about 
political liberal education beyond occasional claims about how just political institutions 
produce reasonable and cooperative citizens and that education is important to this end.  
Other authors who see themselves in a Rawlsian tradition have written about education and 
the upbringing of children. However, my impression is that none of these approaches offers 
are systematic political liberal account of education. Stephen Macedo writes repeatedly 
about education, but his version of liberalism seems to be rather restrictive and it focuses 
on values that are closer to a comprehensive liberalism than they would need to.2 Harry 
Brighouse’s writing about philosophy of education often seem to presume a Rawlsian idea 
of distributive justice, but seems to assume that an actual majority consent is necessary for 
political legitimacy, placing him more in the field of comprehensive democrats.3  Matthew 
Clayton’s account of political education, while probably engaging most fully with the 
details of Rawls’ theory, tends to overlook (in my view) relevant aspects of political 
liberalism when it employs notions of autonomy and political virtues that would meet more 
disagreement by reasonable citizens than necessary.4 
I will return to and engage with the arguments of these authors in the chapters of this 
thesis, endorsing some parts of their positions while rejecting others. However, looking at 
the state of the debate so far, I want to claim that yet there is no such thing as a well-
developed account of political liberal education that considers the various essential features 
of that theory, such as stability for the right reasons, an overlapping consensus on a 
common conception of justice (or a family of such conceptions), and ethical neutrality in 
terms of comprehensive world views. 
The lack of a comprehensive Rawlsian account of education makes the findings of a 
quantitative study of the debate about liberal citizenship education even more surprising: in 
the two decades between 1990 and 2010, a majority of journal articles participating in this 
                                                 
2 See, e.g., Macedo 1990, Macedo 2000a. 
3 See, e.g., Brighouse 1998a, Brighouse 2000. 
4 See Clayton 2006. 
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debate were engaging with some form of “Rawlsian-style liberalism”, with Rawls as the 
prioritised engagement partner (in 27 out of 55 articles), as well as the most referenced 
author.5 A similar tendency to engage with Rawlsian political liberalism, and to dismiss it 
for reasons that draw at least part of their force from arguments grounded in matters of 
education, can be found in books published during the last 25 years.6 
This combination of a lack of any halfway comprehensive account of Rawlsian education 
and the engagement of plenty of literature about education with Rawlsian liberalism are 
motivating this thesis. My aim is to give a more detailed account of education that grounds 
in Rawlsian liberalism, which I take to be political liberalism.7 The key features of this 
account are: 
• An analysis of the requirements on education, derivable from central elements of 
political liberal theory: political virtues, autonomy, and political rights. 
• Updates of and changes in political liberal theory where tensions emerge, either 
internally or with empirical claims, in the course of developing an account of 
education. 
• Examples of how the requirements of political liberal education work in applied 
cases: religion in education, same-sex relations as part of sex education, and the 
relation between political liberal education and migration. 
Before I start, though, it is necessary to say more about the methodology, the scope, and 
the restrictions of the account of Rawlsian education I am going to present, followed by a 
brief preview of the content of the subsequent chapters of the thesis. The final section of 
this introduction will be about the terminology I decided to use. 
                                                 
5 See Fernández, Sundström 2011, pp. 378f. 
6 See Callan 1997, Levinson 1999, Winch 2006. 
7 There are nevertheless people who think that Rawls’ turn toward political liberalism was unfortunate and 
that keeping his position closer to his claims from A Theory of Justice would have been the better choice 
(see, e.g., Taylor 2011). I do not share this view but will make no attempt to argue against it here. 
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1.1 An Exercise in Public Reason 
One could describe this thesis as an exercise in public reason. 
Public reason gained prominence in liberal political philosophy after Rawls introduced the 
idea in Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical8 and incorporated it into his 
political theory in Political Liberalism. It is commonly understood as a moral standard for 
deliberation about political decisions. Citizens of a well-ordered society are supposed to 
only endorse coercive laws and institutions if their reasons for doing so are acceptable to 
their fellow citizens, i.e., their reasons are public.9 It is worth mentioning at this point that 
the citizens of a well-ordered society are idealised to a degree that strips them of any 
psychological biases their real-life counterparts might have (and that assumes that they 
comply with the principles of justice without further need for external incentives or 
sanctions). 
This thesis can be understood as an attempt to provide reasons for endorsing a set of 
principles for a political liberal education system that would be acceptable to the rational 
and reasonable citizens of a well-ordered society. It takes into consideration the basic 
principles and values of a liberal conception of justice and extrapolates reasons for various 
details of public education which would be considered public by the citizens of this 
moderately idealised society. 
One might be tempted to object that public reason is a deliberative framework for citizens, 
and not the forum for ideal (or semi-ideal) political philosophy of the kind found in this 
thesis. On this view, public reason should apply to what “normal” citizens think about 
political problems. However, this sort of deliberation would not necessarily exclude 
                                                 
8 Rawls 1985. 
9 The scope of public reason varies depending of the author defending it. Rawls; own conception of public 
reason applies only to constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice (see Rawls 1999a, p. 136) while 
Johnathan Quong argues for widening the scope to include any type of coercive law (see Quong 2011, Ch. 
9). If public education counts as part of the basic structure of society, as I will assume and argue for in this 
thesis, it is already covered by the narrower scope. 
14 
engaging with ideal theory now and then. It seems quite plausible that even “normal” 
citizens have employ ideal theorising to some degree when thinking about normative 
political questions. Some of those citizens can be even political philosophers who are 
imagining idealised societies to find public reasons for their favoured principles of 
education.10 
When we think of philosophical idealisation as a legitimate way of deliberation, the next 
relevant question must be to what extent we can plausibly idealise in matters of education 
which should offer useful guidelines for real-world educational policies. Finding a 
plausible degree of idealisation without losing sight of actual political challenges is 
therefore one of the concerns of this thesis. 
1.2 Ideal vs. Non-Ideal Theory 
This thesis is an attempt to build a bridge between the ideal theory that grounds Rawlsian 
liberalism, and what I call a semi-ideal view. For this reason, the first part of the thesis 
discusses the basic values and principles which belong to the ideal part of political liberal 
theory. These are, after all, the foundation on which a political liberal account of education 
needs to stand. In the second part of the thesis I propose ways of approaching matters that 
are often discussed in the context of liberal education, such as the standing of religious 
education, same-sex education, and what opportunities liberal education needs to provide 
for immigrants. 
As my approach draws on the normative groundings from the previous chapters, which 
belong to the core ideas of Rawlsian liberalism, the discussion of more “applied” topics 
cannot be non-ideal theory. I try, however, to de-idealise enough to get a picture of a well-
ordered society which is, if not a completely realistic, at least not so abstract that social 
phenomena like discrimination and immigration disappear.  
While I label this a semi-ideal view, I am aware that from the perspective of non-ideal 
theory, it still might appear far too idealised. On many occasions I will try to give at least a 
sketchy discussion of what problems might occur in particular real-life contexts and what 
                                                 
10 For an argument in favour of these two points see Neufeld 2017. 
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options we have considering our political liberal account of education as normative 
background. Nevertheless, this account remains mainly an ideal one, although hopefully 
clearly less ideal in important respects than Rawls’ original theories. 
The step of de-idealising to derive normative guidelines for somewhat more applied 
problems in educational politics also brings into focus that such a project is necessarily 
limited. I should therefore also say a few words about the scope of this thesis. 
1.3 Scope 
The scope of this thesis is limited in various ways, so it seems helpful to make these 
limitations explicit and give at least a short justification for them.  
Cultural and Geographical Limits 
The idealised well-ordered society that is in my focus is a political liberal one and 
therefore modelled after western liberal democratic societies.11 This is the restriction of 
political liberalism, and therefore also the restriction of my account of political liberal 
education. 
This limit of scope is reflected in the application cases discussed in the second part of the 
thesis. The tension between liberalism and religion discussed in Chapter 6 seems to be one 
that is mainly found in western states, most characteristically in the USA. Similarly, 
                                                 
11 Rawls’ own theory is leading the way here. The historical developments that Rawls described in the 
introduction to Political Liberalism and  his identification of the “third feature of a political conception of 
justice [being such] that its content is expressed in terms of certain fundamentals ideas seen as implicit in 
the public political culture of a democratic society” (Rawls 1993, p. 13) both indicate that the subject of 
his political theory is a liberal society with a representative democratic government, an ideal version of the 
democracies in the Western world. 
 
This modest aim of political liberalism is made explicit by Johnathan Quong, who sees political liberal 
theory as aiming at understanding what arguments persons “in modern societies”, who are “already 
committed to certain basic liberal norms can legitimately offer to one another.” See Quong 2011, p. 5, 
emphasis in the original. 
16 
Chapter 7 focuses on topics such as homosexual identity and homophobia as it is found 
and discussed in Western European and Northern American societies. For societies with 
different historical backgrounds, even though political liberalism might be an ideal for 
them as well, an approach to gender and sexual equality might need different approaches. 
These not typically Western approaches could be derived from the basic requirements of 
political liberal education as well, although they are not discussed in this thesis.12 Chapter 
8 is concerned with the kind of immigration as it typically happens in western 
democracies, be it the United States or European countries. 
Some aspects of political liberalism, and thereby probably also some of the more practical 
implications I draw in this thesis, might be transferable to other types of societies.13 A 
proper analysis of which elements would be portable and what this would require from the 
theory as well as the society in question, is obviously beyond the scope of my project. 
Liberal Sectarian Limits 
Another way in which this thesis is limited is by its acceptance of political liberal basic 
concepts and aims as given. I am certainly critical of some of the ideas of political 
liberalism as Rawls develops them, especially in regard to political virtues and autonomy 
(as will be seen in Chapters 3 and 4) but my attempts at improvement aim to remain inside 
the tolerance limits of the political liberal framework. Insofar, in the context of this thesis I 
am not critical of the political liberal project itself. 
Whether, e.g., political liberalism is indeed a liberal theory that distinguishes itself from 
other liberal theories by its neutral approach to various world views, or just another form of 
liberal sectarianism,14 is not discussed here (my hunch is that it is sectarian – but still less 
so than most other forms of liberalism). Independent of this discussion, this work will 
                                                 
12 See, e.g., Dankmeijer 2007. 
13 A current example would be Sungmoon Kim’s work on the integration of public reason with Confucianist 
East Asian societies (Kim 2017). 
14 See Gaus 2012. 
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focus on political liberalism’s need to say something about education. The position of the 
framework among other liberal theories makes no difference for this task. 
Limits of Justice 
The scope of this thesis is restricted in a different sense as well – it is compatible only with 
a restricted range of conceptions of justice. Political liberalism, as it is presented by Rawls, 
takes Justice as Fairness as the central conception of justice which is supported by citizens 
in a well-ordered society. Justice as Fairness, of course, is the label of the theory of justice 
that Rawls himself develops in A Theory of Justice.15 It is supposed to outline the just 
arrangements of what he calls the basic structure of society, including a nation state’s 
constitution and political, legal, and economic institutions, according to egalitarian 
principles of justice. 
Rawls thinks that in the context of his political liberal theory, Justice as Fairness is the 
most reasonable liberal conception of justice, although he concedes that other conceptions 
would also satisfy his definition of a liberal conception of justice.16 Later, Rawls repeats 
the concession that a political liberal society would not necessarily find a consensus based 
on one particular theory of justice. Instead, a range of acceptable theories of justice would 
sustain the overlapping consensus in a political liberal society.17 
The various conceptions of justice which are acceptable for a political liberal society differ 
in their details. At the same time, they all need to have enough in common to satisfy basic 
liberal requirements. The suitability of a conception of justice for political liberalism can 
be determined by “three main features:” 
• They must sustain basic rights and liberties that are taken for granted in a 
constitutional regime,  
                                                 
15 Rawls 1971. 
16 Rawls 1993, p. xlvii. 
17 See Rawls 1999a, p. 137. 
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• assign priorities to those rights and liberties over other political considerations, and 
• they need to ensure that citizens have the means to make effective use of those 
rights and liberties, as well as of the opportunities those rights and liberties open up 
for them.18 
In this thesis I take Justice as Fairness to be the relevant conception of justice. My account 
of education is nevertheless compatible with different reasonable conceptions of justice, as 
they all have to satisfy the above criteria and provide sufficiently similar principles from 
political liberal requirements for education can be derived. Therefore, this thesis is not 
limited to making claims about a society governed by the principles of Justice as Fairness, 
although it is limited by the range of reasonable conceptions of justice. 
So much for the main limitations of this thesis. What is still needed is a brief overview 
over its aims. 
1.4 Aims 
The aim of this thesis is to present an account of political liberal education. But it could do 
so in different ways, therefore it seems helpful to give an indication of what this account 
wants to achieve.  
This thesis is meant to be is one of a range of possible political liberal accounts of 
education. It is a plausible and reasonable account that attempts to solve some of the 
problems that have been brought up at the intersection between political liberal theory and 
philosophy of education. It is also meant to demonstrate how ideal political theory can 
generate less abstract normative guidelines that might be applicable, modified by context, 
to real-world political questions about education. This characterisation is, however, open to 
various interpretations and might lead to expectations that I will not meet. For this reason, 
it is important to clarify what are not aims of the thesis. 
                                                 
18 See Rawls 1999a, pp. 140f, also Rawls 1993, p. xlvi for an earlier version of these conditions. 
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It is not meant to be faithful Rawls exegesis that tries to conserve Rawls’ view of the 
project of political liberalism in every detail. Some of the ideas about autonomy and 
political virtues in Rawls’ version of political liberalism appear to be at odds with basic 
ideas of education, so that especially in Chapters 3 and 4, I suggest modifications of 
Rawls’ account of autonomy and of political virtues. Hence, next to the aim to develop a 
political account of education this thesis also aims at adapting political liberal theory to 
meet basic requirements of education. 
These revisions will perhaps be controversial for some political liberals. The claim made in 
Chapter 3, that Rawls’ Aristotelian account of virtues should be replaced with a Humean 
one, might seem superfluous or even harmful to political liberals who think that Rawls’ 
Aristotelian Principle still has a relevant function after his political turn. The introduction 
of what I call weak autonomy in Chapter 4, deriving from the canonical idea that only the 
“political” autonomy of individuals is relevant for political liberalism, might seem 
unacceptable to those who think that political liberalism needs to be as neutral as possible 
in matters of autonomy. Some political liberals may also disagree with my approach of the 
role of religion in education in Chapter 6, and the claim that private and religious schools 
are (mostly) unproblematic from the perspective of political liberal education. I am well 
aware that not every reader will agree with me on the claims I make in those chapters (and 
probably on a few other claims as well) but it seems to me that there are good reasons for 
these changes, as I will argue in the respective chapters. 
This thesis is also not meant to provide the only definite and correct political liberal 
account of education. This is not only impossible under the limitations given for a doctoral 
thesis, but generally impossible. Depending on what modifications and revisions of 
political liberal theory we think of as acceptable, and what requirements education can or 
must make on the state, on parents, and on children, we will end up with a broad range of 
different accounts of political liberal education. Political philosophers, even those 
committed mainly to political liberalism, are subject to reasonable disagreement just like 
citizens of a well-ordered society. 
To conclude this introduction, I provide a short preview of the thesis chapters and their 
main arguments. 
20 
1.5 Preview 
In Chapter 2, I start approaching political liberal education by giving an overview over the 
sparse material about education that can be found in Rawls’ work. While this thesis focuses 
on a political liberal account of education, I also assess works prior to Rawls’ political turn, 
as views developed in Rawls early work can be (and often are in regard to other matters) 
still relevant to his political liberalism. These findings give a first impression of what 
Rawls thought would be relevant for liberal democratic education and point to the direction 
in which a more robust account of political liberal education should be developed. 
The next three chapters constitute what I call the theoretical part of the thesis. It includes 
political virtues, autonomy, and the political rights and liberties of actors in a political 
liberal society. Any more detailed claims about how political liberal education ought to 
work must take into account these concepts and their implications. 
The topic of Chapter 3 is the political virtues which citizens in a political liberal society 
need to cultivate. The responsibility for the cultivation of political virtues falls at least 
partly to the education system of a society. However, as I will show, the conception of 
virtues and what motivates virtuous behaviour in Rawls’ political liberalism, the 
Aristotelian Principle, looks very much like a leftover from his pre-political theory and 
would imply a range of comprehensive and/or perfectionist policies. Furthermore, 
justifying educational policies on the grounds of the Aristotelian Principle would rest the 
justification for basic policies on an idea of human flourishing that reasonable citizens can 
disagree about and reject. As a solution to this problem I propose to adopt a Humean 
account of virtues instead, which remains mainly neutral about the exact nature of political 
virtues and thus provides a more innocuous justification for education that fosters a range 
of political virtues. 
In Chapter 4 I discuss the role of autonomy for political liberal education. From the brief 
digression on education that can be found in the context of Rawls’ political liberal theory it 
seems to follow that in his view, only political autonomy should be relevant for education. 
Throughout this chapter I argue that this would leave an incomplete picture of political 
liberal education. In order for citizens to develop the moral powers associated with 
citizenship in a liberal democratic society, and to develop some of the political virtues, they 
need more than just political autonomy. The central claim of Chapter 4 is that an account of 
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autonomy of individuals as self-determined agents is necessary to achieve these ends, and 
that political liberal education has to include an account of this type of autonomy. 
Chapter 5 looks at the relations between the political liberal state, parents, and children in 
terms of rights and liberties. I propose casting political rights and duties in a Hohfeldian 
manner for a better understanding of the relations between those actors. Doing so enables 
me to show in which regards demands of justice generate duties for parents, but also the 
state, to ensure a sufficient education for children so they can make adequate use of a range 
of basic goods. The interests of children also generate certain claim-rights of the state 
against parents, should these not be able or willing to fulfil their duties toward their 
children. 
Chapters 6 to 8 constitute the second, applied part of the thesis. Each of these chapters 
addresses a particular set of topics and problems that occur in educational context. 
The role of religion in education, together with the question whether a political liberal 
education system has room for private schools, is discussed in Chapter 6. One main focus 
of this chapter is on Kevin Vallier’s recent claim that public reason liberalism (of which 
political liberalism is one form), properly understood, would necessarily imply that a 
public education system is illegitimate and political justification can only be achieved for a 
privatised education system. I argue against this view that it does not apply to political 
liberalism, despite being a type of public reason liberalism. However, I concede that in a 
political liberal society there would be no prima facie reason against a mixed school 
system that allows private schools, under the right social conditions and the necessary 
political standards and checks. 
Chapter 7 picks up on the discussion of same-sex relations that takes place in philosophy 
of education and education science to see how principles of political liberal education 
apply to it. In this chapter I argue that political liberal education needs to include same-sex 
relations in its sex education curricula, as it is an important building block for self-respect 
of future citizens. In less ideal societies, where inequality between opposite-sex and same-
sex couples exists, e.g., in terms of access to the institution of marriage, an inclusive sex 
education is also a step towards a more equal society, or so I argue. 
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The last of the three applied chapters, Chapter 8, attempts an analysis of whether a political 
liberal education needs to make additional offers to the children of immigrants, and what 
these offers would have to be. This is the applied case that is furthest away from the 
idealised well-ordered society of Rawlsian political liberal theory, as it de-idealised to a 
degree where exchange with other societies and immigration occur. My main claim in this 
chapter is that the political liberal state has indeed an obligation to provide additional 
educational resources to immigrant children, which are generated out of considerations for 
distributive justice as well as for long-term stability of society for the right reasons. 
Chapter 9 summarises the main findings of the previous chapters and explains what makes 
the account of political liberal education I develop in this thesis a plausible and reasonable 
one. Furthermore, I suggest that the project of developing a political account of education 
highlights the circumstance that ideal political theory sometimes needs adjustments if it 
turns out to address real-world problems only insufficiently. Finding out whether such 
adjustments are a required is a necessary step in constructing semi-ideal applications, like I 
attempt to do over the remaining chapters. 
1.6 Terminology 
I am going use the term “public school” frequently throughout the thesis. Depending on the 
region it is used, this term denotes different kind of schools. In England and Wales, public 
schools are actually part of the private sector that charge fees for the attendance of 
students. In Scotland and the United States, the term denotes state schools funded by 
taxation. In this thesis, I will adopt the latter usage for the term “public school.” I will refer 
to schools charging fees as “private schools.” 
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2 Rawlsian Education: Preliminary Observations 
Of course, it must start with Rawls – first, by summarizing the main characteristics of his 
political liberalism, as these set the stage on which a corresponding theory of education can 
be acted out (2.1). Second, by unearthing what little explicit material on this topic Rawls 
himself wrote, the probably most obvious one being a short paragraph in Political 
Liberalism where he sketches a very brief concept of political liberal civic education (2.2 
and 2.3). Third, by analysing what kind of implicit assumptions about education can be 
found in central parts of his work (2.4 to 2.5). In a last step, I will argue that principles and 
regulations concerning education can reasonably be viewed as objects of public reason and 
must be justified according to its standards (2.6). 
Whenever education is mentioned in Rawls’ work, it is often in its role as a resource in 
contexts of distributive justice but also in the context of the development of a sense of 
justice. It is the latter that will be relevant in regard to political liberal education, as I will 
argue, because the sense of justice is one of several political virtues that persons have to 
develop in order to become proper democratic citizens of a well-ordered society. Because 
of my focus on the political and moral requirements of political liberalism, education as a 
matter of the distribution of resources will not be considered here. This does not mean that 
the place of education in a fair distributive scheme would not matter. Rather, it is a 
different aspect of education than the one I am analysing in this thesis. 
Despite Rawls writing close to nothing on the topic of education explicitly, many passages 
in his work imply some form of political education for the citizens of a well-ordered 
society which is ordered by principles of justice that all citizens can agree on. It becomes 
obvious that Rawls is aware of the influence of political structure on citizens' lives when 
he, e.g., writes: 
[T]he institutional form of society affects its members and determines in large part the 
kind of persons they want to be as well as the kind of persons they are. The social structure 
also limits people's ambitions and hopes in different ways; for they will with reason view 
themselves in part according to their position in it and take account of the means and 
opportunities they can realistically expect.19 
                                                 
19  Rawls 1993, p. 269. 
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It is obvious that the institutions of education in Western liberal democratic societies 
influence citizens immensely in their development of the kind of persons they become. 
Although those are certainly not the only institutions doing so, they might be the major 
influence for a large part of the population; and even though Rawls never stated this 
explicitly, schools (and perhaps other institutions of education as well) therefore count as 
part of the basic structure of society and should be considered as such when modelling an 
idealised well-ordered society in order to see how a political conception of justice works 
out. 
2.1 Core Concepts of Political Liberalism 
Political liberalism was developed by Rawls20 to meet the requirements of a society 
characterised by reasonable pluralism – a pluralism of ethical, philosophical, and religious 
world views whose adherents on the one hand are interested in cooperation with each other 
but who on the other hand have diverging conceptions of what makes a good life and what 
moral standpoints are to be taken as true (and for which reasons). As Rawls himself notes, 
the way he presents his conception of Justice as Fairness in his earlier works, most 
famously in A Theory of Justice, assumes that citizens endorse this conception because 
they think of it as true or right by its own virtue. This will not be the case in a pluralistic 
society, and without citizens endorsing the conceptions that defines their basic political 
structures, the pressing question arises: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a 
stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though 
incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”21 
The answer to this question is a “political” conception of justice, “a moral conception 
worked out for a specific kind of subject, namely, for political, social, and economic 
institutions.”22 This political conception of justice needs to be “freestanding”, “a module, 
                                                 
20 Although not exclusively by him, one might say. Similar ideas to those that Rawls develops can be found 
in works by Bruce Ackermann (Ackerman 1980) and Thomas Nagel (Nagel 1987), and some of the ideas 
presented in Political Liberalism find their echo in writings of, e.g., Kenneth Strike (Strike 1994) and 
Charles Larmore (Larmore 1990), which themselves are based on Rawls' earlier articles. 
21 Rawls 1993, p. xviii. 
22 Rawls 1993, p. 11. 
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an essential constituent part that fits into and can be supported by”23 the various reasonable 
world views that citizens in a pluralistic society hold. 
It is important to bear in mind that the “well-ordered” society populated by reasonable 
citizens” is itself an abstraction. It is what Rawls sees as a necessary intermediate step from 
his famous thought experiment of the original position, in which highly abstracted parties 
determine the principles of justice,24 to the acceptance of those principles by concrete 
people. The model of the well-ordered society aims to show whether and how the 
conception of justice from the original position can be accepted by moderately idealised 
citizens in a pluralistic society. Unlike the parties in the original position, they are much 
closer to representing actual persons, including their commitments to different world views 
with different sets of ethical values. The main difference to actual citizens is that these 
moderately idealised citizens will be a bit more reasonable than their real-life counterparts 
(where “reasonable” for Rawls is a complex conception that I will describe in more detail 
below). This is a necessary second step in the process of justifying a conception of justice 
that provides for the structures of basic political institutions: if it can be shown that the 
principles of justice that can be derived from the original position are acceptable to the 
idealised citizens of the well-ordered society, then they are finally justified to “you and me 
who are elaborating Justice as Fairness and examining it as a political conception of 
justice.”25 
The mechanisms that Rawls envisions in order to make this political conception of justice 
work in the well-ordered society are complex. I will introduce its central parts and their 
functions here, as all of them will have an influence on a political liberal theory of 
education. 
                                                 
23 Rawls 1993, p. 12. 
24 See Rawls 1971, pp. 11-17. 
25 Rawls 1993, p. 28. 
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2.1.1 Comprehensive Doctrines 
Rawls calls it the “fact of pluralism”26 that citizens of modern societies will adhere to a 
diversity of comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral world views, all of which 
are often simply referred to as “comprehensive doctrines.” Central to any comprehensive 
doctrine is that “it covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human 
life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner”, “it organizes and characterizes 
recognized values so that they are compatible with one another and express an intelligible 
view of the world”, and it is “singling out which values to count as especially 
significant.”27 
Paradigmatic examples for comprehensive doctrines are religions. However, they include 
other metaphysical doctrines as well, such as utilitarianism or forms of classical liberalism 
as they have been promoted by Kant or Mill. Aside from these examples given by Rawls 
himself throughout Political Liberalism, we can also classify certain secularist views as 
comprehensive.28 Such doctrines will emphasise an atheist, scientifically oriented 
perspective on life and see religion as mere superstition or even as dangerous to 
humanity.29 
The fact that citizens in a pluralistic society will sustain a variety of different 
comprehensive doctrines which emphasise different values, some of which will likely 
disagree with each other, leads to problems for social and political stability, as Rawls 
observes. 
2.1.2 The Challenge of Stability 
In light of a pluralism of comprehensive doctrines, Rawls claims that the following three 
facts should make us concerned about the stability of such a pluralistic society: 
                                                 
26 Rawls 1993, p. xxv. 
27 Rawls 1993, p. 59. 
28 See, e.g., Laborde 2013, in particular p. 74 for a distinction between secular and secularist views. 
29 Take, e.g., Richard Dawkins as a contemporary example for a popular comprehensive secularist. 
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1. “The diversity of reasonable comprehensive religious, philosophical, and moral 
doctrines found in modern democratic societies [...] is a permanent feature of the 
public culture of democracy.”30 
2. “[A] continuing shared understanding of one comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral doctrine can be maintained only by the oppressive use of 
state power.”31 
3. “[A]n enduring and secure democratic regime, one not divided into contending 
doctrinal confessions and hostile social classes, must be willingly and freely 
supported by at least a substantial majority of its politically active citizens.”32 
From these premises Rawls concludes that a liberal democratic society must be centred 
around a political conception of justice which cannot be derived from the values or truths 
of a single comprehensive doctrine. The reason for this is that there will be reasonable 
disagreement about those values, and at least some values of one particular doctrine will 
likely not be acceptable from the perspective of another comprehensive doctrine. It is 
therefore important that a shared conception of justice can be affirmed from the various 
perspectives these doctrines hold. Only if a shared conception of justice can be accepted on 
moral grounds shared by all reasonable comprehensive doctrines, there can be continuous 
social stability. 
Of course, persons can cooperate without endorsing a political conception of justice. They 
can do so for prudential reasons alone, the result of which will be some sort of “mere 
modus vivendi” arrangement in which people tolerate each other because of the advantages 
this social constellation has for them. But as these kinds of arrangements are only based on 
self- or group-interests, Rawls thinks that they are not reliable enough in terms of stability, 
“as [their] stability is contingent on circumstances remaining such as not to upset the 
                                                 
30 Rawls 1993, p. 36. 
31 Rawls 1993, p. 37. 
32 Rawls 1993, p. 38. 
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fortunate convergence of interests.”33 Therefore it is important for political liberalism to 
reach stability for the right reasons, which will lead to something that Rawls calls the 
“overlapping consensus.” 
2.1.3 Overlapping Consensus 
“[W]e suppose a constitutional democratic regime to be reasonably just and workable, and 
worth defending. Yet given the fact of reasonable pluralism, how can we frame our defense 
of it so that it can win sufficiently wide support to achieve stability?”34 Rawls’ answer to 
this question is a consensus on a political conception of justice. This conception of justice 
is (despite the label “political”) a moral one, as it includes a range of values such as “the 
values of equal political and civil liberty; fair equality of opportunity; the values of 
economic reciprocity; the social bases of mutual respect between citizens”, as well as the 
values of public reason, the latter of which will be explained in more detail further down.35 
The principles and values at the focus of this consensus are not rooted in one particular 
comprehensive doctrine but can be affirmed from the perspective of all doctrines that are 
considered reasonable (I will explain in the next section what it means to be reasonable in 
Rawls’ terms). Hence, the Rawlsian term for this shared affirmation is “overlapping 
consensus,” as the content of the consensus will be an intersection of the value sets of 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Establishing the overlapping consensus will 
contribute to political stability, as the conception of justice that is its object, is a moral 
conception, and it is affirmed on moral grounds: “[a]ll those, who affirm the political 
conception start from within their own comprehensive view and draw on the religious, 
philosophical, and moral grounds it provides.”36 This moral endorsement of the political 
conception of justice and the values and procedures connected to it lead to stability for the 
                                                 
33 Rawls 1993, p. 147. It can be questioned whether modus vivendi arrangements are really that unstable (see, 
e g., Gray 2000, Horton 2011, Wendt 2016). For now, I will assume that Rawls’ worries about the 
instability of modus vivendi arrangements are plausible. 
34 Rawls 1993, p. 49. 
35 Rawls 1993, p. 139. 
36 Rawls 1993. p. 147. 
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right reasons, without the risk of losing it as soon as the balance of political power and 
influence changes. Citizens who participate in the overlapping consensus will, so Rawls’ 
conviction, not abandon the principles of justice and re-negotiate the terms of social 
cooperation in case they find themselves in a better bargaining position one day. 
As mentioned above, one of the conditions of participation in the overlapping consensus is 
that citizens, and the comprehensive doctrines from which citizens draw their reasons to 
participate, are reasonable. The reasonable is a rather complex concept for Rawls and plays 
an important role in determining to whom justification for political coercion is owed. I will 
therefore give a more detailed description what it means to be reasonable in the following 
section. 
2.1.4 The Reasonable 
A central term in political liberalism is “reasonable,” used in many different contexts to 
refer to various things.37 The most important applications of it are in regard to persons and 
in regard to comprehensive doctrines. In these two cases the term is used in slightly 
different ways. 
The shortest Rawlsian definition of what qualifies a person as reasonable that can probably 
be found says that being reasonable is associated “with the willingness to propose and 
honor fair terms of cooperation [and] with the willingness to recognize the burdens of 
judgment and to accept their consequences.”38 This definition can be split into two parts, of 
which the first is a moral (partial) definition and the second an epistemic one. 
Honouring fair terms of cooperation means that citizens are not merely motivated by their 
own, self-directed interests to cooperate with their compatriots but also by the 
acknowledgement of cooperation as the mechanism which advances those interests. They 
“desire for its own sake a world in which they […] can cooperate with others on terms all 
                                                 
37 For what seems an exhaustive list of the various uses of the term “reasonable” in Political Liberalism see 
Wenar 1995. 
38 Rawls 1993, pp. 48f, n. 1. 
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can accept.”39 Still, they are no altruists and “not moved by the general good as such.”40 
The interests of the idealised citizens in a well-ordered society to engage in fair 
cooperation seems to be a moral motivation of medium strength, so to speak. 
The epistemic part of this definition refers to what Rawls calls “the burdens of judgement,” 
a set of considerations about the sources of disagreement. The burdens of judgement 
include considerations of conflicting and hard to assess evidence, different weighting of 
evidence in persons’ individual evidential sets, the vagueness of (some) concepts, 
perceptual and psychological biases, diverging normative considerations regarding 
particular states of affairs, and the potential incommensurability of values.41 If 
disagreement in society originates from one or more of these sources, reasonable citizens 
need to tolerate it, as there is no rational way to end this kind of disagreement. Recognising 
and accepting these limitations “leads to a form of toleration and supports the idea of 
public reason,”42 which I will say more about in the next sub-section. 
The second way in which “reasonable” is used is as a potential property of comprehensive 
doctrines. This is important in so far as only reasonable comprehensive doctrines can 
partake in the overlapping consensus. Therefore, it will be good to know how to identify 
them. Although Rawls assumes “that reasonable persons only affirm reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines,”43 this alone is not sufficient description of what makes a 
doctrine reasonable. Beyond the affirmation by reasonable persons, reasonable doctrines 
are characterised by three main features: 
• It “is an exercise of theoretical reason: it covers the major religious, philosophical, 
and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner.” 
                                                 
39 Rawls 1993, p. 50. 
40 Rawls 1993, p. 50. 
41 Rawls 1993, pp. 56f. 
42 Rawls 1993, p. 59. 
43 Rawls 1993, p. 59. 
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• “It organizes and characterizes recognized values so that they are compatible with 
one another and express an intelligible view of the world.” 
• It “belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition of thought and doctrine [but a]lthough 
stable over time […] it tends to evolve slowly in the light of what, from its point of 
view, it sees as good and sufficient reasons.”44 
In contrast to the moral notion that is included in the Rawlsian concept of a reasonable 
person, the concept of the reasonable applied to comprehensive doctrines includes the 
notions of consistency and coherence, as expressed in the first two parts of the 
characterisation. It is useful to keep the difference between these two applications of the 
concept of the reasonable in mind, because some of the problems I will describe later are 
rooted here. For now, let us focus again on reasonable persons and how their acceptance of 
the burdens of judgement pave the way to public reason. 
2.1.5 Public Reason 
The way a democratic political society ideally should make plans and decisions, as well as 
order its values, is by its reason, as Rawls writes, which “is an intellectual and moral 
power, rooted in the capacities of its human members.”45 Rawls calls it public reason, as he 
claims that this kind of political deliberation is “public in three ways:” it is the reason of 
persons in their role as citizens, it is concerned with the public good on “matters of funda-
mental justice” and “its nature and content is public, being given by the ideals and 
principles expressed by society's conception of political justice, and conducted open to 
view on that basis.”46 
Why public reason? The answer is that the exercise of political power results in coercion, 
usually by limiting the freedom of persons. If one of the basic intuitions that political 
                                                 
44 Rawls 1993, p. 59. 
45 Rawls 1993, pp. 212f. 
46 Rawls 1993, p. 213. 
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liberalism appeals to is that citizens are free and equal, political coercion needs to be 
justified to them. Rawls expresses this in his principle of liberal legitimacy: 
[O]ur exercise of political power if fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance 
with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be 
expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human 
reason.47 
In order for political coercion to be legitimate, it must be justifiable to citizens who are 
affected by it.48 
For Rawls, as clearly stated in the quoted passage, justification needs to be given for what 
he calls “constitutional essentials” and “questions of basic justice,”49 but not for a wide 
range of other political questions that are less fundamental. Although he does not go into 
more detail, Rawls suggests that there might be a difference between political questions 
that concern fundamental matters and those that do not. At the same time, he admits that 
his aim is “to consider first the strongest case” of coercive political power, “[s]hould it 
hold there, we can then proceed to other cases.”50 Rawls remains vague regarding whether 
public reason is necessarily restricted to fundamental matters or whether this restriction is 
merely due to more pragmatic reasons. It seems at least possible to interpret public reasons 
in a way that allows its application to a broader range of political questions.51 I will return 
to this question about the scope of public reason in later chapters, as it will turn out to be 
important in the context of child raising and education. 
The justification for coercive political measures, however, must be of a certain kind. Rawls 
speaks of a moral duty, “the duty of civility,” which is imposed upon citizens by the 
principle of liberal legitimacy and requires of citizens 
                                                 
47 Rawls 1993, p. 137. 
48 Unless otherwise noted I will use the terms “legitimised” and “justified” synonymously and not distinguish 
between them in a sense in which, e.g., John Simmons does. See Simmons 1999. 
49 Rawls 1993, p. 214. 
50 Rawls 1993, p. 215. 
51 As does, e.g., Jonathan Quong, see Quong 2011, pp. 273-289. 
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to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions [i.e., such concerning 
constitutional essentials and the basic structure] how the principles and policies they 
advocate and vote for can be supported by the political values of public reason. This duty 
also involves a willingness to listen to others and a fairmindedness in deciding when 
accommodations to their views should reasonably be made.52 
Effectively, this means that justifications for supporting some coercive political measure 
can eventually only invoke values that are agreed upon by all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines in society as part of the overlapping consensus. Only for these values acceptance 
can be expected from reasonable citizens, and only political coercion justified on the 
grounds of these values will be endorsed for certain by reasonable citizens. Obviously, 
persons can have other reasons for supporting a particular political measure as well, but 
these are classified as “nonpublic reasons,” which have their place in the “background 
culture” of civil society. Many of them are social, as they are valid in all kinds of non-
political associations like churches or universities, therefore Rawls refrains from calling 
them “private” reasons.53 
When it comes to justification of state policies, the concept of the reasonable person 
defines the set of persons whose reasons must be considered when justifying state 
coercion. Only the reasons of reasonable persons have justificatory force in political 
deliberation. Furthermore, public reason liberals generally assume that the reasons of 
reasonable citizens against a particular implementation of coercive policies effectively 
block that policy.54 
It is worth mentioning that Rawls later modifies his account of public reason and 
introduces something called “the wide view of public political culture.”55 It allows for 
                                                 
52 Rawls 1993, p. 217. 
53 See Rawls 1993, p 220. 
54 The notion of defeater reasons does not occur in Rawls’ own writings and is, to my knowledge, introduced 
into public reason liberalism by Gerald Gaus (Gaus 2011, pp. 244-251), who adopts the idea from John 
Pollock (Pollock 1996). More about justificatory and defeater reasons and what this means for public 
justification of educational policies will be said in Chapter 6. 
55 Rawls 1999a, p. 152. 
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reasons originating from the values of reasonable comprehensive doctrines to be employed 
in political discourse, “provided that in due course proper political reasons […] are 
presented that are sufficient to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced 
are said to support.”56 Nevertheless, a restriction of political reasoning imposed by the duty 
of civility remains in place and I will return to it later in the context of education and 
religion.57 
This does not mean, though, that the standards of public reason apply to reasoning about 
political issues anywhere and anytime. Citizens are expected to meet the requirements of 
public reasons in specific contexts – when voting, because engaging in this act they 
“exercise their final and coercive political power over one another,”58 and also “when they 
engage in political advocacy in the public forum, and thus for members of political parties 
and for candidates in their campaigns and for other groups who support them.”59 The 
requirements of public reason also apply to official forums of legislation, i.e., “to 
legislators when they speak on the floor of parliament, and to the executive in its public 
acts and pronouncements.”60 When instances of the judiciary have to engage in review of 
legislative decisions, standards of public reason apply to those as well.61 In private 
contexts or social contexts belonging to the background culture, persons are free of the 
constraints set by public reason. 
2.1.6 Political, Comprehensive, and Perfectionist Theories 
Political liberalism aims toward neutrality in matters of substantive ethical world views. 
No moral values should be used to justify political structures and institutions unless it can 
be taken for granted that these values are indeed morally acceptable from all reasonable 
                                                 
56 Rawls 1999a, p. 152. 
57 See e. g. Eberle 2002, Vallier 2014. 
58 Rawls 1993, p. 215. 
59 Rawls 1993, p. 215. 
60 Rawls 1993, p. 216. 
61 See Rawls 1993, p. 216. 
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perspectives. In that case, they are part of the “political” morality of political liberalism. 
Political liberalism therefore does not qualify as another comprehensive doctrine (as 
characterised in 2.1.1) in contrast to forms of liberalism who do declare central intrinsic 
values as, e.g., autonomy.62 
The distinction between comprehensive and political liberalism is not the only distinction 
that matters in this context, though. Another distinction that is relevant in the context of 
political liberal education is the one between perfectionism and anti-perfectionism. For a 
perfectionist kind of liberal theory, it is permissible to promote or to discourage a range of 
ways of life due to some assumed intrinsic values or other metaphysical claims, while an 
anti-perfectionist liberal theory would regard such strategies as impermissible.63 
Unquestionable political liberalism is not intended to be a comprehensive form of 
liberalism, but whether the same is true in regard to perfectionism is still open for 
discussion. Jonathan Quong argues that political liberalism is anti-perfectionist,64 while 
others like, e.g., Steven Wall think that political liberalism leaves room for perfectionist 
justificatory reasons.65 To my knowledge, no conclusive argument has been made in regard 
which of these two positions is the more plausible. Whether we accept Quong’s position or 
Wall’s, though, will make a difference in the range of educational policies that would be 
permissible in a well-ordered society, and a difference in their justification (something 
which will be discussed in more depth in Chapter 3). 
                                                 
62 At least from the point of view of most political liberals. Criticism of this claim of neutrality comes, e.g., 
from Gerald Gaus, who argues that political liberalism of a Rawlsian kind remains another sectarian 
liberal doctrine (and therefore no different from comprehensive liberal theories), see Gaus 2012. 
63 I follow the distinction of comprehensiveness and perfectionism used by Jonathan Quong here, see Quong 
2011, pp. 15-21. 
64 See Quong 2011, pp. 15-21. 
65 See Wall 2013. I will discuss Wall’s argument in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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2.1.7 Conclusion 
So far, I have given a summary of what I take to be the key concepts of political liberalism. 
They will be referred to repeatedly in the following discussion about the role of education 
in Rawls’ political theory and I will argue that some of them create problems in educational 
contexts that are worth examining further. 
2.2 Education in Rawls’ Work 
Before starting the discussion about how the core concepts of political liberalism relate to 
education, we need to a look at what Rawls himself wrote about education. Ideally, this 
could provide us at least with a lead about how a complex matter like education fits best 
into his philosophical framework and what kind of approach to education Rawls himself 
would have favoured or avoided. In fact, though, very little is written about education in 
Rawls’ corpus of work, and even less of it seems relevant for this project. What follows is a 
collection of, to my knowledge, all references to education that can be found in Rawls’ 
major writings. It turns out that wherever education is mentioned in his papers and articles, 
the same claims and arguments have been repeated in his major works. For the sake of 
completeness, in these cases references to earlier occurrences will be given together with 
the main references. 
2.2.1 A Theory of Justice 
In A Theory of Justice education is explicitly mentioned mainly in the context of 
distributional justice. It is used as an example of the application of the difference principle. 
(In a nutshell, the difference principle tells us that an unequal distribution of goods and 
welfare in a society is just as long as the position of the least well-off member of this 
society would not be better under a different pattern of distribution.) A just educational 
policy has, according to Rawls, not to aim at equalising the various possible disadvantages 
of citizens completely but at improving “the long-term expectation of the least favored.”66 
Regarding the fairness of the distribution of resources of education, the criterion of 
allocation should not only be the expected return of a person's productivity but also the 
                                                 
66 Rawls 1971, p. 101. 
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amount of enrichment for those whom it will not turn into highly productive individuals. 
This will increase those person's sense of their own worth, which for Rawls is an important 
primary good and needs to be factored into any just distributive scheme for educational 
resources.67 
The only explicit mention of education not in the context of resources but rather 
mentioning education as an institution can be found in a short discussion of paternalism in 
a liberal society: 
Paternalistic principles are a protection against our own irrationality, and must not be 
interpreted to license assaults on one's convictions and character by any means so long as 
these offer the prospect of securing consent later on. More generally, methods of education 
must likewise honor these constraints.68 
This can be read as the normative claim that schools (where “methods of education” 
supposedly are applied) have to adhere to some liberal principle of respecting the 
autonomy of children, as far as applicable.69 It is not clear from this short passage whether 
the underlying value for this normative constraint would be political in the sense it is used 
in the yet-to-come Political Liberalism or whether it is used as a more comprehensive 
ethical notion here. But even if it is intended in the latter way at the time of writing, one 
could try to make a similar argument based solely on political values. 
Another question concerning this passage which turns up in light of later publications is 
whether honouring one’s convictions and character also includes methods of education in 
familial settings. When the late Rawls states that the family counts as part of the basic 
structure of society (see the section about The Idea of Public Reason Revisited below), one 
can be tempted to argue that that constraints of political liberalism indeed apply to the 
family as well. 
                                                 
67 See Rawls 1971, p. 107. The same argument can also be found earlier in Rawls 1968, p. 166. 
68 Rawls 1971, p. 250. 
69 It seems obvious that children, depending on their age, cannot be treated as fully autonomous agents, but 
that they develop autonomy gradually. Also, children might be considered autonomous regarding some 
limited areas of their life earlier than regarding others.  See e. g. Archard 1993, Ch. 5 and 6. 
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Finally, as an institution of education, schools are mentioned as one kind of association in 
which children develop their sense of morality of association, i.e., they learn that different 
roles in different social contexts have position-dependent moral standards. But the school 
is only one association of many in which children realise this stage of moral development 
(one of three according to Rawls’ moral psychology), next to, e.g., the family, the 
neighbourhood, and more temporary forms of cooperation like playing games with peers.70 
Later, in a more detailed discussion about the development of the sense of justice I will 
argue that the role of schools in the development of political virtues is quite an important 
one (see 2.2.3). 
2.2.2 Political Liberalism 
The idea that the resources of education ought to be distributed according to the difference 
principle also finds a short mention in Political Liberalism,71 where apart from that brief 
passage nothing more is said about education in relation to the basic institutions of society. 
The more interesting claim (from the perspective of the present thesis) Rawls makes about 
education can be found in the context of the question if political liberalism is unfair in its 
treatment of very reclusive comprehensive doctrines.72 Here he gives a brief account of 
minimal education, which does to some extent refer to the normative requirements a 
political liberal education would have to meet. 
This brief part can be considered the main source of conditions for political liberal 
education given by Rawls himself. If it were only for these, it would be only a very 
minimal set of normative criteria the education of citizens in a well-ordered society would 
                                                 
70 See Rawls 1971, pp. 467f. This account of moral development already appears in a less sophisticated 
version in Rawls 1963, pp. 102-105, where it is called “the generation of association guilt.” 
71 See Rawls 1993, p. 184. 
72 See Rawls 1993, pp. 199f. As with many elements found in Political Liberalism, Rawls developed this 
argument in an earlier article. The same account of minimal education an already be found in Rawls 1988, 
pp. 464f and in the lectures collected in Rawls 2001, pp. 156f. 
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have to meet. I will discuss this minimal account of education in one of the forthcoming 
sections (see 2.3). 
2.2.3 The Idea of Public Reason Revisited 
Although not as voluminous as the two titles listed before, this late essay contains some 
important clarifications and modifications of the concept of public reason presented in 
Political Liberalism. During his “final statement of political liberalism,”73 Rawls briefly 
discusses the relation between public education and religion. To show that public reason 
does not strictly determine the outcome of debates about political issues in advance, he 
refers to the debate between Patrick Henry and James Madison about the question whether 
school prayers should be established in public schools. I will examine this passage in more 
detail later to see how public reason can be applied to educational matters for Rawls (see 
2.7). 
Apart from this, Rawls emphasises fairly en passant the importance of education for public 
reason, one of political liberalism’s core elements (at this point in his career, he takes 
public reason to be a necessary part democratic deliberation in a well-ordered society): 
[W]ithout widespread education in the basic aspects of constitutional democratic 
government for all citizens, and without a public informed about pressing problems, 
crucial political and social decisions simply cannot be made. Even should farsighted 
political leaders wish to make sound changes and reforms, they cannot convince a 
misinformed and cynical public to accept and follow them.74 
Although the implications are not spelled out, in this short passage it becomes more than 
clear that in a political liberal society with its claim to justify political decisions to all 
reasonable citizens, education is a necessary condition to achieve this goal. 
                                                 
73 Freeman 2007, p. xxi. 
74 Rawls 1999a, pp. 139f. 
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2.2.4 Conclusion 
Rawls does not tell us explicitly that schools themselves are part of the basic structure of 
society, i.e., that they are institutions to the organisation of which the principles of justice 
and the restraints of public reason apply. The passages in his works that relate to 
educational matters indicate, though, that it is highly plausible to conceive of schools as 
part of the basic structure of society and therefore to ask how they fit into the justificatory 
model of political liberalism. 
2.3 Minimal Civic Education 
The most direct and explicit account of education that Rawls gives is a minimal one. As 
mentioned before, it appears in the context of the question whether a political conception 
of justice is unfair to people holding certain conceptions of the good and will struggle to 
maintain their ethical integrity in a just constitutional regime: 
[Political liberalism] will ask that children's education include such things as knowledge of 
their constitutional and civic rights so that, for example, they know that liberty of 
conscience exists in their society and that apostasy is not a legal crime, all this to insure 
that their continued membership when they come of age is not based simply on ignorance 
of their basic rights or fear of punishment for offenses that do not exist. Moreover, their 
education should also encourage them to be fully cooperating members of society and 
enable them to be self-supporting; it should also encourage the political virtues so that they 
want to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of 
society.75 
Rawls emphasises that in comparison with comprehensive liberalism, political liberalism 
does require less in terms of education. There is no requirement for a comprehensive (or 
“ethical,” in Rawls’ own terms) conception of autonomy which would presume that the 
active development of one’s capacities or individualist forms of life as inherently valuable, 
as it would be with Kantian or Millian forms of liberalism. In general, no values are 
supposed to be taught as part of a political liberal education which are not shared by all 
reasonable citizens.76 
                                                 
75 Rawls 1993, p. 199. 
76 Although Rawls restricts his examples to autonomy, it seems possible that a liberal state could promote 
different values, such as knowledge or certain aesthetic values (see, e.g., Sher 1997, esp. Ch. 9), or the 
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However, Rawls agrees that even this minimal education could lead in consequence to 
some people endorsing a more comprehensive liberal view, as “there is some resemblance 
between the values of political liberalism and the values of the comprehensive liberalisms 
of Kant and Mill.”77 The important difference is the justification that political liberalism 
provides: political values are supposed to be valid justificatory reasons for all reasonable 
people, not just those who share a comprehensive liberal conception of the good. 
The brief account of education quoted above has two distinct parts. The first one remains 
neutral regarding citizens' values because it is about the legal facts of constitutional and 
civic rights. The knowledge of these facts can be taught without the inculcation of any 
values and without any incentive to endorse any moral values that might be associated with 
these rights. 
The second part of the above statement is about normative educational requirements, as it 
includes values that are fundamental for political liberalism: 
• being a fully cooperating member of society 
• being self-supporting 
• having a particular set of political virtues 
These normative requirements can be understood as moral, or ethical, requirements in a 
broad sense. Nevertheless, from the perspective of political liberalism these are 
requirements of a political morality that is supported by all reasonable citizens, in contrast 
to what Rawls calls “comprehensive” or “ethical” moral requirements which are only 
supported by the normative world-view of a specific subset of all reasonable citizens. 
                                                                                                                                                    
development of human nature according to some particular definition (see e. g. Hurka 1993), or valuable 
forms of life (see e. g. Raz 1986). For an argument against the objection that comprehensive liberalism 
rules out ways of life that do not consider autonomy as valuable see e. g. Colburn 2008. A more detailed 
discussion of the status of autonomy will appear in one of the following chapters. 
77 Rawls 1993, p. 200. 
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To understand the full extension of the normative requirements of this “minimal” account, 
it is helpful to expand the normative content of those three items that originally have been 
so innocently summarised in one sentence. 
2.3.1 Cooperation 
When talking about cooperation in the context of political liberalism, we need to keep in 
mind that in Rawlsian theory society is assumed to be “a fair system of cooperation”, an 
idea that he takes “to be implicit in the public culture of a democratic society.”78 It is not 
cooperation for prudential reasons, as Rawls assumes it would be under a modus vivendi or 
under some kind of purely rational Hobbesian scheme where citizens cooperate because 
potential sanctions imposed by the state increase the opportunity costs of defection, 
thereby making it an unattractive choice. Instead, in the well-ordered society, cooperation 
is supported by moral considerations on the side of the participants. Three elements define 
this notion of cooperation more clearly: (a) it is guided by public, mutually accepted rules, 
(b) it involves an idea of fairness, and (c) it also takes into account each participant's 
personal motivations. Let us look at each of these elements more closely. 
(a) Cooperation is guided “by publicly recognized rules and procedures that those 
cooperating accept and regard as properly regulating their conduct.”79 Rawls remains 
vague on where and in which way the cooperating members of society gain their 
knowledge of these rules and procedures, and, perhaps more importantly, what makes them 
accept and regard them as adequate. He acknowledges indeed that 
if citizens of a well-ordered society are to recognize one another as free and equal, basic 
institutions must educate them to this conception of themselves, as well as publicly exhibit 
and encourage this ideal of political justice. This task of education belongs to what we 
may call the wide role of a political conception. In this role such a conception is part of the 
public political culture: its first principles are embodied in the institutions of the basic 
structure and appealed to in their interpretation. Acquaintance with and participation in 
that public culture is one way citizens learn to conceive of themselves as free and equal, a 
                                                 
78 Rawls 1993, p. 15. 
79 Rawls 1993, p. 16. 
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conception which, if left to their own reflections, they would most likely never form, much 
less accept and desire to realize.80 
Yet, Rawls does not specify how citizens get acquainted with their public culture, so we 
will have to fill the gaps left by this passage ourselves. One possible way doing so could be 
to assume that citizens just observe and learn by example, and that merely growing up and 
living under a political system functioning according to principles of justice is enough to 
make them proper citizens. To the extent that children learn to obey the law and follow 
social rules as a matter of practice, this is plausible, as long as their parents do it likewise. 
When it comes to understand the reasons why the political structure of a well-ordered 
society and its principles are justified and appropriate, though, I am sceptical whether this 
is knowledge that is sufficiently conveyed by most parents. 
Although Rawls idealises the citizens of a well-ordered society in regard to the degree that 
they act according to certain principles of social and political morality, he certainly does 
not assume them to be more idealised than their real-life counterparts when it comes to 
their ability to know about the world they live in. To keep the well-ordered society of his 
theory realistic enough to be of any justificatory value for applied politics, the rational 
capacities of idealised citizens will have to be modelled as bound by processing limits as 
those of their real-life counterparts. Like real-life citizens, idealised citizens will have to 
evaluate the properties of their society under a certain level of uncertainty that is 
determined by the costs of acquiring and processing it. 
This way of reading Rawls would also mean that something like the burdens of judgement 
(see 2.1.4) would apply to the knowledge about the appropriateness of rules of social 
cooperation in the same way as they would to various conceptions of the good, at least 
initially.81 It is not to say that it is absolutely impossible for citizens to realise “just like 
                                                 
80 Rawls 1999a, p. 56. This account of how society forms the ambitions and expectations of its citizens is 
repeated in in Rawls 1993, pp. 269f, but without the focus on the mutual recognition as free and equal 
citizens. I think the quote given here expresses more clearly than the later version that the basic structure 
does not only influence the realisation of talents and abilities of individuals (and thus needs to be shaped 
in regard to these aspects) but also that the basic structure has to provide persons with knowledge of the 
basic political concepts and procedures of their society. 
81 For a detailed critique of this kind see Gaus 1999. 
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that” the appropriateness of the social institutions they live under. It seems unlikely, 
though, that a majority of them will do so to an extent that makes them the kind of 
satisfactorily self-motivated cooperators they ought to be. It seems also unlikely that in a 
majority of cases parents would past this knowledge on to their children.82 Therefore, most 
citizens would need a more explicit introduction to the just political institutions they live 
under, and one way to familiarise them with basic political concepts and procedures would 
be in the context of school education. 
I think that in this regard, political liberal education should be understood being similar to 
the sort of democratic education proposed by Amy Gutmann, who claims that institutions 
of education are the means of reproducing citizens.83 This certainly is a thought that can be 
found in Political Liberalism as well: 
[T]he basic structure shapes the way the social system produces and reproduces over time 
a certain form of culture shared by persons with certain conceptions of their good.84 
It appears that already the first element characterising Rawls’ conception of cooperation, 
the recognitions of rules and procedures that matter for understanding and participating in 
the political system, must be learned by children who will become citizens.85 It would be 
too idealistic to assume that this happens as a side-effect of being part of a well-ordered 
society and a more plausible reading of Rawls would lead to the conclusion that 
                                                 
82 We can assume that children of well-educated parents with a genuine interest in politics might actually 
learn about the appropriateness of the political system and the justification of rules of cooperation in their 
society. It is likely, though, that this type of parents remains a minority, even in a well-ordered society. 
83 See Gutmann 1987. Gutmann’s account of democratic education differs insofar, as it has a tendency 
towards a more comprehensive (in Rawlsian terms) view on democratic values. Nevertheless, many of her 
considerations apply to a political liberal account of education as well. 
84 Rawls 1993, p. 269. The same thought, although in a slightly different context, can also be found on p. 18: 
“[S]ociety is [...] conceived as existing in perpetuity it produces and reproduces itself and its institutions 
and culture over generations and there is no time at which it is expected to wind up its affairs.” 
85 Certainly, there will be cases in which recognising the appropriate rules will have to be learned by adults as 
well, e.g., in the case of immigrants from sufficiently non-democratic societies. Unfortunately, the 
education of adults is beyond the scope of the present thesis, although special considerations of immigrant 
children will be addressed in Chapter 8. 
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fundamental knowledge about these matters can and should be imparted to future citizens 
in schools. Otherwise it is by no means certain that citizens will acquire a shared 
knowledge about the rules of cooperation, less so can they judge whether these are 
adequate. 
(b) Furthermore, “[c]ooperation involves the idea of fair terms of cooperation: these are 
terms that each participant may reasonably accept, provided that everyone else likewise 
accepts them.”86 The fair terms of cooperation are specified by the conception of political 
justice that structures society's institutions. Rawls develops his particular conception of 
justice – Justice as Fairness – in A Theory of Justice. It could, however, also be a different 
one, as he admitted in later writings.87 In any case, the chosen conception of justice 
(whichever it is) is one of the subjects of the overlapping consensus that all reasonable 
citizens agree upon. However, it does not seem necessary that children are required to learn 
every detail and every entailment of the prevailing conception of justice in school. It 
should be sufficient that they learn the basics of it already in private contexts, and that 
most will learn more details about why and how this conception of justice manifests itself 
in the political structure during formal education. The latter knowledge acquired in school 
supposedly forms the broader basis for children to become well-informed, politically 
participating citizens. 
(c) The third element is the requirement of “an idea of each participant's rational 
advantage, or good. This idea of good specifies what those who are engaged in cooperation 
[…] are trying to achieve, when the scheme is viewed from their own standpoint.”88 To 
engage successfully in cooperation, members of society will have to understand that their 
cooperation partners have their own motivating reason which might be different from their 
own but still of similar validity. While Rawls does not give much more details on this 
topic, I would like to go further and claim that to realise this understanding, they will also 
need to be able to make some good inferences about the nature of the motivating reasons of 
                                                 
86 Rawls 1993, p. 16. 
87 See Rawls 1999a, p. 142. 
88 Rawls 1993, p. 16. 
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their cooperating partners. Therefore, we should take a look at how these processes can be 
expected to work and what the psychological mechanisms involved would mean for the 
requirement above. 
The ability to infer the motives of others, the capacity to view a matter of fact from other 
perspectives than one's own is not learned at school in the first place. Human beings 
usually develop an ability to adopt other persons perspective in a very early stage of life.89 
It can be assumed that in everyday situations citizens will be able to get an idea of their 
fellow cooperators’ standpoint even without ever having visited a school – as long as they 
are sufficiently familiar with them, know their circumstances, and maybe can clarify things 
by directly communicating with them. In a modern mass society this is often not the case; 
citizens of a pluralistic society will every so often meet others with a very different cultural 
background, believing in a very different comprehensive doctrine. Many of them will 
never meet each other at all, still all of them are participating in the process of voting, 
supporting laws and policies, having political influence on each other. 
One way to enable at least some insight into the more remote perspectives of fellow 
citizens is education. This can happen in at least two ways: first by providing a pluralistic 
environment in which children will have contact with other children from cultural and 
social background other than their own. For some, this might be the first, or even the only, 
contact to people from different backgrounds than theirs.90 A second way would be to 
provide a curriculum that conveys perspectives of minorities and remote social groups as 
well as the unique problems they have faced or still face in society, e.g., in the context of 
literature lessons, but also by other pedagogical means.91 
                                                 
89 Children by the age of 18 months seem to be able to infer intended acts by adults already (see Meltzoff 
1995) and at the age of five children can adopt others' perspectives in order to refer to others' beliefs and 
desires (Atance et al. 2010). 
90 This is, e.g., what Harry Brighouse sees as an important part of schools' contribution to citizenship in a 
pluralist society, see Brighouse 2006, pp. 129f. 
91 See Nussbaum 1997 for a more extensive take of this argument. Even though Nussbaum discusses 
specifically the topic of higher education at universities, similar approaches (with adequate literature and 
other media) seem feasible in primary and secondary education. 
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In any case, the capacities for the kind of fair cooperation required by political liberalism 
can be facilitated by an appropriate kind of education. This is not to say that without it 
citizens would not be able to form these capacities, but in a society characterised by value 
pluralism and cultural diversity, education can be an important additional factor 
contributing to their development. 
2.3.2 Being Self-Supporting 
The claim that education should “enable [future citizens] to be self-supporting” is least 
well-explained in comparison with the rest of Rawls’ minimal account of civic education. 
In contrast to the previous two normative claims, there is neither another place in Rawls’ 
Political Liberalism, nor elsewhere in his work (as far as I am aware), that provides more 
information about the notion of self-support. This could be problematic, because the 
original aim of this minimalistic approach to education for Rawls is to argue that political 
liberalism differs from comprehensive liberalism. Leaving the concept of being self-
supporting wide open for a range of interpretations seems to weaken the strength of the 
claim that political liberalism is different in this regard. Critics might suspect that 
comprehensive values like autonomy and individuality are lurking behind the concept of 
self-support. 
If political liberalism wants to avoid wandering off into comprehensive terrain, the notion 
of self-support involved here can only be a very shallow one. We can acknowledge that 
part of being a cooperating member of a modern democratic society is to be able to pay for 
one’s own expenses and find one's way through the administrative structures of daily life 
(to a certain degree at least) by oneself. Average citizens can be supposed to pay their own 
rent (or afford other modes of housing), to be able to open a bank account by themselves, 
to file their taxes (or find accountants to do this for them) and to register for voting, to 
name just a few challenges of modern life. I believe we can safely assume that these and 
other rather mundane tasks that will be part of a citizens’ role in the cooperation with other 
citizens will have to be mastered if that citizen should count as self-supporting. At least 
partially these skills of self-support will be based on children's school education. In 
addition to this I assume basic literacy, numeracy etc. to be essential for being self-
supporting in a modern society, as they are necessary to ensure minimal employability. 
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To demand of citizens to be self-supporting in this sense is, I think, innocuous when 
viewed from the perspective of political liberalism.92 It is a mainly pragmatic concept of 
self-support that does not promote any values that are not part of the overlapping 
consensus, and as such acceptable from the perspective of all reasonable doctrines.93 Even 
in the case of, e.g., learning about ways of political participation (at least in the form of 
voting, perhaps also in the form of getting involved in political parties) the only values 
involved are political, as ideas of citizens as free and equal, with equal opportunities to 
participate in politics and to run for offices, is supposed to be shared by all reasonable 
citizens. Any comprehensive doctrine would have to be considered unreasonable that 
insists that even this pragmatic version of being self-supporting constitutes an unfair 
interference with its values. 
Furthermore, persons refusing to acquire those minimal capacities for self-support would 
stunt their capacity for fair cooperation and contribution for a fair share to the social 
product. These persons could be causing an unjust distribution of resources, as they would 
require support from society that would otherwise not be needed. A minimum of self-
supporting skills seems to be a requirement of distributive justice. 
The question remains to what degree these self-supporting capabilities are required, and at 
which point this would unfairly discriminate against, e.g., religious doctrines that perceive 
this kind of education as endangering for their way of living or opposing their fundamental 
believes about what is right. The court cases Wisconsin v. Yoder and Mozert v. Hawkins are 
often cited examples here, both of which I will briefly summarise as they will be referred 
to repeatedly throughout the rest of the thesis. 
                                                 
92 That is, as long as we accept the current structure of a given society as just. Citizens who do not accept 
their political system could object that teaching everyday skills of self-support is nothing more than unjust 
indoctrination. Yet, as the well-ordered society of our model is considered just, these citizens would have 
to be classified as unreasonable for Rawls. 
93 One might argue that this presumes a capitalist society with a market for labour and is therefore already no 
longer neutral towards various forms of social organisation. While true, I do not think that the ambitions of 
political liberalism are to be neutral about various forms of social organisation. Indeed, the conceptions of 
justice as fairness with its famous difference principle presumes a form of market-based social 
organisation. While presumably not as focused on free markets as, e.g., classical liberalism, political 
liberalism remains a market-oriented form of liberalism, although with a strong ‘socialist’ flavour. 
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The decision of Wisconsin v. Yoder established (for the United States) that members of the 
Old Order Amish could rightfully withdraw their children from public schooling after they 
completed the eighth grade. This means that their children can finish school after the eights 
grade, between the age of 14 and 15, while the law of the state of Wisconsin required 
compulsory schooling until the age of 16. Staying in the public education system after 
completing the eighth grade would mean for Amish children to attend high school, which 
the Old Order Amish perceives as problematic. The high school curriculum with its 
increased focus on competition and intellectual accomplishments becomes less compatible 
with Amish religious values of leading a simple life characterised to a large extent by 
physical labour. In addition, this would interfere with a stage in Amish children’s lives 
where they are introduced into the daily routines of their community by an informal 
learning process of “learning through doing.”  Taking into consideration expert testimony 
that public high schools indeed cannot impart values promoted by the Amish world view, 
and that enforcing compulsory school attendance until the age of 16 would interfere with 
children’s integration into the Amish community, the U.S. Supreme Court decided that an 
exemption was justified in this case.94 
In the case of Mozert v. Hawkins, conservative Christian parents objected to the use of an 
English textbook that was mandated by the Hawkins County, Tennessee, school board. The 
objection was based on the fact that the textbook covered a diversity of world views and 
included content which contradicted their religious belief. Furthermore, it encouraged their 
children to make critical judgement in cases where the Bible was supposed to provide 
definite guidelines. After their request to opt out their children from the classes using the 
textbook and substituting a different textbook for reading exercises was declined by the 
school board, the parents sued against this decision. While the responsible District Court 
decided in favour of the parents,95 the decision was later overturned by a United States 
Appeals Court,96 not permitting an opt out for children from parts of the curriculum that 
parents perceived as incompatible with their religious beliefs. 
                                                 
94 See U.S. Supreme Court. 
95 See U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Tennessee. 
96 See United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.  
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In the debate about the relation between liberal democratic education and religious 
communities, these two cases are often used to illustrate the application of important basic 
values like toleration, freedom, autonomy, respect, or the unfortunate ignorance thereof.97 
In this regard the present thesis is no exception, and I will refer to these cases in the 
following chapters when appropriate. 
2.3.3 Political Virtues 
Although not giving a unified and definitive list anywhere, throughout his work Rawls 
provides us with an idea of what political virtues are: they “characterize the ideal of a good 
citizen of a democratic state.”98 The political virtues mentioned in particular are a sense of 
justice,99 “toleration, mutual respect, a sense of fairness and civility,”100 “a spirit of 
compromise and a readiness to meet others halfway,”101 “reasonableness and 
fairmindedness as shown in abiding by the criteria and procedures of commonsense 
knowledge and accepting the methods and conclusions of science when not 
controversial.”102  They are relevant for social cooperation because they “underwrite the 
willingness if not the desire to cooperate with others on terms that all can publicly accept 
as fair on a footing of equality and mutual respect.”103 
The talk of virtues and their specification highlight a substantial moral aspect of political 
liberalism. Citizens of a liberal democratic society ought to acquire these virtues at some 
point in their lives, and the two main resources from which they learn their political virtues 
                                                 
97 For academic discussion see, e.g., Michael 1987, Breyer 1991, Burtt 1994, Gutmann 1995, Macedo 1995, 
Arneson, Shapiro 1996, Burtt 1996, Eisgruber 2002, Gutmann 2002, Reich 2002, Tomasi 2002, Vojak 
2003, Ramsay 2007, DeGroff 2009, Kessel 2015, to name just a few. 
98 Rawls 1993, pp. 195f. 
99 See Rawls 1993, p. 402. 
100 Rawls 1993, p. 122. 
101 Rawls 1993, p. 163. 
102 Rawls 1993, p. 139. 
103 Rawls 2001, p.116. 
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are the family104 and the institutions of education. The main reason for Rawls to regard 
these virtues as necessary is the issue of stability, and one part of the content of the 
overlapping consensus contributing to stability is “an account of the political virtues 
through which [the principles of that conception] are embodied in human character and 
expressed in public life.”105 
One political virtue that has been Rawls’ focus very early and ever since is the sense of 
justice that motivates persons to interact with others in fair cooperation. I will give a quick 
summary of how he thinks people develop their sense of justice to show the possible ways 
of how education can be involved here. 
2.4 The Development of a Political Virtue: The Sense of Justice 
The sense of justice has been central to Rawls’ work before it became only one among 
several political virtues in Political Liberalism. How citizens develop a proper sense of 
justice is therefore a recurring topic throughout his writings.106 Due to the repeated 
description of this process and its status as political virtue, it is worth determining the kind 
of moral learning that is involved in acquiring a sense of justice. This includes looking at 
what role school education has in this process and whether the same observations hold for 
other political virtues as well. 
A summary of the development of a sense of justice can be found in Section 75 of A 
Theory of Justice. Here Rawls give a list of three “psychological laws:” 
First law: given that family institutions are just, and that the parents love the child and 
manifestly express their love by caring for his good, then the child, recognizing their 
evident love of him, come to love them. 
Second Law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by 
acquiring attachments in accordance with the first law, and given that a social arrangement 
is just and publicly known by all to be just, then this person develops ties of friendly 
                                                 
104 See Rawls 2001, p. 157. 
105 Rawls 1993, p. 147. 
106 Starting with Rawls 1963 and being discussed in more length in Rawls 1971. 
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feeling and trust toward others in the association as they with evident intention comply 
with their duties and obligations, and live up to the ideals of their station. 
Third law: given that a person's capacity for fellow feeling has been realized by his 
forming attachments in accordance with the first two laws, and given that a society's 
institutions are just and are publicly known by all to be just, then this person acquires the 
corresponding sense of justice as he recognizes that he and those for whom he cares are 
the beneficiaries of these arrangements.107 
Whether these “laws” are supposed to be descriptive accounts of human psychology or 
whether Rawls intends them to be normative claims remains undefined. In early versions 
of this account, they are “the stages of a development […] by which the sense of justice 
might arise from our primitive natural attitudes,” although Rawls does “not claim that it 
represents what actually takes place.”108 Later, he seems to be content that, even if his 
account does not include all psychological details and sketches “at best only the main 
outlines,” it aims “to be true and in accordance with existing knowledge.”109 
Be it as it may, central to Rawls’ theory is the claim that the sense of justice is one of the 
basic moral capacities of citizens. This capacity needs some sort of plausible model to 
explain how and why persons would be motivated to act in accordance with just social 
institutions. Therefore, the three psychological laws or a similar explanation of the moral 
psychology of people is a necessary and important part of Rawlsian political philosophy. 
They can also tell us something about the role of moral education in a just society. 
In the first law, we find reference to family institutions which have to be just, and indeed 
Rawls later identifies the family as part of the basic structure of society.110 Because “one of 
[the family's] main roles is to be the basis of the orderly production and reproduction of 
society and culture from one generation to the next,”111  the conception of justice applies to 
                                                 
107 Rawls 1971, pp. 490f. 
108 Rawls 1963, p. 100. 
109 Rawls 1971, p. 462. The three laws are inspired by the work of Jean Piaget about the moral development 
of children, as Rawls writes in Rawls 1963, p.100, n 5. 
110 See Rawls 1999a, §5. 
111 Rawls 1999a, p. 157. 
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the family in the same way as to other institutions of the basic structure. The sense of 
justice, and likely other political virtues too, is at least in part something that is fostered by 
the institution of the family in a well-ordered society. The family does not remain the only 
social environment for the moral education of citizens, though. 
According to the second law, the next stage of moral development takes place in a variety 
of environments at the same time. An early definition characterises this stage as “a joint 
activity [that satisfies the principles of justice] – perhaps some scheme of economic 
cooperation – [where] the participants are bound by ties of friendship and mutual trust, and 
rely on one another to do their part.”112 Later Rawls uses the term “social arrangement” 
(see the quote about the three laws from A Theory of Justice above) to leave room for a 
variety of social environments in which a person interacts with others: this may include 
still the family itself, but also the school, the neighbourhood, cases of short-term 
cooperation such as games with peers. At this stage, the child has different roles in these 
different kinds of associations and learns that different virtues are related to each.113 
Schools are another of many places which offer occasion for the kind of moral 
development mentioned in the context of the second law, yet they can have significant 
impact. At school, children are often confronted with an environment that is more diverse 
and varied than the one they usually experience. Schools differ in important ways from 
other moral learning environments like their own family or the neighbourhood, which 
might be more homogeneous in terms of race, income, and culture. They can provide an 
opportunity to develop the children's sense of justice to include people from different 
backgrounds than their own, whose beliefs and motivations differ significantly from 
familiar ones. Insofar the role of institutional education can be emphasised when 
stimulating moral learning of this second stage.114 
                                                 
112 Rawls 1963, p. 103. 
113 See Rawls 1971, pp. 467f. 
114 Contingently so, of course. Schools can be homogeneous too, even more so when they are private schools 
that are attended primarily by children from the same social, cultural, or religious background. In this case, 
of course, they do not differ significantly from the other forms of association that foster the development 
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The third law finally deals with society's institutions and the sense of justice that character-
ises citizens of the well-ordered Rawlsian society, and schools might have a special role 
here again. The fact that society's institutions are just needs to be publicly known, and part 
of this knowledge includes at least some basic information about their workings. It does 
not suffice to only plainly tell adolescents who are growing into citizenship that their 
constitution, their supreme court, and other institutions of their political system are just and 
leave it at that. To have good reasons to hold these believes about their society, they will 
have to learn at least to a certain degree how these institutions work, which procedures are 
involved, and why they are considered just. Certainly, schools do not have to be the only 
place where this knowledge is conveyed, but for most people they are the first (and in 
many cases probably the only) source of knowledge about these things. Schools are not 
only just social arrangements in which fellow feelings can develop, but also crucial for the 
development of a sense of justice insofar this involves knowledge about the political 
institutions they live under. 
In this brief discussion of the acquisition of a sense of justice, and by generalisation, of 
political virtues in general, it should have become clear that schools are important social 
institutions when it comes to the political moral education of citizens. Schools are therefore 
part of the basic structure of a well-ordered society, and their role for political society must 
be something that all reasonable citizens agree on (at least to a sufficient degree) as part of 
the overlapping consensus. However, apart from instilling political virtues there will be 
other content of political morality that reasonable citizens agree on and that needs to be 
addressed by schools in one way or other. 
2.5 Remaining Content of the Overlapping Consensus 
Political virtues are not the only aspect of political morality that needs to be part of 
political liberal education. The overlapping consensus has other normative elements as 
well which need to be taught to children in order to shape them into liberal democratic 
                                                                                                                                                    
of the sense of justice. This does not mean that private schools are necessarily impermissible in a well-
ordered society, although they might be impermissible under certain social conditions, as I argue in 
Chapter 6. 
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citizens.115 Next to political virtues, the relevant normative content of the overlapping 
consensus consists in the principles of justice, which define the basic political structure of 
society, and the idea of public justification, including normative concepts like the principle 
of liberal legitimacy and the duty of civility. 
2.5.1 The Conception of Justice 
In which way the constitution, political institutions, and the political procedures of a 
society are designed is a matter of justice, therefore a common conception of justice is 
required to outline this basic structure. However, under the circumstance of pluralism only 
“a political conception of justice that can gain the support of an overlapping consensus”116 
will lead to a stable basic structure that can be legitimised to all citizens, regardless of the 
comprehensive doctrine they follow. And although a pro tanto justification of a conception 
of justice (which is supposedly acceptable to all rational persons) is given in the thought-
experiment of the original position under conditions of high abstraction, a final 
justification of a conception of justice as political can only be achieved if that conception 
would be accepted by reasonable citizens of a well-ordered society as a part of the 
overlapping consensus.117 
Throughout his work Rawls assumes his own conception of justice, Justice as Fairness, to 
be the one that the overlapping consensus agreed upon, but this must not be necessarily so. 
Instead, it could be one out of “a family of conceptions of justice […]. For instance, 
                                                 
115 Although I am focussing on children's education here, the same is to some extent true to every “new” 
member of society. Migrants with different socio-political backgrounds would most likely have to learn 
many of the things discussed in this chapter as well, provided we imagine the well-ordered society not as 
closed as Rawls did. 
116 Rawls 1993, p. 15. My emphasis. 
117 Justification in this way is considered final by political liberals who agree with Rawls’ idea that this 
procedure indeed justifies political coercion and results in normative obligations for real people. Whether 
justification can be achieved in this way is a matter of ongoing discussion and cannot be sufficiently 
covered here. For the time being, I assume that justification can be achieved in this manner and would like 
to ask readers who think differently to kindly suspend their disbelief for the length of the thesis. 
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political liberalism also admits Habermas's discourse conception of legitimacy […], as 
well as Catholic views of the common good and solidarity when they are expressed in the 
terms of political values.”118 
However, it seems that none of the possible conceptions of justice is by itself evident to 
everyone. Rawls himself uses the original position to show that Justice as Fairness is a 
reasonable conception of justice, a rather complex device of representation that requires 
intellectual competence and background knowledge to employ. To reflect on matters of 
cooperation and fairness on this level will certainly have to be taught (to some degree at 
least) to enable citizens to see that their political institutions are just and the reasons for 
it.119 
Regardless whether for a well-ordered society whose consensus is built around a singular 
conception of justice or whether for a society that accepts a family of acceptable 
conceptions of justice, it looks like the principles of justice involved, and the connections 
between these principles and the actual political institutions of that society, need to be part 
of a political liberal education. Without the knowledge about these basic elements of a just 
society, citizens would act according to seemingly arbitrary conventions rather than 
according to principles they can endorse as right and inherently valuable. 
2.5.2 Public Justifiability 
Just as it cannot be taken for granted that citizens will endorse the principles of justice all 
by themselves, the same is true for the requirement for public justifiability and the duty of 
civility. The conception of citizens as free and equal, the principle of liberal legitimacy, the 
duty of civility, and the relation between these concepts need to be similarly taught and 
explained if a sufficient majority of future citizens are supposed to decide and act on these 
grounds. Especially the connection between the idea of freedom and equality and the duty 
of justification is not something that is necessarily obvious to everyone, so that children 
                                                 
118 Rawls 1999a, pp. 141f. 
119 In an attempt to add an interesting element of recursion to the discussion one could propose to make 
Rawls' Theory of Justice itself a part of common civic education. 
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will at some point in their education as future citizens have to be told the reasons why 
political coercion has to be justified.120 
What makes public justifiability a particularly interesting topic in the context of education 
is the fact, that it is central to political liberalism and at the same time more controversial 
in its consequences for citizens than Rawls seems ready to admit. It is for example not at 
all clear how much restraint is required of citizens by the duty of civility, and there are 
good arguments that Rawls’ version leads to an unfair limitation of the public political 
reasoning of religious citizens.121 In this case, requiring them to have their children taught 
principles that they themselves conceive as unfair, perhaps with good reason, seems to add 
more than just insult to injury. I will describe the problems arising from this, and how 
political liberal education can approach them, in more detail in Chapter 6. 
2.6 Education as Object of Public Reason 
By now it has become clear that education has an important part to play in political liberal 
theory and that schools as institutions of education are part of the basic structure of society. 
The previous sections have shown that political liberal education is supposed to shape self-
sufficient, politically autonomous citizens who are familiar with the basic ideas behind a 
political liberal society and who are, at least potentially, capable of understanding the 
legitimacy and appropriateness of their political system. Institutions of education and 
educational policies must therefore be part of the basic structure and subject to public 
                                                 
120 Rawls himself seems to assume that the fact that political power is coercive power is sufficient to ask for 
public justification, but this might even be too little. Perhaps, as Charles Larmore claims, the idea of 
liberal legitimacy and public justification rests on something more fundamental, like a principle of respect 
for persons (see Larmore 1999). If this is the case, then demonstrating the connections between this 
principle and the political values explicated by Rawls might also have to be part of a political liberal 
education. In this thesis I will argue that the idea of free and equal citizens and the connected need for 
public justification rests on a form of personal autonomy that political liberalism needs to endorse beyond 
its more familiar conception of political autonomy (see Chapter 4). 
121 For an extensive survey on different positions of public justification and what this means for religious 
citizens, see Eberle 2002, Ch. 3. The problem of public justification of education policies regarding 
religious curriculum content and faith schools will also be topic of Chapter 6 of this thesis. 
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justification requirements. Nevertheless, if standards of public justification apply to 
education and to schools, the question remains at what the level of granularity public 
justification in educational matters must be given. To get an idea under which 
circumstances Rawls would apply standards public reason to educational matters, we 
should return to a passage from The Idea of Public Reason Revisited which was already 
briefly mentioned before. 
To counter the concerns that his conception of public reason is too restrictive for political 
discourse, in The Idea of Public Reason Revisited Rawls refers to the historical debate 
between Patrick Henry and James Madison about the question whether school prayers 
should be established in public schools. Instead of taking it for granted that school prayers 
are inadmissible from a liberal position, Rawls points out that there can be a reasonable 
debate about this topic as long as all sides refer to political values in their arguments (as, 
according to him, this was almost entirely the case in that particular debate).122 
This case can serve as an example for the openness of political discourse even under the 
restrictions of public reason. Provided that citizens can refer to political values (i.e., values 
that all reasonable people can agree on) in which their reasons are eventually grounded, 
they can even argue for school prayers, as Henry did. And although in the historical case, 
school prayers have been banned from public schools “by objections […] turned largely on 
whether religious establishment was necessary to support orderly civil society,”123 it looks 
like there could have been an alternative outcome compatible with the limits of public 
reason which would have found school prayers admissible. It is worth noting that Rawls 
himself does not seem to think so: for him, the debate is merely an example to show that 
the separation of church and state can be justified by reasons that “can be affirmed by all 
free an equal citizens, given the fact of reasonable pluralism.”124 His following 
elaborations about the good of this separation for both church and state makes clear, that 
                                                 
122 The same example can be found in Political Liberalism in the Introduction to the Paperback Edition, p. li-
lii. 
123 Rawls 1999a, p. 165. 
124 Rawls 1999a, p. 166. 
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even though public reasons allows to argue against this separation in political terms, Rawls 
does not think it is a viable result of a debate based on public reasons.125 
For those sceptical of political liberalism this example probably does not do much in the 
way of showing that public reason is not, or only minimally, restrictive. What it does show, 
and which is more interesting for now, is that the school as a social institution is an object 
of public reason, at least when it comes to “fundamental political questions.”126 This is 
consistent with the various ways in which schools are involved in the moral development 
of children  (see above) and, as I want to claim, it shows that schools are as important for 
the “orderly production and reproduction of society and its culture” as, e.g., the family is. 
2.7 Conclusion 
Although Rawls writes only rarely in an explicit fashion about education, he provides a 
range of clues to what role education has to play in political liberalism. When spelling out 
what the implications of his brief remarks on education are, we see that a political liberal 
education cannot be as minimal as Rawls himself claimed. Instead, it must already convey 
some specific substantial normative content to educate people to become the kind of 
citizens the well-ordered society needs. Like other democratic and liberal theories, political 
liberalism has an interest in “conscious social reproduction,”127 which will necessarily 
express itself in education. 
                                                 
125 A basic tendency to marginalise religious commitments in the public sphere that can be inferred from this 
example has been put forward more directly by other public reason liberals and been the object of 
extensive criticism. I will say more about this topic in the context of education and religion later in 
Chapter 6. 
126 Rawls 1999a, pp. 165f. 
127 Gutmann 1987, p. 45. It should be noted that in Democratic Education, Gutmann argues that conscious 
social reproduction is a unique characteristic of a democratic education, in contrast to liberal education 
which aims at absolute moral neutrality. The kind of liberalism she has in mind at that point is not political 
liberalism, though, whose democratic commitments she acknowledges in later writings, e.g., Gutmann 
1995. 
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The rest of the thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, I discuss in detail central 
elements of political liberalism that are relevant for a political liberal education that needs 
to shape future citizens in regard to the requirements and limits identified in this chapter. It 
covers the role of political virtues, of autonomy, and of political rights and liberties in 
political liberal education. The second part will suggest strategies for political liberal 
education to approach topics that pose particular challenges to education, such as the place 
of religion in education, the thematization of same-sex relations in gender education, and 
the special requirements education needs to provide for in the case of immigrants. 
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Part 1: Central Elements of Political Liberalism 
The next three chapters form the first main part of this thesis. This first part focuses on 
three abstract theoretical elements of political liberal theory: political virtues, autonomy, 
and rights. In addition to being central elements of political liberal theory, these are 
relevant elements in the context of education. Together they frame the main requirements a 
political liberal account of education can make on parents, children, and the state, while 
also establishing the limits for these requirements. Yet, these requirements and permissions 
are only sufficiently robust if the central elements of political liberalism themselves satisfy 
certain conditions: internal coherence and sufficient anthropological realism. 
Internal coherence seems an almost trivial condition, and we should assume that political 
liberalism has proven itself sufficiently coherent. In the course of developing a political 
liberal account of education, though, conflicts between political liberal requirements on 
education and more general claims about, e.g., the nature of virtues or the role of autonomy 
will emerge. The chapters in Part 1 highlight these emerging conflicts and suggest ways to 
resolve them in order to maintain political liberalism’s internal coherence. 
The condition of sufficient anthropological realism is related to the metatheoretical claims 
Rawls himself makes about political liberalism. Political liberal theory is supposed to be 
ideal theory, i.e., not so much determined by what is feasible under circumstances found in 
the contemporary real world, but rather aiming at identifying political principles that would 
be used to order society in an ideal world. However, as Rawls writes, his political theory is 
supposed to provide the guidelines for a realistic utopia, something that would be 
attainable by human beings as they are. Taking the idea of the realistic utopia seriously, the 
idealisation and abstraction away from real-life conditions must be limited to a degree 
where our theory still considers basic parameters of human psychology. The models of 
virtues and autonomy employed by political liberalism should realistically reflect human 
capacities, even more so in a political liberal approach to education. The chapters in Part 1 
discuss the relation between central elements like virtues and autonomy to education and 
indicate, how requirements on educational institutions can be formulated that meet these 
expectations of realism. 
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The weighting of these two aspects varies throughout the next three chapters. In regard to 
political virtues both, the internal coherence of the account of virtues in political liberalism 
and objections based on empirical psychological research are covered. When it comes to 
autonomy, the emphasis is on the question how neutral political liberalism can be in terms 
of individual autonomy and what exactly the preconditions for children are to become 
politically autonomous citizens. The chapter about rights and liberties has mainly a 
clarificatory function and aims to provide a clearer structure for the normative relations 
between parents, children, and the state. 
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3 Political Virtues 
For a better understanding of how the political liberal conception of virtues shapes 
education, we need to take a closer look at the role of virtues in Rawlsian political 
philosophy. In the context of civic education, liberals often emphasise that citizens should 
develop and maintain a certain range of political virtues;128 Rawls is no exception here, 
although he is less explicit about the place of virtues in liberal education. However, even 
the minimal account of civic education that can be found in Political Liberalism is 
supposed to encourage the development of these political virtues in future citizens (see 
2.3.3 and 2.4.), such as toleration, mutual respect, reasonableness, fairness, civility, and 
perhaps best known, a sense to justice. 
I will begin with a short summary of how Rawls understands virtues and of the role they 
play in his theory. As we will see, Rawls’ own conception of virtues is, to say the least, 
ambiguous and in its original Aristotelian interpretation it seems inconsistent with the aims 
of his political liberal project not to rest on comprehensive ethical views. In a next step, I 
will attempt to clarify what role virtues are supposed to have in liberal political theory by 
having a quick look at other liberal accounts of virtues. After the role of virtues in 
liberalism has been clarified, I will present the challenge to virtue ethics posed by 
situationist psychology. While this challenge is aimed at virtue ethics in general, it implies 
problems for accounts of political virtues as well. 
To solve both problems at once, a promising strategy would be to replace an account of 
political virtues by an account of norm-following. Such an account, which would be a 
robust reply especially to the empirical challenge, would be compatible with the role of 
virtues in political liberalism, or so I will argue. However, in the face of objections against 
norm-following accounts and in acknowledgment of empirically unresolved questions of 
how far elements like personal character traits are involved in virtuous behaviour after all, 
I will suggest that political liberalism fares best with a Humean account of virtues that 
focuses on the functionality of virtues in a social environment while remaining as far as 
possible agnostic about the underlying mechanisms. 
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3.1 Virtues, Excellence, and the Aristotelian Principle 
To understand how Rawls defines virtues we need to look at A Theory of Justice, where he 
introduces the so-called Aristotelian Principle. This principle says that, 
other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their 
innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realised, 
or the greater its complexity.129 
For Rawls, this kind of striving for excellence is important in order to develop and 
maintain self-respect. It is one of the primary goods he assumes every person needs 
regardless of their particular plans of life. But, as he points out, any rational plan of life 
will have to consider the claims of this principle.130 While not explicitly stated, this seems 
to imply that the more a plan of life involves developing and realising one’s capacity for 
complex activities, the more rational, and therefore in some sense better, one’s life is.  
However, Rawls himself does not see any problem in this. He claims that the Aristotelian 
Principle is characterising human nature in an objective, factual way, therefore it must also 
have a central role in a theory of the human good. Furthermore, the Aristotelian Principle 
seems connected in a relevant way to one of the two moral powers, namely the capacity for 
a conception of a good life, as the following passage suggests: 
The role of the Aristotelian Principle in the theory of the good is that it states a deep 
psychological fact which, in conjunction with other general facts and the conception of a 
rational plan, accounts for our considered judgments of values. The things that are 
commonly thought of as human goods should turn out to be the ends and activities that 
have a major place in rational plans. The principle is part of the background that regulates 
these judgments. Provided that it is true, and leads to conclusions matching our 
convictions about what it good and bad (in reflective equilibrium), it has a proper place in 
moral theory.131 
The factual status ascribed to the principle and its importance for self-respect makes it a 
building block for the (thin) theory of the good which allows the parties in the original 
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position to figure out the principles of right and justice, and to determine the primary goods 
that every member of society will be interested in. 
Next to these things, another result of the deliberations in the original position is a 
definition of what makes a good person. Rawls’s conclusion is that a good person has a set 
of “broadly based properties […] that it is rational for persons to want in one another.”132 
There is no doubt for him about what belongs to this set for a citizen of a well-ordered 
society: 
I note straightaway that the fundamental moral virtues, that is, the strong and normally 
effective desires to act on the basic principles of right, are undoubtedly among the broadly 
based properties. […] Now since the basic structure of [a well-ordered society] is just, and 
these arrangements are stable with respect to the society's public conception of justice, its 
members will in general have the appropriate sense of justice and the desire to see their 
institutions affirmed.133 
From the Aristotelian Principle Rawls leads us to the notion of the good person, which is 
partly defined by having certain moral virtues, of which the sense of justice is an 
extraordinarily important one. Nevertheless, maintaining this property oneself is only 
rational as long as others have it as well: 
Therefore, the representative member of a well-ordered society will find that he wants 
others to have the basic virtues, and in particular a sense of justice. His rational plan of life 
is consistent with the constraints of right, and he will surely want others to acknowledge 
the same restrictions.134 
One notable thing these passages make clear is that the sense of justice and other basic 
virtues seem to have a strangely ambiguous status. On one hand they seem to be human 
capacities, the exercise of which the citizens of a well-ordered society enjoy for their own 
sake. Being virtuous, it appears, is supposed to have an intrinsic value for citizens. On the 
other hand. their value depends on the circumstance that fellow citizens share these virtues. 
The reason for this is easy to see: acting in accordance with principles of justice in a 
society where nobody else does would hardly be a rational strategy, as it would lead to 
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exploitation by one's fellow citizens who do not care about justice. From the perspective of 
individual rationality, the preferred strategy of social interaction needs to be conditional – 
only to act politically virtuously if the others (or a sufficiently large part of them) can be 
supposed to act in the same way. This is strangely at odds with the notion of virtues as 
intrinsically valuable that Rawls also seems to employ, at least if we assume him to share 
the widely held presumption that virtuous acts are independent of instrumental benefit 
calculations.135 
Now, according to Rawls, under his favoured conception of justice that originates from the 
original position, Justice as Fairness, “the desire to do what is right and just is the main 
way for persons to express their nature as free and equal rational beings.”136  If I 
understand Rawls right in this context, all citizens that accept the conception of Justice as 
Fairness will necessarily accept the desire to act rightly and justly as an aspect of the good 
in which they have to excel. His conclusion regarding virtues then is 
that the virtues are excellences. They are good from the standpoint of ourselves as well as 
from that of others. The lack of them will tend to undermine both our self-esteem and the 
esteem that our associates have for us. Therefore indications of these faults will wound 
one's self-respect with accompanying feelings of shame.137 
Arguing in this way enables Rawls to claim that there exists a congruence between the 
human good and the right. Because he is concerned with political stability for the right 
reasons, Rawls wants citizens to conform with the principles of justice not just for reasons 
of self-interest, as the latter would not prevent them from acting unjust whenever possible 
and preferable. Instead, the sense of justice must be a non-instrumental moral motivation. 
By creating the relation between something that is a human good (and as such intrinsically 
                                                 
135 One of the particular properties of virtuous acts is that they are taken to be valuable, even though they will 
not lead to the best possible, or even merely good, consequences when judged by instrumental rationality. 
See e g. Adams 2006, pp. 60-62. 
136 Rawls 1971, p. 445. 
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valuable) and the right (which is instrumentally valuable) Rawls believes that he can 
achieve this end.138 
This dual character of the sense of justice, and other virtues as well, seems to mark the 
liberal theory developed in A Theory of Justice as a (at least partially) comprehensive form 
of liberalism that could be used to justify perfectionist political decisions. As Samuel 
Freeman observes, “the Aristotelian Principle introduces an element of perfectionism […] 
via a claim regarding human nature.”139 A life plan will have to align with the Aristotelian 
Principle in order to make it a good, or “flourishing” life over the time it lasts. A similar 
observation is made by Steven Wall: “Rawls’s acceptance of this principle pulls him 
beyond [a] simple subjectivist view of the human good […]. It also provides a foundation 
for a type of perfectionist politics that runs counter to his explicit commitments.”140 
It is worth noting, though, that another contemporary Rawlsian, Paul Weithman, does not 
seem to share this view on the Aristotelian Principle. In his discussion of the principle as a 
conjunctive that can be read in different ways, his way of understanding it is this: 
Some of what needs to be accounted for is the value we attach to activities like the arts, 
demanding intellectual endeavours and the appreciation of beauty. The second conjunct 
seems to be the part of the Principle that does that work, helping us to understand why 
rational plans include such activities, and doing so without appeal to perfectionist 
principles or Mill's distinction between higher and lower pleasures.141 
It is not completely clear to me whether Weithman's claim about the Aristotelian Principle 
not incorporating perfectionist principles is supposed to be valid only for the second claim 
(the second conjunct is saying that human beings enjoy more complex activities better than 
less complex ones) or for the principle as a whole. Regardless of this uncertainty, he seems 
to take the Aristotelian Principle as a purely descriptive claim which does not include an 
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139 Freeman 2007, p. 271. 
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ethically evaluative component in form of a claim about preferences for more complex 
activities being of increased value. Nevertheless, his list of valuable activities the principle 
accounts for seems curiously weighted towards what traditionally is conceived as valuable 
especially by an educated elite. It does not include watching mud wrestling on television, 
regular visits to the pub, or spending hours playing video games. This might just be by 
accident, but it seems more likely that the principle has some tacit evaluative content after 
all. When taking it as a measure of a good life, we can no longer say that pushpin is just as 
good as poetry. 
Contrary to Weithman and in line with Freeman and Wall, it occurs to me that the principle 
has some tacit evaluative content. To explain the value of a range of particular activities, 
Rawls uses a broader principle which applies to all of them,142 and depending on our 
metaethical convictions this move might be a problematic one. For anyone believing in 
some version of the Naturalistic Fallacy which rejects moving from an is to an ought, we 
either have to assume that valid evaluative conclusions can be inferred from factual 
statements, or that the Aristotelian Principle itself has already evaluative ethical content. 
Whether the first solution is feasible is controversial. The second solution would already 
imply an evaluative basis that political liberalism would have to (partially) rest upon, 
something that the neutrality-minded Rawlsian might want to avoid if possible. 
Let us grant the former for the moment – that it is somehow possible to derive normative 
conclusions from purely descriptive premises.143 Perhaps now it could be possible to save 
the Aristotelian moral psychology by pointing out that it is not an evaluative ethical view 
but merely a “descriptive principle about human motivation,” 144 that lends explanatory 
power to Rawls’ claim that the good and the right are congruent. This attempt certainly is 
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warranted by Rawls’ emphasis that the Aristotelian Principle fits well with empirical 
evidence about human behaviour.145 
But, as Wall observes, even if the principle accurately describes a fact about human nature, 
it remains an evaluative question if the kinds of activities involved are to be encouraged or 
supported by political measures. A positive verdict on this would result in perfectionist 
policies. To support this perfectionist reading further, Wall provides a plausible 
interpretation of the famous passage about counting blades of grass which claims that the 
person in the example indeed ought to choose a different way of living, one that would 
allow for excellence in more complex activities, if she were able to do so. This, so Wall, 
suggests that for Rawls the Aristotelian Principles is true and has to play an essential role 
in an account of the good for human beings.146 
For Wall, the Aristotelian Principle leads indeed to perfectionist policies that aim at 
promoting the good. While Rawls seems to think that private association “and the cultural 
marketplace more generally” will provide sufficient opportunity for citizens to develop 
excellence in a variety of talents, Wall argues for state subsidies to encourage engagement 
in worthwhile complex activities: “state subsidies for intrinsically valuable cultural 
pursuits, as well as state funded educational initiatives to foster appreciation of them, 
plausibly could be justified by appeal to the AP.”147 
The fact that Rawls does not reject the Aristotelian Principle in Political Liberalism 
supports the perfectionist reading even more. Rawls’ continued endorsement of the 
principle is compatible with political liberalism, Wall claims; the political decisions about 
perfectionist policies justified by the principle are neither regarding constitutional 
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essentials nor matters of basic justice, and as such can be appropriately based on 
comprehensive views about excellence and human nature.148 
While we should accept Wall's observation about the comprehensive nature of the 
Aristotelian Principle, the same cannot be said for his conclusion. The perfectionist inter-
pretation of Rawls’ political liberalism given by Wall seems problematic for at least two 
reasons.149 First, the demand for neutrality expressed in the duty of civility and its 
restraints should perhaps have a wider scope than the one Rawls himself declared. 
Jonathan Quong argues that we have to assume a wide scope of application for the duty of 
civility if we want to take public reason seriously, and that the main defences of a narrow 
scope (which includes only constitutional essentials) turn out to be insufficient.150 But even 
if we are sceptical about Quong's claim, there is a second reason to reject Wall’s position at 
least in regard to education: if institutionalised education is indeed part of the basic 
structure of society, perfectionism like the one advocated by Wall has no place in matters 
of educational policy. We will have to look for another solution to the problem the 
Aristotelian Principle poses in this regard. 
So far, it looks safe to say that the Aristotelian Principle can be interpreted as a compre-
hensive philosophical doctrine (perhaps, though, only a partial one) which provides 
justification to perfectionist policies. But, as Rawls himself notes, his turn to political 
liberalism was motivated by the concern that in a reasonably pluralistic society not all 
citizens will endorse comprehensive doctrines like these.151 If we properly want to honour 
this ambition, we should avoid perfectionist concessions like the one Wall proposes. 
Therefore, in the context of political liberalism we would expect a different account of 
political virtues that reflects the division of the two moral powers (the capacity for a 
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149 For the distinction between comprehensive and perfectionist conceptions of liberalism that I employ here, 
see 2.1.6. 
150 See Quong 2011, Ch. 9. 
151 See e. g. Rawls 1993, pp. xvif. 
71 
 
conception of the good and the capacity for a sense of justice) and avoids any grounding in 
comprehensive philosophical doctrines that can be rejected by reasonable citizens.152 
Nevertheless, as already mentioned, Rawls does not discard the Aristotelian Principle. 
Instead, in Political Liberalism he reaffirms his claim about virtues from his earlier work 
and its role in the process of determining a conception of justice. In a final step, 
by drawing on the Aristotelian principle and other elements of justice as fairness, we spell 
out the ways in which the well-ordered society of justice as fairness is intrinsically 
good.153 
In the same way the explanation for political virtues still rests on the Aristotelian 
principle.154 This suggests that, even after Rawls’ political turn, reasonable citizens are 
supposed to endorse an overlapping consensus containing a conception of justice partially 
based on and a notion of political virtues fully based on an Aristotelian conception of 
virtues. They will also, as he claims, experience the exercise of their two moral powers as 
good due to the Rawlsian moral psychology based on the Aristotelian principle,155 
something that might seem contestable from the perspectives of reasonable citizens 
holding different ethical views on virtues and the human good.  
Therefore, if the overlapping consensus is really supposed to be acceptable to all 
reasonable citizens, regardless of their comprehensive doctrines, then basing some of its 
content on a comprehensive philosophical doctrine like the Aristotelian principle should 
appear more than suspicious. This looks exactly like the sort of case that should be ruled 
out by adopting political liberalism. 
Apart from claiming that there is no comprehensive and/or perfectionist view involved 
(Weithman), that there is but ignoring it (Freeman), or biting the bullet and endorsing 
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perfectionism (Wall), Rawls seems to suggest another way of reconciling the Aristotelian 
Principle in a footnote. He proposes to take the moral psychology of Justice as Fairness for 
granted, but to see the Aristotelian Principle as replaceable by equivalent principles. These 
substitute principles would be compatible with the various comprehensive views held by 
reasonable citizens but would still lead to similar conclusions.156 While Rawls still thinks 
some sort of principle necessary to connect the right and the good, he allows for a variety 
of explanatory routes that are compatible with different comprehensive doctrines. 
How plausible this approach is for achieving the congruency between those two spheres 
cannot be discussed here. A pressing question would be, at any rate, how similar these 
alternative explanatory principles would have to be to Rawls’ own: do they just have to 
result in a satisfying level of congruency, regardless of how they achieve it, or are they 
required to share particular elements with the Aristotelian principle, e.g., an account of 
virtuosity? The first version implies a high probability that acceptable alternative principles 
will lack the intrinsic account of virtues that the Aristotelian version sports. The second 
version seems to narrow down the range of alternative accounts significantly and might 
result in the exclusion of views that would otherwise count as perfectly reasonable in the 
wider scope of political liberalism. With both versions, we would need a detailed 
explanation of how each comprehensive view that does not accept the Aristotelian 
Principle accounts for the talk of political virtues and their link to intrinsic values. This 
seems like a lot of unpromising work – work that we fortunately can avoid, if my 
arguments in the following sections are plausible. 
By now, we have seen that the role of the Aristotelian Principle and the nature of virtues in 
Rawls’ moral psychology is messier than his own cursory treatment of this topic in 
Political Liberalism suggests. While it does not falsify political liberalism as such, it looks 
like an inconsistency that makes the overall theory appear less robust than the faithful 
Rawlsian might wish. Finding a more robust way to avoid inconsistencies regarding virtues 
will almost be necessary for a political liberal theory of education. However, this is not the 
only problem posed by the Rawlsian account of political virtues. In addition, it shares a 
common weakness with other virtue theories – a vulnerability to the situationist challenge. 
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3.2 The Situationist Challenge 
Aside from the problem that Rawls’ Aristotelian political virtues could make his political 
turn look inconsistent, the role of virtues in ethics and political philosophy is not 
uncontroversial in general. The concept of virtues as desirable and stable character traits 
has been challenged for some time now on the basis of empirical evidence from social 
psychology. 
Generally, virtues are conceived as character traits, as dispositions to act in a certain way 
that are supposed to be morally valuable. Following Julia Annas' account of virtues as an 
example here, we can take a virtue to be a persisting feature of one's person which is 
reliable and characteristic of the person in question as it is deeply set within her – “[a] 
virtue is a disposition which is central to the person, to whom he or she is, a way we 
standardly think of character.”157 It is a relevant characteristic of virtues that they do not 
only express themselves in the behaviour of their bearers, but also in “reasoning and 
feelings.”158 
However, this idea of stable action-guiding dispositions has been challenged by empirical 
psychology at least since the 1970s. Empirical research in so-called “situationist” 
psychology seems to support the hypothesis that the relevant motivations for behaviour is 
dependent to a much larger extent on situational cues than on character traits. A radical 
interpretation of situationist experiments would be to claim that there are not character 
traits of any action-guiding relevance. But even under a more moderate interpretation, 
existing character traits that can influence an individual’s behaviour are not stable across a 
range of different situation types. Research results show, e.g., that helpful behaviour in test 
subjects can be significantly determined by external factors. These factors are contingent 
circumstances that make them “feel good,” such as having received a cookie or finding 
money prior to a situation where they have an opportunity of helping others.159 Whereas 
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these positive circumstances increase the likelihood of participants offering help to others, 
“negative” factors such as being in a hurry160 or the amount of environmental noise, e.g., 
from a lawn mower,161 seem to have the opposite effect. In this context well-known is also 
Stanley Milgram's “Behavioral Study of Obedience”162 as evidence that virtues have little 
action guiding effect in stressful situations. In Milgram’s experiment, test subjects were 
ordered to apply electric shocks of increasing severity to a person (whom they could not 
see and who was not really connected to the shock generator). Although it was clearly 
indicated to them that the receiver of the shocks would be at the risk of his life at some 
point, the majority of test subjects increased the shock intensity to a lethal level before they 
refused to continue. The setup of the experiment was designed to expose the test subjects 
to increasing pressure by the experimenter, whom they perceived as an authority. As in the 
experiments mentioned before, the situational circumstance had a much greater influence 
of the subjects’ behaviour than any virtuous character traits. 
For Gilbert Harman, an extraordinary zealous advocate of the situationist hypothesis, these 
research results show that the ordinary view of character traits as determining factors of 
behaviour and their assumed role in virtue ethics rests on an error which has finally been 
exposed by social psychology. Harman’s position is therefore that virtue ethics should be 
ignored in favour of a situationist approach to ethical questions.163 Others, like Owen 
Flanagan or John Doris, are more modest in their criticism but still argue that virtue ethics 
cannot rely on character traits as motivating factors alone.164 Aside from the question 
which of these interpretation of the situationist challenge is the more plausible one, what 
seems evident is that it is not only a challenge for “ethical” accounts of virtues. The same 
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75 
 
objections apply to Rawls’ use of the virtue concept in political philosophy as well, as 
Doris notes.165 
In a recent contribution to this discussion, Emily McTernan outlined what the situationist 
challenge means for political virtues in liberal political philosophy. Although being less 
radical in her views than Harman and admitting that contemporary social psychology sees 
behaviour determined by both, character traits as well as situational factors, virtues are for 
McTernan nevertheless no “stable, effective way to secure certain behaviours across 
situations.”166 To assure that a majority of citizens adhere to politically appropriate patterns 
of behaviour, she maintains, political theory needs to look out for a for an approach that 
can replace a virtue education aiming at developing certain character traits. 
3.3 Social Norms in Political Theory 
As an alternative for political virtues McTernan proposes that political philosophers should 
instead adopt social norms to take the place of virtues when it comes to motivating citizens 
to act in accordance with liberal principles.167 A very broad definition of what a social 
norm is she takes from Elisabeth Anderson: “A social norm is a standard of behavior 
shared by a social group, commonly understood by its members as authoritative or 
obligatory for them.”168 These norms could take the role in behaviour formation that 
authors like Rawls have so far ascribed to virtues: 
Social norms are strong contenders for the instrumental role that liberal virtue was 
introduced to fulfil. Research in social psychology and economics suggests that social 
norms are powerful determinants of behaviour, and secure stable patterns of behaviour 
from the majority of those who internalise the norm.169 
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To do so would be advantageous for liberal political philosophy in at least two ways: it 
would be an empirically supported approach that is compatible with contemporary 
paradigms of social psychology, and it would only pose minimal requirements for citizens, 
because people already come fitted with an innate desire to conform to the expectation of 
others.170 
Social norms provide people with social identities or roles that are associated with certain 
kinds of behaviour, and being a citizen is one of the social identities people in modern 
societies have, including a particular set of normative requirements. As, e.g., Cass Sunstein 
observes, acting in the capacity as citizens often requires different behaviour than acting as 
a consumer, a “difference [that] is connected to the fact that a citizen is helping to make a 
judgment not simply for himself but for a collectivity.”171 The normative requirements of 
the citizen identity appear to be a suitable replacement for the political virtues required 
under political liberalism. They could even provide behavioural guidance in cases when 
citizens actions are not observed by others, e.g., motivating citizens to comply with the 
duty of civility even when being alone in the voting booth, provided they internalised this 
aspect of their role sufficiently. 
3.4 In Defence of Social Norms 
In a direct reply to McTernan, Eamonn Callan objects to this replacement strategy and 
attempts to vindicate the role of virtues in liberal education. One of his central observation 
is that the stability that can be maintained by norms seems to be rather unsatisfactory. It 
would exhaust itself in 
preserving the set of regime properties that distinguish (at least minimally) liberal states 
from their many alternatives. Once the rule of law obtains and basic liberal rights are 
secured without any threat of subversion, stability of this kind is realized.172 
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Norms make people act according to liberal principles, but they do not make them liberals. 
The stability needed by political liberalism in the face of reasonable disagreement, in 
contrast, also requires “social criticism, and that in turn seems to require open-mindedness 
and allied intellectual virtues.”173 It appears that this must to be indeed a genuine point of 
worry for any liberal who does not think of the idealised liberal state as a mere utopian (or 
perhaps rather dystopian) status quo, but as a dynamic structure subject to changes over 
time. As long as there is a possibility for the conditions under which a society exists to 
change, there will be a need to readjust the basic structure in reflection of these changes. 
Yet, the intellectual virtues required for social criticism which Callan is concerned about 
are a different subset of political virtues than the ones needed for a stable liberal society.  
Unlike, e.g., tolerance and mutual respect that are basic requirements for liberal citizens, 
the virtues necessary for social criticism seem to be closer to the original Aristotelian 
conception of virtues as something everyone should strive for, but which is attained only 
by a few. It is not necessary that every citizen realises these virtues to a high degree, as 
long as there are at least some citizens who do. This would allow for some political virtues, 
including those necessary for social criticism, to be mainly depending on character traits, 
while virtues that are conducive to social stability would be backed primarily by social 
norms. Nevertheless, the concern remains that norms could perhaps only secure the most 
basic form of stability, which would not be sufficient. Even though liberal in a minimal 
sense, a liberal society stabilised only by norms could develop a culture that “is strongly 
inhospitable to free speech, even though dissent speech is legally tolerated.”174 This 
concern, that a norm-based version of political virtues would lead to a less-than-
sufficiently liberal society, needs to be taken seriously. A satisfactory answer must say 
more about the distinction between social norms and moral norms, which leads directly to 
another of Callan’s objections.  
McTernan’s account lacks an explicit distinction of moral and other, “merely” social 
norms, as pointed out by Callan. The relevant distinction here is not one of the attitude 
citizen have regarding the norms in question: even though the content of norms might be a 
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moral imperative (e.g., “respect your fellow citizens despite their different religious 
beliefs”), the reasons of citizens to comply with them can be pragmatic, e.g., they could 
follow the norm to avoid sanctions or because they hope to gain social advantages by 
following the norm. If citizen of a liberal society were to follow norms of political morality 
for pragmatic reasons only, this would mean falling back into a modus vivendi in the 
Rawlsian sense which is assumed to become unstable as soon as the balance of power 
changes. To avoid this regress, norms of political morality would have to be internalised by 
citizens in a manner that they accept them as moral imperatives, meaning “that their 
violation cannot be justified by ordinary reason of self- or group-interest.”175 Yet, as Callan 
suggests, this kind of internalisation would result in the same kind of education as a virtue-
focused education would be. If Callan is right, from the perspective of education nothing is 
won by giving up the traditional character-based conception of virtues. 
It needs to be said first that good arguments exist for an internalisation of norms that makes 
them work as moral reasons. From the perspective of political theory, Gerald Gaus gives a 
convincing evolutionary account of the advantages of rule internalisation for a society, and 
how internalised rules connect to a practice of social morality.176 From the perspective of 
individual practical reasoning, Geoffrey Brennan et al. provide a plausible explanation of 
how we internalise social norms and why it is rational to do so.177 When it comes to 
internalisation as a necessary precondition for motivating politically virtuous behaviour, it 
seems that norms can do as good as striving for excellence can. The remaining question 
therefore is not if norms could replace character traits, but whether it would make any 
difference in educating them. Callan assumes that norms that are sufficiently similar to 
virtuous character traits in their motivational force must lead to the same educational 
requirements. For norms to have the effect of virtues, they do not just need to be mere 
social norms, but moral norms with a “distinctive motivational gravity.”178 If citizens will 
conceive of a particular set of norms as moral, he concludes, their inculcation seems to be 
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no different to the inculcation of virtues, “because norm promotion ultimately collapses 
into civic education.”179 
Like Callan, McTernan is aware of the relevance of distinguishing between social and 
moral norms,180 but does not elucidate it much further in her approach. Perhaps she does 
take it for granted that the behaviour patterns that are required by liberal citizens can be 
grounded in social norms alone, while Callan's position seems to be that norms that take 
the role of political virtues have to be moral norms and to be internalised as such. 
To say more about whether and how a norm-based account of political virtues could fit into 
political liberalism, we need a clear distinction between social and moral norms, though. 
According to Brennan et al, 
[p]aradigmatic examples of moral norms include the norms that exist in most societies 
forbidding murder, rape, and torture, norms of truth-telling and promise-keeping, and 
norms of beneficence. Paradigmatic examples of social norms include norms forbidding 
nudity in public places, norms of gift-giving, and norms of address.181 
It is important to keep in mind that here the term “moral norms” is supposed to refer to “a 
special kind of accepted rule or normative principles,” not “to objectively valid rules or 
normative principles.”182 Categorising norms as moral in this context means that they have 
a particular motivating force for individuals accepting them. The principles in which those 
accepted rules are grounded might be objectively valid, but whether they are does not 
change the fact that they are accepted moral norms in a particular society. We can easily 
imagine a society in which same-sex relationships are viewed as morally wrong, which is 
reflected in moral norms against entering same-sex relationships. Members of this society 
who endorse those particular moral norms would insist that same-sex relationships are 
morally wrong, not only in their own society but in all societies. Yet it seems doubtful that 
this kind of norm is really grounded in justifiable moral principles. 
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The relevant difference between moral norms and social norms are the distinct types of 
accountability created by them. In the case of moral norms, it is individual accountability 
that we have qua being individuals; we are accountable to other individuals, regardless 
whether they are members of our society or not. Usually, this kind of moral accountability 
is grounded in “properties that we and they possess as individual agents.”183 In the case of 
social norms, in contrast, we have this accountability as members of a group for which 
these norms are valid. Thus, we are only accountable to other members of that particular 
group, and likewise can also hold other members of that group accountable for breaching 
associated rules. 
In contrast to what seems to be Callan’s claim, i.e., that norms that replace character traits 
as the basis for political virtues need to be moral norms, it seems to me that the sort of 
virtuous behaviour liberal citizens are supposed to engage in is linked to social norms. 
Certainly, when citizens are supposed to act according to principles of justice, to be 
respectful and tolerant, at least in political liberal theory they are supposed to do so in the 
context of our society or state. In some cases, for example in the case of the duty of 
civility, it is obvious that any norm concerning this duty is limited to a particular polity, as 
the responsibility of citizens for their political decisions only includes those others who are 
citizens of that polity themselves and as such subject to the coercion these political 
decisions involve. The limitation of scope is less obvious in the case of other virtues, e.g., 
tolerance, as one could argue that the scope of rules governing toleration of others vary by 
context. But it seems quite clear that the political virtue of tolerance is about tolerance 
toward one's fellow citizens and not tolerance for people everywhere. 
For Rawls, political virtuous behaviour is moral behaviour in terms of justification. Moral 
norms that guide citizens' actions in the well-ordered society will have to be “real” moral 
norms inasmuch as they need be justifiable by valid philosophical principles. When it 
comes to their scope in terms of accountability, however, these are social norms: they are 
valid for exactly one society or state.184 Therefore, I see no reason to agree with Callan that 
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they need to have a particular motivational weight. Although for philosophers like Rawls 
the justification of their grounds is a moral question, in their application they seem to be 
social norms due to their limited scope of accountability. 
Despite these arguments in favour of norms, it is still far from settled whether norms offer 
a clear alternative to virtues in liberal political theory. As far as I can see, the empirical 
research is not as conclusive as its advocates claim, but neither can it be easily dismissed in 
favour of virtues. At this point I do not aim to make a final verdict on the question whether 
political liberalism should stick with the traditional account of virtues as good character 
traits or whether it should follow McTernan's recommendation and adopt norms instead as 
the new “political virtues”. It might be the case that citizens are more effectively motivated 
by social norms to behave in a way we would call virtuous, and that the same behaviour 
based on character traits is harder to teach, less reliable, and perhaps even an illiberal 
practice. It might also be that virtue ethics can come up with successful replies to the 
empirical challenges revealed by psychological research.185 
In the light of the inconclusive state of the debate about virtues and norms, it would be 
preferable to have an approach to political virtues that delivers the functional aspects 
political liberalism needs without committing firmly to support one of the possible 
underlying theories. Therefore, I suggest that political liberalism should adopt a pragmatic 
Humean account of political virtues that could do all the work needed while staying neutral 
in regard to substantive claims about what sort of psychological grounding virtuous citizen 
behaviour should have. 
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3.5 Humean Virtues 
Two main problems have been discussed so far in this chapter: the comprehensive 
theoretical background that the Aristotelian Principle provides for a political liberal 
account of virtues and the uncomfortable status of virtues as robust character traits in the 
light of empirical evidence. In the light of these problems, the concept of virtues in the 
theoretical framework starts to look rather inconvenient. 
Two obvious replies to these challenges have been discussed so far: we could just claim 
that the Aristotelian Principle and the moral psychology it is embedded in would pass the 
overlapping consensus and that the burden of proof that it would not is on those who claim 
otherwise. We could also side with Callan and argue that virtues are far less problematic 
than empirical psychology make them seem and there is no reason to be concerned about 
them. Nevertheless, none of these solutions seem to me to result in the necessary 
robustness a liberal theoretical framework should have. 
I want to suggest doing neither, but instead falling back to a different account of virtues. To 
save the idea of political virtues for political liberalism it looks promising to employ a 
Humean conception of virtues as proposed by Maria Merritt. Doing this will allow us to 
continue referring to virtues as political liberals while getting at once rid of any 
metaphysical baggage that, as we might fear, could come with the Aristotelian Principle, 
and of any empirical objections against virtues. Admittedly, this approach will require 
further consideration about the relation between the good and the right in Rawlsian theory 
as well. 
What are the advantages of the Humean account of virtues? For Merritt, the incongruity 
between Aristotelian virtue ethics and situationist psychology results from the strong 
degree of motivational self-sufficiency that character traits are supposed to have in virtue 
ethics.186 These just do not fit well with empirical evidence. For this reason, she suggests, 
we should adopt a Humean conception of virtues instead. The same strategy also provides 
us with a solution to the tension of the Aristotelian Principle with the political liberal 
claims not to rest on comprehensive views. 
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In Merrit's interpretation of Hume, virtues are “socially or personally beneficial qualities of 
mind [which] should be relatively stable over time somehow or other.”187 In contrast to 
Aristotelian virtues, the stability of Humean virtues has not to rely on those qualities 
“taking a special, self-sufficiently sustained psychological form.”188 The stability of 
Humean virtues does not rely on the motivational self-sufficiency of character traits that 
are beneficial from a personal or social perspective. While the relevant motivations must 
have “regularity and constancy”189 in order to be judged as virtuous, it is not the case that 
character traits are a self-sufficient motivating force. Instead our “sentiments, actions and 
manners” are, as Hume writes in his discussion about liberty and necessity in regard to 
freedom of will,190 shaped and sustained by external (and internal) influences. In other 
words, what can stabilise our virtuous behaviour under the Humean model can be a 
mixture of stable (or at least locally, i.e., in a certain range of similar situations, stable) 
dispositions of character as well as of external factors of social life that would be too 
contingent to be acceptable from a perspective of classical Aristotelian virtue ethics. 
Taking norms to be part of these external influences seems only plausible. 
Although a Humean model of virtues differs from the way Rawls defines virtues, it is 
perfectly compatible with the way he employs virtues in his political liberalism. As Merritt 
writes: 
[W]hat the Humean normative ideal of the virtuous person presents us with is the figure of 
someone with whom it would be reasonable to live in every kind of cooperative social 
relation – as opposed to the Aristotelian figure of someone who has mastered a set of 
correct, rationally well-founded attitudes governing practical choice.191 
It seems that Humean virtues are much more “political” than Aristotelian ones in the sense 
that they are less focused on an ideal of what makes life good for an individual, which 
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makes them excellent candidates for modelling the political virtues political liberalism 
needs. They offer a solution for the problems of comprehensiveness and perfectionism 
associated with the Aristotelian Principle. By employing a Humean conception of virtues, 
political liberals can remain agnostic about which component, psychological dispositions 
or the following of norms, does the relevant work in motivating virtuous behaviour in 
citizens. Alternatively, it might be the case that it is only a combination of both that leads 
to the desired results. In any case, no further assumptions are needed about the nature of 
excellence or about what contributes to human flourishing. 
To give an example of how Humean virtues work for political liberalism, let us take the 
sense of justice to compare different ways of understanding political virtues. In the original 
conception of political virtues, citizens identify acting in accordance with the principles of 
justice as a complex and challenging task they want to excel in. This provides, as far as 
Rawls is concerned, the necessary intrinsic motivation for just social behaviour. 
With the Humean account, several explanatory routes for the politically virtuous behaviour 
are available. First, citizens (at least some of them) could indeed have a stable character 
trait that makes them eager to be excellent in just cooperation with their fellow citizens. 
Second, even if average citizens lack these character traits they will have, as human beings, 
a desire to follow social norms in order to satisfy the expectations of others in regard to 
social cooperation. Therefore, they are still provided with sufficient motivation to act in 
accordance with the principles of justice (I will say more in the following paragraphs about 
whether this is the right kind of motivation). Third, citizens could sometimes be motivated 
by a desire for excellence in social interaction, but sometimes this desire might be too 
weak to prevail against conflicting egoistic desires. On these occasions, their desire for 
norm-following might provide a fall-back mechanism that ensures an overall stability of 
social cooperation. 
One possible concern needs to be addressed here, though. Does the non-commitment that 
makes Humean virtues attractive for political liberalism in my view not at the same time 
make them incompatible with the ambitions of Rawls’ moral psychology concerning 
stability for the right reasons? One of the reasons why citizens will be motivated to act in 
accordance with the rules and limitation of just principles is because they perceive them as 
a good for two types of reasons. The first type of reason is instrumental: “political society 
[…] secures for them the good of justice and the social bases of their mutual self-respect. 
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[…] In securing these things political society secures their fundamental needs.”192 It is in 
the self-interest of citizens to endorse the right. The second type of reason is intrinsic and 
in order to make the right also intrinsically motivating for them, Rawls thinks that 
something like the moral psychology based on the Aristotelian Principle is necessary. This 
way they will also acknowledge the right as their good, and their intrinsic motivation is 
based on the intrinsic value of their good. 
While Humean virtues work well with the instrumental part, perhaps there is something 
particular about the intrinsic motivation generated by a human good (in this case the 
striving for excellence) that this account might miss. The Humean account remains 
agnostic about the exact motivator of a particular behaviour – it can be some character 
trait, a social norm, or a combination of both. But it seems that if we want the relevant 
motivation linked to intrinsic values, we will have to end up with virtues in the classical 
sense. One could argue that only a classical account of virtues can capture the connection 
between intrinsic value and intrinsically motivated beneficial behaviour. 
It certainly is the case that Rawls needs citizens to be intrinsically motivated to act in a 
politically virtuous way. If there were only instrumental reasons for citizens to act virtuous, 
e.g., because this kind of behaviour secures to them the benefits of mutual cooperation, this 
would leave them free to act in an adverse manner whenever they feel the benefits of this 
adverse act outweigh the benefits they gain by acting politically virtuous. But at this point 
there might be some clarification needed about the way in which political virtues can 
generate this intrinsic motivation. 
The requirement for intrinsic motivation does not necessarily mean that acting in a way 
that political virtues facilitate must be linked to some intrinsically valuable good from an 
objective point of view. It can be enough for citizens to subjectively assign value to the 
relevant acts to ensure stable, non-opportunistic behaviour. There seems to be no further 
need for objective intrinsic value as implied by the excellence claim of the Aristotelian 
Principle. As long as citizens endorse tolerance, mutual respect etc. because they take these 
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patterns of behaviour as inherently valuable, it is not relevant for political stability if these 
practices have an objective intrinsic value. 
In the case of norms that lead to politically virtuous behaviour the intrinsic motivation 
comes with the internalisation of these norms. As I have argued earlier, norms that could 
replace political virtues should be taken as social norms in the way Brennan et al define 
them. Citizens do not see these norms as instances of mere shared practice but instead they 
hold normative attitudes that correspond with these practices. This means that in the first 
case, citizens will acknowledge that ‘this is the way we do it around here’ but do not assign 
any particular moral weight to these practices. In the second case, citizens' reasons to 
follow these norms include the idea that it is good to do so in a moral sense. Therefore, 
they will have non-instrumental reasons to act in accordance with the social norms 
prescribing just, fair, tolerant, and respectful behaviour as citizens.193 
Certainly, there will be a part of the population that will not follow, but only conform to 
those norms for instrumental reasons, e.g., because they see an individual benefit in it or 
because they want to avoid sanctions for non-conforming behaviour.194 But this is in itself 
no argument against norms taking the role of virtues in political theory, as long as the 
majority of the population is acting justly due to their belief that their behaviour is 
intrinsically valuable. 
When it comes to education, it looks like the Humean model leaves both routes open – the 
inculcation of character traits as well as the inculcation of norms. Which one should have 
more weight, either in terms of efficiency or in terms of neutrality can be left open for 
discussion according to further empirical evidence or the particular social context. 
Regardless of which route will be the feasible or the most successful one, a need for some 
sort of civic education will remain, but not for the reason Callan claims. If in the case of 
virtues, the aim of civic education is supposed to facilitate the development of the right 
kind of character traits, in the case of norms its aim will be to stabilise the tendency to 
follow the right kind of norms. Although the desire to follow norms might be an innate 
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one, the concrete norms which citizens choose to follow may vary. To make sure that they 
will be at least more likely to follow political liberal norms, education will be as helpful as 
it would be in developing the right kind of virtues. 
3.6 Conclusion 
In this chapter I tried to argue that the conception of political virtues, based on the 
Aristotelian principle, which Rawls introduces in A Theory of Justice and still holds on to 
in Political Liberalism has two significant problems. One of them is the at least partially 
comprehensive assumption about human nature that could justify perfectionist policies, the 
other is the more general question if virtues, understood as stable character traits, are a 
realistic building block for stability in liberal political theory. The answer to both these 
problems can be a Humean conception of virtues that remains agnostic about the exact 
motivational source of the kind of behaviour that citizens of a liberal democratic society 
should adopt. When employing this conception, citizens count as having the necessary 
political virtues if they act according to the principles of justice and other requirements of 
political liberalism, regardless if their action is motivated by character traits of norm 
following. 
In order to discuss a political liberal account of education, it looks reasonable to dismiss 
the Aristotelian Principle introduced originally by Rawls and instead become a Humean 
minimalist about political virtues. This strategy does not exclude any of the possible 
explanations for how political virtues actually work and it still allows us to operate with a 
pragmatic conception of virtue that can be found throughout a vast part of the literature 
about liberal political theory. 
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4 Autonomy 
In contrast to political liberalism, most other liberal theories consider autonomy as a 
central value. Generally, these are comprehensive liberal theories (in the Rawlsian sense) 
whose proponents see no problem in justifying policies supporting and improving the 
autonomy of citizens, regardless of whether some citizens might (reasonably) disagree with 
this policy. The idea of autonomy as central value is often associated with, e.g., the 
liberalism of John Stuart Mill and plays a central role in the work of many contemporary 
liberals such as Joseph Raz,195 Joel Feinberg,196 Marina Oshana,197 Steven Wall,198 or 
Thomas Hurka.199 
Political liberalism, however, aims to avoid any justification of political coercion based on 
claims about individual autonomy that invoke notions of substantive value. At the same 
time, political liberalism needs some conception of autonomy, it seems, to capture the 
capacities of citizens to participate in free and equal political decisions. Without it, there 
would be no grounds on which to claim that citizens are entitled to a range of political 
rights and liberties. Rawls therefore introduces the distinction between so-called “ethical” 
autonomy and “political” autonomy. Ethical conceptions of autonomy are part of a 
comprehensive view of the good and intrinsically linked to other comprehensive values, 
which Rawls associated with the liberal ideas of Kant, Mill, and Raz. Political autonomy, 
on the other hand, is restricted to the public aspect of persons' lives, i.e., to their role as 
citizens. The latter kind of autonomy should therefore be safe to use in political liberal 
theory. 
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From the perspective of education, though, I think that there is more of a story to tell. 
Political autonomy is, by design, a conception of autonomy that applies to a very narrow 
social role, the role of being a citizen of a liberal democratic state. It is grounded in claims 
about the equality of citizens, rooted in their moral power of having a capacity for bearing 
a conception of the good (more details on this are coming up in 4.3). This notion of 
equality implies, so I will argue, a more basic conception of autonomy of individuals as 
self-determined agents which is therefore a necessary part of the grounding of political 
autonomy. This is a relevant factor in the context of education, as it seems necessary that 
children gain an understanding of this basic conception of autonomy before they can grasp 
the meaning of political autonomy. It is hard to see how we could understand that our 
fellow citizens have the status of politically autonomous citizens if we do not understand 
an underlying conception of autonomy as self-determined agent. However, this underlying 
conception of autonomy, while not being political, is not ethical in Rawls’ sense and is 
therefore compatible with political liberalism’s claim for neutrality. 
This chapter starts with an overview of ethical conceptions of autonomy which Rawls 
rejects as comprehensive and which thus cannot have any justificatory use in political 
liberalism, followed by a brief analysis of his definition of political autonomy. After the 
conceptions of ethical and political autonomy have been outlined, I will claim that beyond 
political autonomy, political liberalism must involve a different kind of autonomy that is 
neither political nor ethical in the strong sense Rawls has in mind. This kind of “weak” 
conception of autonomy is implicit in one of the most basic notions that grounds political 
liberalism, the notion of equality. Particularly in regard to the matter of education, political 
liberals will have to endorse at least some kind of weak, proceduralist account of 
individual autonomy. 
After having discussed in more detail what adopting weak autonomy means for a political 
liberal education, I will present arguments against this sort of weak autonomy that have 
been brought forth by Meira Levinson, who claims that a proceduralist account leaves us 
with a counter-intuitive conception of autonomy and that liberal education must require a 
substantive notion of autonomy. My aim is to show that this is not the case and a 
proceduralist notion of autonomy can offer plausible answers to Levinson's critique. 
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4.1 Varieties of Autonomy 
Before discussing notions of autonomy that are relevant to political liberalism, we should 
look at other liberal conceptions of autonomy. This will be helpful for two reasons. First, 
Rawls himself characterises the conceptions of autonomy that political liberalism is based 
on to a large degree by distinguishing it from comprehensive conceptions of autonomy. 
Having a clearer notion of these conceptions therefore will be essential to the 
understanding of what sets apart the ideas of autonomy in political liberalism from 
comprehensive autonomy. Second, it might be that some elements common to 
comprehensive notions of autonomy are compatible with political liberalism after all. 
Gaining a broader overview of the autonomy debate will make it easier to identify these 
elements later in this chapter. 
The accounts of autonomy I discuss are the ones that Rawls gives as examples for types of 
comprehensive liberalism: the accounts of Immanuel Kant, J.S. Mill, and Joseph Raz, 
followed by brief list of examples from other contemporary accounts of autonomy which 
would fit the same pattern. I will also focus on a distinction that Rawls does not explicitly 
address but that will be of some importance for political liberalism, the distinction between 
substantive and proceduralist accounts of autonomy. 
The first example for someone employing an ethical view of autonomy is Kant, who uses 
the terms of autonomy and heteronomy in regard to moral action. Kant insists that, as long 
as our actions are relying on interests, “be it one's own or that of another […] the 
imperative had to be conditional, and could not be fit to be a moral command at all.”200 
Without a vantage point from which we can that evaluate our motives in moral regards, our 
actions are still heteronomously guided. The reason for this is that, while certainly the 
interests that are guiding us are “our” interests, they are external in the sense that they are 
not under control of the rational self that Kant assumes to be the characteristic feature of 
human beings. To act morally, and thus autonomously, one must act “in conformity with 
his own will which is, however, universally legislating according to its natural end.”201 The 
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Kantian moral agent is rational and by his rationality can and ought to determine by 
himself whether an action is morally required, permitted, or prohibited by applying the 
categorical imperative to it.  
This conception of the person can be understood as metaphysically substantive and 
individualistic: the moral agent's compass is her rationality, not mere inclination, 
sentiment, or an attachment to customs. Although Kant is aware that the common person in 
everyday life does not live up to these expectations, his ideal moral agent is the rational 
individual that does determine the morality of her actions by herself alone. Autonomy, for 
Kant, means being rational in one's moral decisions. What classifies this view as 
comprehensive is the complex metaphysical theory about the self it is based on, including 
among others the claim that the self can be meaningfully distinguished from its interests, 
and that this distinction carries a relevant moral value. 
For the next proponent of a comprehensive conception of autonomy, John Stuart Mill, 
personal individuality is one of the central values of a free society. Drawing on the ideals 
made popular by German humanist Wilhelm von Humboldt, Mill claims that only the 
person whose “desires and impulses are his own – are the expression of his own nature, as 
it has been developed and modified by his own culture – is said to have a character.”202 
Individuality, for Mill, “is one of the leading essentials of well-being,” not only just a part 
“of civilization, instruction, education, culture, but [it] is itself a necessary part of all those 
things.”203 Although Mill himself does not explicitly name it, it is clear that his claims rest 
on the idea of a valuable form of individual autonomy. Compared with Kant, Mill’s 
account of autonomy is much broader, as it concerns not only morality but basically the 
whole way of life of a human being. Whatever our projects are, according to Mill they will 
have only real value if we develop and pursue them as an expression of ourselves, not as 
part of tradition or convention. 
The most contemporary view of autonomy that Rawls identifies as comprehensive is held 
by Joseph Raz. Similar to Mill, Raz believes that there are two valuable forms of activity 
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involved in the project of “creating [one's] own moral world”, one of which is having 
human relationships and the second one “forming and pursuing projects that give shape 
and content to one's life.”204 By ascribing value to these kinds of activity, his conception of 
autonomy becomes one involving a strong notion of self-determination or self-authorship. 
Notably, not just any relationship or project is valuable in this view, only those that have 
been autonomously achieved or pursued.205 Furthermore, although Raz allows for degrees 
of autonomy and admits that some people might find it valuable to not focus directly on 
autonomy in all aspects of their lives, he claims that “[t]he value of autonomy is a fact of 
life. […] [T]hose who live in an autonomy-enhancing culture can prosper only by being 
autonomous.”206 Raz's conception of autonomy, in a nutshell, sees self-authorship as the 
key component of autonomy, but accepts autonomy only as valuable in relation to morally 
valuable choices. 
Next to the particular moral evaluation of one’s relations and activities as a condition for 
being autonomous, what adds to the ethical character of this approach are the political 
conclusions Raz draws. For Raz, the good and valuable life has to be, at least in modern 
Western societies, an autonomous one. This must have political consequences, because he 
understands the function of governments being the promotion of morality:207 
So if the government has a duty to promote the autonomy of people the harm principle 
allows it to use coercion both in order to stop people from actions which would diminish 
people's autonomy and in order to force them to take actions which are required to 
improve peoples' options and opportunities.208 
In order to do this, it is legitimate and probably even desirable for governments to engage 
in perfectionist policy making and to use paternalistic means of promoting autonomy, as 
long as they are compatible with the respect of autonomy in his sense. 
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These three accounts of autonomy by Kant, Mill, and Raz, despite differing in many of 
their details, are significantly similar insofar as they are substantive accounts of autonomy 
which specify distinct capacities or circumstances that make a person autonomous. There 
are many more contemporary substantive views of autonomy whose claims work in the 
same way, although they might identify different conditions of autonomy. Steven Wall, 
e.g., emphasises the role of external conditions such as freedom from coercion and 
manipulation as well as “access to an adequate range of options.”209 Marina Oshana 
meanwhile attributes “autonomy to a person when the person has de facto power and 
authority to direct affairs of elemental importance to her life within a framework of rules 
[…] that she has set for herself” and summarises this with the phrase “being true to 
oneself.”210 Lastly, there are also views like that of Thomas Hurka who understands 
“autonomy as goodness.”211 Not much would be gained to discuss these accounts in more 
detail, as they can all be rejected as comprehensive by political liberalism on the same 
grounds. 
We should pay more attention to a different sort of accounts of autonomy, though. 
Alongside substantive theories of autonomy such as these, there are also proceduralist 
accounts that define autonomy not so much by evaluating the content of a person’s 
commitments, notions of a good life, etc. but by assessing how these commitments came 
into existence. Proponents of this view are, e.g., Harry Frankfurt,212 Gerald Dworkin,213 
John Christman,214 and Ben Colburn.215 As Rawls did not, to my knowledge, object to any 
proceduralist account of autonomy, I will discuss this type of view on autonomy in the 
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following sections in connection with the kind of autonomy that is inherent to political 
liberalism. 
4.2 Political Autonomy 
The conception of autonomy that is supposed to be central to political liberalism is that of 
political autonomy. Although it differs relevantly from Rawls’ earlier notion of autonomy 
in A Theory of Justice, I will start with his earlier approach, as it will make his turn toward 
a political conception of autonomy more transparent. 
The account of autonomy held by early Rawls is quite straightforward: 
Following the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness, we can say that by acting from 
[the principles of justice as fairness] persons are acting autonomously: they are acting 
from principles that they would acknowledge under conditions that best express their 
nature as free and rational beings.216 
Among other changes that come with political liberalism, Rawls also acknowledges that 
this Kantian notion of autonomy is a comprehensive one. In order to account for the fact of 
reasonable pluralism, it needs to be replaced.217 Therefore, in Political Liberalism Rawls 
introduces two important distinctions concerning autonomy, one between rational and full 
autonomy, the other one between ethical and political autonomy. 
The rational/full distinction is another take on the congruence between the good and the 
right, a congruence which Rawls already tried to obtain by employing the Aristotelian 
Principle for the domain of political virtues, as discussed in Chapter 3. According to this 
distinction, citizens 
are rationally autonomous in two ways—they are free within the limits of political justice 
to pursue their (permissible) conceptions of the good; and they are motivated to secure 
their higher-order interests associated with their moral powers […].218 
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This rationality is the basis for the decisions about the basic principles of justice, which are 
made by the parties in the original position. The parties are a representation of the idea that 
citizens, when “fairly situated in respect to one another,”219 can determine fair terms of 
cooperation while doing so with their own advantage in mind. In the original position, the 
fair situation is given by the veil of ignorance that hides detailed information about each 
party's position in actual society.  At the same time, the parties' mutual disinterest and their 
interest in maximising their share of basic goods without risk reflects the aiming of citizens 
for their own advantage. The outcome of this procedure is justified insofar it is what 
rationally autonomous citizens would decide for in ideal circumstances. 
The (pro tanto) justification the original position provides for these principles then leads to 
what Rawls calls full autonomy that is found in the citizens of a well-ordered society: 
[C]itizens of a well-ordered society in their public life [...] are fully autonomous. This 
means that in their conduct citizens not only comply with the principles of justice, but they 
also act from these principles as just. Moreover, they recognize these principles as those 
that would be adopted in the original position. It is in their public recognition and 
informed application of the principles of justice in their political life, and as their effective 
sense of justice directs, that citizens achieve full autonomy. Thus, full autonomy is realized 
by citizens when they act from principles of justice that specify the fair terms of 
cooperation they would give to themselves when fairly represented as free and equal 
persons.”220 
To speak in Kantian terms, the self-given law for public life consists in the principles of 
justice and acting according to these principles makes citizens fully autonomous. The 
principles of justice, as Rawls conceives them, are the result of citizens' own rationality 
when applied to the question of social justice, and thus their self-chosen nomos – but 
limited to the political sphere. At this point, Rawls makes the second important distinction 
between political autonomy and ethical autonomy: 
“Here I stress that full autonomy is achieved by citizens: it is a political and not an ethical 
value. By that I mean that it is realized in public life by affirming the political principles of 
justice and enjoying the protections of the basic rights and liberties; it is also realized by 
participating in society's public affairs and sharing in its collective self-determination over 
time. This full autonomy of political life must be distinguished from the ethical values of 
autonomy and individuality, which may apply to the whole of life, both social and 
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individual, as expressed by the comprehensive liberalisms of Kant and Mill. Justice as 
fairness emphasizes this contrast: it affirms political autonomy for all but leaves the 
weight of ethical autonomy to be decided by citizens severally in light of their 
comprehensive doctrines.”221 
It is worth analysing this passage in more detail, as some parts of this characterisation of 
political autonomy are fairly obvious, while others remain surprisingly ambiguous. 
The first and clearest condition is that citizens must hold certain pro-attitudes towards the 
principles of justice. They need to do so in order to reach full autonomy by rationally 
endorsing the principles of justice, as we have seen before. 
When Rawls says that citizens have to enjoy their liberties, it seems at least that he has 
external factors in mind: if citizens are kept from acting in a politically autonomous way 
by particular circumstances (say, a policy that prohibits association of citizens in order to 
promote their political interests), they cannot be really autonomous. But it seems that 
enjoying one's liberties must also include some sort of internal condition, such as 
acknowledging or being aware of the value which the political liberties have for oneself as 
a citizen.222 While getting the external factors right is a matter of designing the political 
structures and laws accordingly, the necessity of providing the required internal factors has 
implications for civic education, as the awareness of one's liberty might not come by itself. 
Rawls’ reference to participation remains slightly ambiguous. He writes that full political 
autonomy “is also realized” by political participation, but this way of phrasing it could 
mean two things. One way to see it is as another item on the list of necessary conditions: a 
citizen has to politically participate in order to be fully autonomous. This would be an 
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almost Republican way to read Rawls,223 and perhaps it would also imply a binary 
conception of autonomy: only when all necessary conditions are satisfied can we be fully 
autonomous, otherwise we are not. Another way to read this passage would be to 
understand political participation as something that adds in degree to full autonomy. This 
would presuppose a gradual conception of autonomy, granting some citizens (those who 
actively participate in shaping their society's future) a higher degree of full autonomy than 
those who rather stay at home in front on the television, perhaps even on election day. 
Nevertheless, even the latter sort would be fully autonomous as long as they endorse the 
principles of justice and enjoy their liberties, only less than their more involved fellow 
citizens. 
I will happily leave the question of which of these interpretations is closest to Rawls’ 
intentions to others (although I assume the most plausible view is that political autonomy 
comes, like other sorts of autonomy, in degrees). What I want to focus on in the next 
sections is my claim that political autonomy cannot be the only conception of autonomy 
that political liberalism is committed to. 
4.3 Weak Autonomy 
Although it might appear that political autonomy is the only conception of autonomy that 
is relevant for political liberalism, there is more to be said. One of the main premises of 
political liberal theory, that citizens are free and equal, implies another notion of autonomy. 
It is not the kind of political autonomy that is explicitly required as part of the political 
liberal framework. But neither is it, as I want to argue, some sort of comprehensive (or 
ethical) conception of autonomy that could not be shared by all reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines.224 Let me explain. 
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Equality, for Rawls, is based on the status of citizens as moral persons which have two 
basic features, also called the “two moral powers”: 
first they are capable of having (and are assumed to have) a conception of their good (as 
expressed by a rational plan of life); and second they are capable of having (and are 
assumed to acquire) a sense of justice, a normally effective desire to apply and to act upon 
the principles of justice, at least to a certain minimum degree.225 
Moreover, a point that is repeatedly emphasised in Political Liberalism is that free and 
equal persons do not only have a capacity for the good but “have at any given time a 
determinate conception of the good interpreted in the light of a (reasonable) comprehensive 
view.”226 
Built into this conception of equality is a notion of autonomy. It is neither the 
comprehensive and substantive Kantian conception of autonomy of early Rawls nor the 
restricted political one of the later. It is, instead, a kind of proceduralist autonomy. The kind 
of autonomy that comes with the presumed equality of persons can be best understood as 
“a relatively weak and contentless notion,”227 as Gerald Dworkin puts it, or much in the 
way of what Gerald Gaus describes as “ultra-minimal conception of personal 
autonomy.”228 It does not rest on a notion of “substantive independence,” but is rather 
based on 
a shared conception of what a person is. What makes an individual the particular person he 
is, his life-plan, his projects. In pursuing autonomy, one shapes one's life, one constructs 
its meaning. The autonomous person gives meaning to his life.229 
Dworkin claims that this shared conception of personhood is the basis for the requirement 
of moral justification when it comes to coercion. This neatly fits with the political liberal 
idea of justification of laws and policies, as well as the respect for persons that is implicit 
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in Rawls’ political liberalism. Justification has to be given in the form of public reasons 
that are acceptable to all citizens, regardless of their comprehensive views because citizens 
understand themselves as equal to each other. To do so, they will have to share a notion of 
what constitutes a person (in this context), just as noted above. 
It seems also to be this minimal form of autonomy that Ronald Dworkin refers to as the 
“particular but plausible theory of philosophical psychology”230 which is required for any 
conceptions of equality aiming at some sort of equality of personal success. While 
Dworkin’s theory of equality differs from Rawls’, it is still the case that Rawls’ notion of 
primary goods, and especially the idea of self-respect being of particular importance, 
makes political liberalism a theory that aims, among other things, at a certain level of 
distributive equality. Without citizens perceiving themselves as “active agents who 
distinguish between success of failure in making the choices and decisions open to them 
open to them personally,”231 Justice as Fairness could not be coherent as an egalitarian 
theory (and the same holds, I suppose, for any other conception of justice that is 
compatible with political liberalism). 
One particular variant of making one’s own choices is brought to light in the 
characterisation of the first moral power, the capacity for having a conception of the good. 
Individuals with this capacity are also able to form and, if necessary, revise their 
conception of the good, and while Rawls himself, to my knowledge, does not explicitly 
draw a connection between the two moral powers and autonomy, this point is developed by 
others. Will Kymlicka argues that the moral power of forming and revising one's 
conception of the good still implies a capacity to autonomously make choices about one’s 
conception of the good, even though citizens do not necessarily have to exercise this 
capacity.232 Here it becomes evident that autonomy, and not only one of the purely political 
                                                 
230 Dworkin 2000, p. 28. 
231 Dworkin 2000, p. 28. 
232 See Kymlicka 1995, pp. 158-163. While Kymlicka takes this as evidence that Rawls' conception of 
political autonomy is not successful, I think that the kind of autonomy required by the second moral power 
is indeed of the weak kind proposed in this chapter. It should be mentioned here that Meira Levinson 
refers to Kymlicka's connection of the second moral power with autonomy but draws the conclusion that 
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kind, is involved in the basic conceptions of a person, a conception on which the idea of 
free and equal citizens relies. 
Therefore, political liberalism, despite Rawls’ efforts to separate ethical and political 
autonomy, is at least partially grounded in a conception of autonomy that is connected with 
the idea of equality in a way that cannot be purely political. This is no reason for concern, 
though, because the conception of autonomy in question is not ethical in the sense that 
Rawls wants to avoid – it does not advocate substantive ideals of individuality or 
independence. It includes, though, an idea of shaping one's own life, of self-determination 
or self-rule, but without a substantive ideal of what sort of choices or decisions count as 
good. Instead it is a proceduralist, or formal, conception of autonomy. I will refer to it as a 
weak conception of autonomy in the following. 
This interpretation of an underlying non-political conception of autonomy for political 
liberalism might not be uncontroversial. On the one hand there will be objections that the 
idea of weak, proceduralist autonomy that I assume is too thin and that the first moral 
power implies something much stronger that resembles a Razian notion of autonomy more 
closely.233 From this perspective, the conception of weak autonomy would not be 
substantive enough. At this point, I am not concerned with objections of this type, as it 
seems to me that they would be part of a broader objection against the political liberal 
project with its ambitions of neutrality as a whole. As I said in the beginning of this thesis, 
for the present work I take the soundness of the political liberal project in general for 
granted. 
On the other hand, there is the possible objection that, all things considered, my 
understanding of the role of autonomy in political liberalism is not very different from the 
Razian liberal account. As noted above, an idea of shaping one's own life is central to Raz's 
version of autonomy as well (Section 4.1), and the assumption of an underlying account of 
autonomy in this sense could look like a very similar move in a direction that is too 
                                                                                                                                                    
autonomy must be taken as a substantive good in itself (see Levinson 1999, pp. 18-21). Levinson's 
perspective, especially her argument against a proceduralist account of autonomy, will be discussed later 
in this chapter. 
233 Such an approach can be found in Blake 2001, pp. 266-271. 
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comprehensive for political liberal taste.234 This concern can be moderated, though, and the 
next sections explains in some details to what extent ideas of self-determination and self-
authorship are associated with a weak conception of autonomy. 
4.4 Self-Determination 
Talking about “shaping one's life” in the context of autonomy can mean very different 
things. For somebody like Raz, who also uses the term “self-authorship,” it connotes 
notions of deliberate planning, perhaps even aspiring to some sort of perfection regarding 
one's life projects, and ideas about human flourishing and what makes personal projects 
valuable. In contrast, proponents of a proceduralist approach to autonomy understand the 
phrase merely in the sense of self-determination, which has to include neither much 
deliberation or substantive values autonomous agents needs to pursue, nor any particularly 
valuable projects thy need to be involved in. To adapt an example from Gaus, the 
conception of autonomy needed here will also include the uncomplicated, beer-drinking 
football fan whose main “project” it is to enjoy as many Glasgow Rangers games as 
possible.235 Weak autonomy does not need to include “the ideal of free and conscious self-
creation,”236 and we also do not need to claim that autonomy is valuable only if it is 
connected to valuable activities or relationships.237 Due to these fairly low requirements, 
there is no need for perfectionist state action to promote autonomy other than to the extent 
that is needed to treat citizens as free and equal. This seems to be the minimum 
requirement that all reasonable comprehensive doctrines will accept anyway, as far as the 
basic premises of political liberalism go. A weak, proceduralist conception of autonomy 
seems to be able to fulfil this role. 
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Quong 2011, Ch. 2. 
235 See Gaus 2005, p. 296. 
236 Raz 1986, p. 390. 
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Even so, with a weak conception of autonomy we should spell out the content of terms like 
self-determination or “shaping one's life” in more detail. This will not only help to clarify 
further why it is not problematic for political liberalism in the way substantial conceptions 
of autonomy are, but also to find out more about the requirements of political liberal 
education in regard to autonomy. To get a better idea of what deciding about one's own 
course of life means, it might be helpful to look at what Ben Colburn wrote about 
autonomy in the context of liberal theory.238 
While the overall level of autonomy of a person's life depends “upon the extent to which 
the agent in question throughout her adult life decides for herself what is valuable,”239 
Colburn identifies two conditions for determining whether a decision is autonomous. The 
first one is an endorsement condition, which requires that reflection about “what putative 
values she ought to pursue in her life”240 would lead a person to endorse these values for 
herself. This condition does not, however, require actual reflection but is already satisfied 
if the above was hypothetically the case. The second condition is an independence 
condition, requiring that this reflection (actual or hypothetical) about a person's own values 
is “free from factors undermining her independence.”241 
These two conditions support a weak conception of autonomy like the one I endorse in this 
chapter. It is minimal enough to let people live their lives according to their own 
comprehensive views, and at the same times it seems like something that every reasonable 
comprehensive doctrine needs to accept – that persons are self-determined agents.242 This 
                                                 
238 Most interestingly, despite Colburn identifying himself as a sort of Razian liberal, his account of 
proceduralist autonomy and authenticity can be integrated into political liberalism without difficulty. 
239 Colburn 2010b, pp. 24f. 
240 Colburn 2010b, p. 25. 
241 Colburn 2010b, p. 25. 
242 This is not to say that every reasonable comprehensive doctrine must acknowledge freedom of will in a 
deep metaphysical sense. A reasonable comprehensive doctrine might hold a determinist view of agency, it 
must acknowledge, however, that agents in contemporary liberal democratic societies thinks of themselves 
as self-determined (even if this could be nothing more than a convenient kind of fictionalism about 
freedom of will). 
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view of human individuals as agents does not seem in any way problematic for political 
liberalism. 
Yet there might be a concern that explicit talk about autonomy is still either too 
comprehensive or that it leads to a version of perfectionistic liberalism. To be sure that it is 
not, let us have a look at the criteria that Quong set up for falling under the category of 
political liberalism (or political anti-perfectionism, as he also calls it). In order to be 
comprehensive, liberalism must “be based in some particular ideal of what constitutes a 
valuable or worthwhile human life, or other metaphysical beliefs.”243 This is not the case 
with the account of weak autonomy, which does not take the place of a central ideal here. 
Instead it is, as I have argued, an integral part of the assumption of persons being free and 
equal. This is one of the basic assumption of political liberalism, shared by Rawls and 
Quong alike. It would be very odd if we wanted to claim that “[p]ersons are free in the 
sense of being rational agents, capable of practical reasoning, with plans and projects for 
their own life,”244 but deny that this has anything to do with autonomy. Invoking some 
non-substantive conception of autonomy here is not a comprehensive move. 
Neither does the conception of weak autonomy imply liberal perfectionism. For Quong, 
perfectionism is characterised by the permissibility of state actions that “promote or 
discourage some activities, ideals, or ways of life on grounds relating to their inherent or 
intrinsic value, or on the basis of other metaphysical claims.”245 But the weak conception 
of autonomy does not demand more promotion or discouragement than the ideal of free 
and equal citizens does. It is also not used as a justification for this kind of political actions 
or restrictions, instead by taking care of citizens' status as free and equal, the liberal state 
respects their autonomy. 
The assumption of a weak notion of autonomy which is inherent to the idea of free and 
equal persons is neither comprehensive nor perfectionistic when checked against Quong's 
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criteria for political liberalism. Therefore, when talking about education in the context of 
political liberalism, there is no harm in talking about autonomy as well. For a start, it will 
be helpful to look again at Colburn's account of liberal autonomy and how it relates to the 
education of children. Despite understanding himself as a comprehensive liberal insofar as 
he takes autonomy as being a value worth promoting (while being anti-perfectionist in 
regard to other possible values),246 Colburn provides a reasonable list of autonomy-related 
requirements for liberal education that is compatible with the conception of weak 
autonomy which is part of political liberalism. 
Colburn's central claim is that the liberal state should be autonomy-minded, and while his 
favourite conception of autonomy allows for adults to live a wide range of lives (even ones 
that might look not very autonomous from the outside, as long as the person in question 
satisfies the two conditions named above), there have to be stronger limitations in the case 
of children: 
Autonomy does require that individual [sic] decide what is valuable in life. Hence, the 
autonomy-minded state must also try to ensure that people can make those decisions. 
Amongst other things, this entails that the state must put in place a compulsory system of 
education designed to promote autonomy. Such a system need not instil a belief that 
autonomy is valuable […]. However, it does seem to require some other definite measures, 
such as making children aware of a variety of possible ways of life, and offering them the 
conceptual wherewithal to choose between them.247 
If we want to follow Colburn here, and if we understand political liberalism to be 
autonomy-minded in the weak sense discussed above, then this would mean that the 
political liberal state would have indeed to design its educational policies in the way that 
Colburn proposes. And although the steps leading here seem plausible, this might be a 
stronger claim about political liberal education than we would have supposed acceptable in 
the framework of political liberalism, particularly bearing in mind what Rawls himself 
writes about it (see 2.2). 
How compatible with Rawls’ political liberal ideas this proposal for liberal education is, 
remains to be seen. To determine this, it will be useful to investigate the three questions 
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that emerge from Colburn's claim about liberal education for autonomy: how legitimate is 
a compulsory system of education, what does it mean to promote autonomy without 
promoting its value, and what range of possible ways does liberal education have to offer? 
I will discuss each to these question in more detail in the following sections. 
4.5 Compulsory Education 
Although it seems that a form of compulsory education is usually accepted by the majority 
of political philosophers without further questioning, it might be required to ask for a 
proper justification for this kind of education, as it is a form of political coercion. In liberal 
democratic societies, children of a certain age range usually receive an education that 
conforms to standards set by the state, regardless whether they themselves or their parents 
approve of it. Although in practice compulsory education often involves compulsory 
schooling as well, the latter is no necessary implication of the former. At least when it 
comes to promoting autonomy, it seems that compulsory schooling is not strictly necessary 
(despite public schooling probably being more conducive to this end). Therefore, I will 
assume that the necessary requirement here is for compulsory education only. A system of 
compulsory education seems also to be the default for Rawls when he outlines the 
requirements of political liberal education, regardless of how minimal they might be (see 
2.2.2). 
Justification for compulsory education has been given on various grounds. It has been 
argued that it ensures that children will grow into autonomous persons, become competent 
members of a democratic society, that it is a form of distributing important resources 
needed to enjoy their rights and liberties, and that it is important in order to inculcate some 
form of communal or national identity, as well as political virtues. 
One often named liberal purpose of compulsory education is to make children become 
autonomous persons, assuming that it includes an idea of individuality similar to that of 
John Stuart Mill. From this perspective, compulsory education is meant to “take rational 
and responsible control of their lives”248 and to bring about that children become “self-
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formative and self-directive”249 citizens. It safeguards what Joel Feinberg calls children’s 
“right to an open future”250 by shielding their autonomy rights until they are adults. 
Otherwise, children could be at risk of being unfairly limited: “An education that renders a 
child fit for only one way of life forecloses irrevocably his other options.”251 Feinberg 
claims that compulsory education in addition secures children's autonomous future against 
their own decisions – thereby making up for their lack of capacity for long-term planning. 
While Feinberg’s concrete idea of autonomy might be already too substantive to serve as 
justification on a political liberal view of education, it is one that certainly has appeal to 
comprehensive theories of liberal education. 
But it is far from clear if compulsory education is the right way to tackle these demands.252 
Aharon Aviram, for example, even argues that the idea of an autonomy-facilitating 
education contradicts the concept of compulsory education. Autonomy, so his argument 
goes, is inherently linked to the rationality of a person. Only in cases where a person is not 
rational is paternalistic interference justified. A common assumption of liberals that often 
remains tacit is that children are not, or not to a sufficient degree, rational, so that 
paternalism regarding them is justified, including the requirement of compulsory 
education. Aviram claims that children (with the exception of small infants) cannot 
generally be assumed to be irrational and that, if they have the status of rational 
individuals, they also have to be treated as autonomous persons. It therefore seems 
paradoxical to justify paternalism towards children with the necessity of preparing them for 
an autonomous life. Valuing autonomy seems indeed to require either refraining from 
paternalism or finding another justification for it.253 
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The problem with this objection against compulsory education is that it relies on the claim 
that children in fact are sufficiently rational to make them autonomous to a degree above 
which paternalism against them has to be justified. Although one might agree with Aviram 
that children are not totally irrational, one might still think that, as long as they have not 
reached a certain minimum threshold with their capacity to make rational, informed 
decisions, they are not sufficiently autonomous to, e.g., opt out of schooling. Political 
liberal education therefore does not need to be concerned about compulsory education 
being illegitimate due to children’s autonomy. 
The case of compulsory education might best be understood as a special case of what 
David Archard calls the “caretaker thesis,” the liberal conception that children are not (yet) 
autonomous agents and thus important choices regarding their lives are legitimately made 
by adults, usually their parents. In general, says Archard, “the paternalist caretaker must 
choose what the child would choose if competent to make choices, and choose with regard 
to the interests of the adult the child will become.”254 The default assumption is that the 
caretakers themselves are competent in these matters, which might be true for parents in 
relation to many aspects of a child's upbringing. But, as John Kleinig writes, “[p]arents do 
not always have their children’s interests at heart, and even if they do, they may not know 
how to respond to them or they may be placed in a situation where they are forced (by 
economic or other circumstances) to sacrifice them.”255 Therefore, the task of education 
might best be “outsourced” to experts on this matter, much in the same way as parents 
would, e.g., ask medical experts for help with health issues of their children. 
Primary education of children is crucial for ensuring at least a basic range of options in 
later life, therefore it needs to include a sufficiently broad variety of topics. It seems 
reasonable to assume that schools as professional institutions are more competent than 
most parents when it comes to decisions about what children should learn and in which 
way.256 They contribute to providing the right to an open future to children by guiding their 
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development of “the capacity to reflect, deliberate and argue as well as the ability to 
acquire knowledge about herself and her world.”257 As children grow older, they become 
gradually more autonomous and able to make decisions in their own interest. The end of 
the compulsory stage of education can be understood to reflect this fact.258 
In the context of political liberalism, autonomy offers one way to justify compulsory 
education. Children in a political liberal society will need to develop the kind of autonomy 
necessary for their civic duties during their time in school – this includes political 
autonomy in the Rawlsian sense as well as the kind of weak autonomy I have argued for 
earlier in this chapter. It is, of course, possible that some different, non-compulsory 
schooling system could address the liberal concern with autonomy just as effectively, or 
even better. Whether such forms of schooling are feasible I cannot answer. Yet, for a well-
ordered political liberal society modelled after contemporary Western democracies, an 
autonomy-based argument for compulsory education appears most plausible. 
Nevertheless, even if we agree that there is a case for compulsory education, we might 
disagree on the question of its extent. Some liberals could argue that only primary 
education should be compulsory, while others see a need for a more extended compulsory 
education. It seems to me that these questions on details are no longer questions about 
generally applicable principles across all possible well-ordered societies, but that the right 
decision here would rather depend on the particular socio-political context. In a society 
characterised by very diverse religious yet reasonable comprehensive doctrines which put 
much emphasis on life in religious community, compulsory education might be limited to 
primary education only. In a more market-focused, competitive society, or in a society that 
requires extensive political involvement of citizens, it might be prudentially and morally 
                                                                                                                                                    
schools, which then could offer different teaching methods/environments, some of which would probably 
turn out more effective than others (see, e.g., Tooley 2000). Nevertheless, it seems safe to assume that, on 
average, schools are more competent in educating children than parents themselves in a well-ordered 
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257 Archard 1993, p. 82. 
258 On average, the compulsory stage of education ends at age 16 in most European countries, although some 
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required to extend compulsory education to secondary education as well. What can be said 
generally, though, is that there are reasonable liberal arguments in favour of compulsory 
education as such. 
4.6 Promoting Autonomy 
Proceduralist accounts of autonomy like the ones of Dworkin and Colburn, which do not 
require inculcating the belief that autonomy is a substantive value, seems to work well with 
the tendency of political liberalism to avoid an ethical conception of autonomy. But even if 
autonomy does not enter education as something that is good and valuable in itself, it is 
nearly impossible (and maybe also hardly desirable) to avoid promoting weak autonomy 
altogether. The particularly interesting question for the Rawlsian political liberal is in this 
regard, if and how autonomy can be taught without giving up the position of neutrality 
towards reasonable comprehensive doctrines and becoming too perfectionist. 
An autonomy-minded education, Colburn argues, would have to be at least committed to 
“making everyone aware of a variety of ways of life, offering the conceptual wherewithal 
to choose between these, and ensuring that everyone has a fair chance of acquiring the 
knowledge and skills required to succeed in them.”259 While being more neutral than an 
education that promotes autonomy as intrinsically valuable, he notices that this still 
excludes a certain range of comprehensive doctrines: 
The autonomy-minded liberal is committed to saying that certain ways of life are beyond 
the pale, because they cannot survive the education process that autonomy-minded 
liberalism requires. For example, any way of life will de facto be ruled out if it requires 
children to be raised in ignorance of possible courses their lives might take other than 
those approved by their parents […].260 
While Colburn has a form of liberalism in mind that resembles Raz's when talking about 
autonomy-minded liberalism, he observes that these concessions are acceptable for the 
political liberal as well. If we remember Rawls’ stance on minimal political liberal 
education (see 2.2.2), we will recall he conceded that the effects of political liberal 
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education can sometimes resemble those of a more comprehensive liberal one, despite the 
different justifications for both. Rawls also acknowledges that this sometimes can lead to 
changes in traditional ways of living that conflict with these requirements and that the 
changes have to be accepted.261 It seems so far, that Colburn's argument, although 
primarily designed for a more comprehensive autonomy-valuing kind of liberalism, works 
for political liberalism as well. 
Someone could complain about this requirement being too strict and resulting in policies 
which are unfair toward ways of life that see too much knowledge about the world outside 
their sphere of influence as endangering. It seems to me, though, that the conceptions of 
weak autonomy and of political autonomy, which shape the content of political liberal 
education, allow for a principled vindication of these requirements. Children in a well-
ordered society need to understand themselves, and others, as self-determined agents. This 
does not necessarily mean teaching that the aims and values of other comprehensive 
doctrines are as substantially valuable as one’s own, but it implies inculcating an 
acceptance of other citizens’ reasonable comprehensive doctrines as equally worthy of 
respect on a political level. In terms of political autonomy, they will also need to acquire 
the skills and knowledge mentioned in 2.2.2. These are all requirements which contribute 
to the stability and continuity of a free and equal political liberal society. Reasonable 
citizens therefore cannot legitimately complain about them. 
4.7 The Range of Possible Life Options 
What does it mean to make children aware of a variety of possible ways of life? We can 
attempt to answer to this question by making quantifications along following dimensions: 
how many different ways do children have to learn about, and how much detailed 
information about possible ways is necessary to facilitate autonomous future lives? 
From a simplified point of view, it seems that more options are better. As with other things, 
the marginal utility of knowing about possible ways of life will decrease, but unless it hits 
zero or turns negative, we might feel inclined to say: the more options, the better. Of 
course, things are not that simple. Getting information about ways of life comes with costs, 
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and those costs increase with every option that we want to gain knowledge about. To a 
degree, schools decrease these costs for children by saving them the effort to search for 
relevant information and (ideally) only providing information of sufficient quality. 
Nevertheless, children will have to invest time and capacity to process information, both of 
which are limited and, furthermore, need to be distributed between different educational 
goals. There are practical constraints on how much can be taught about various ways of 
living. 
Yet it seems important to make children in the context of their school education aware of a 
relevant range of reasonable world views and approaches to life existing in their society.262 
Given these aims and the practical restrictions, someone will have to decide in which way 
this kind of awareness ought to be achieved, which ways of life are supposed to be 
included, and to what depth. An example for this is the representation of LGBT263 
relationships as normatively equivalent to heterosexual relationships that are still taken as 
the norm by a majority in existing liberal democratic societies. The perceived inequality 
between, e.g., homo- and heterosexual lifestyles leads in many cases to social pressure on 
children and young adults because either their parents or they themselves fall into the 
LGBT category (while the first can already be a problem during primary school, the latter 
usually occurs during secondary school). This pressure is not so much the result of formal 
discrimination but of informal, every day discrimination due to prejudices and stereotypes 
held by schoolmates and teachers. Removing this informal discrimination in actual 
societies and at least avoiding it in moderately idealised ones is a matter of justice and as 
such a political liberal account of education must be sensitive to them. Presenting LGBT 
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ways of living as possible and equally valuable options next to more traditional ones looks 
like an essential step in coping with this particular kind of injustice.264 
Rawls’ own minimal account of political liberal education does not tell us much about 
being aware of and understanding different ways of living. Nevertheless, adding a 
requirement for teaching this kind of awareness is justified by the notion of equality in his 
liberal political philosophy and the weak conception of autonomy that is built into it. First, 
by learning about various ways of living children (and persons in the wider sense) can 
realise that there are meaningful choices that are, in principle, open to them (even if they 
might never change their way of life radically by, say, adopting completely different 
conception of the good at some point). As Gerald Dworkin claims: 
What does have intrinsic value is not having choices but being recognized as the kind of 
creature who is capable of making choices. That capacity grounds our idea of what it is to 
be a person and a moral agent equally worthy of respect by all.265 
Similar ideas of what constitutes a person from a moral perspective can be found in the 
works of various other authors as well (often combined with accounts of moral 
responsibility), such as Peter Strawson,266 Stanley Benn,267 and Gerald Gaus.268 
Second, having one's own comprehensive doctrine presented as one of a range of 
reasonably considerable alternatives in a pluralistic society can be understood as one way 
to signal equal respect to citizens. Citizens owe each other equal respect, following Charles 
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Larmore, “as beings capable of affirming a vision of the good life.”269 An education that 
includes various ways of life does not only facilitate respect for adherents of these ways of 
life, but also provides reassurance of the equal status of their conception of the good. 
This aspect becomes even more important if we think about the transition from political 
principles applied to the model of a well-ordered society to an all-things-considered 
approach for real societies. For the moderately idealised well-ordered (and closed) society, 
perhaps there seems no particular need for making other comprehensive doctrines more 
accessible. In Rawls’ vision they share a single political identity and, as Onora O'Neill 
remarks, will therefore “unsurprisingly be willing to seek and abide by shared principles 
and standards for the fundamental arrangements of life when it is possible. That is more or 
less what it is to be a citizen of a democratic society.”270 Real liberal societies have so far 
not reached this level of homogeneity in their political culture. As Victoria Costa observes, 
this way of modelling the well-ordered society ignores “things such as that not all members 
speak the same language, that some are recent immigrants, or that there may be deep social 
divisions along ethno-cultural or racial lines.”271 In order to accommodate to those 
circumstances, political liberal education cannot be (as Rawls proposes) minimal but has to 
endorse a wider approach that fosters “dialogue and mutual understanding among 
citizens.”272 An important part of this approach is to make children aware that ways of life 
other than their own exist, and supply them with at least a sufficient amount of details 
about these ways of life to create an understanding of why people living those kinds of 
lives might not share one's views and arguments, despite being reasonable. This variety of 
considerations speak in favour of providing knowledge about a range of possible life 
options, not only for reasons of personal autonomy but also in order to foster respect 
among citizens for each other's ways of living and, by this, contributing to social cohesion 
and stability. 
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This ends the discussion of Colburn's three requirements for an autonomy-minded liberal 
education, which should have demonstrated what a political liberal education must provide 
that is committed to a conception of weak autonomy as well as to a conception of political 
autonomy. What still remains to do is to look at objections to proceduralist autonomy 
conceptions on the basis that they are too weak for a fully-fledged liberal theory of 
education. 
4.8 Objections to Weak Autonomy 
Although it seems obvious that the moral powers of citizens imply some sort of autonomy, 
not everyone would agree that it is only a weak kind of autonomy, as I am suggesting. 
Meira Levinson in particular has argued in the context of liberal education that a 
proceduralist conception of autonomy is not sufficient for a robust liberal theory. Instead 
even political liberalism would have to adopt a more substantive conception of autonomy 
that would result in it becoming what she calls “a weakly perfectionist” brand of 
liberalism. Levinson's “ideal of personal autonomy is a substantive notion of higher-order 
preference formation within a context of cultural coherence, plural constitutive personal 
values and beliefs, openness to others' evaluations of oneself, and a sufficiently developed 
moral, spiritual or aesthetic, intellectual, and emotional personality.”273 It is hard to see 
how an educational programme based on this ideal could be justified from the perspective 
of the comprehensive doctrines involved, as the development of a spiritual, aesthetic, and 
emotional personality is exactly what they will reasonably disagree about to a wide extent. 
Levinson sees citizens' capacity for a conception of the good, i.e., “to form, to revise, and 
[to] rationally pursue such a conception”274 as a main feature of Rawls’ theory that 
“encompasses the capacity for autonomy.”275 Instead of buying into Rawls’ explanation 
that this is a mere characterisation of how citizens are supposed to think of themselves (as 
citizens) instead of being a moral ideal,276 Levinson insists that the justification of liberal 
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institutions “relies on the value of autonomy.”277 The fact that this capacity plays an 
important role in the political conception of the person does show, so Levinson, that we 
assign a particular value to it. Echoing Ronald Dworkin, she concludes that the capacity for 
autonomy “represents a substantive good”278 that we want to exercise not just because it is 
there but because we take it to be valuable. Thus, the only way to properly and fully justify 
liberal institutions lies in “adopting an ideal of individual liberal autonomy.”279 
The weak account of autonomy given by Gerald Dworkin, “the thinnest possible notion of 
autonomy”280 is of no use in this context for Levinson. This is due to the formal nature of 
Dworkin's conception of autonomy: to be autonomous, individuals must have the capacity 
to identify or reject the reasons for which they are acting,281 but it does not evaluate the 
second-order reasons for this identification/rejection. This disqualifies it from being an 
acceptable conception of autonomy in Levinson's eyes for at least two reasons. 
First, we are told, the Dworkinian weak conception of autonomy does not provide us with 
good criteria “to distinguish properly between heteronomous and autonomous 
individuals,”282 as we cannot make this distinction on the basis of the second-order reasons 
that individuals hold. Levinson's example compares Harry, who will do whatever his 
mother tells him to do, regardless of the consequences, and Abner, who will also do 
whatever his mother tells him to do, but because she is wiser than him and will help him to 
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achieve a particular goal X.283 Both articulate “second-order desires that [they] reached 
following a period of reflection on their first-order desires”284 when stating these plans. 
Therefore, Levinson thinks that a proceduralist conception of autonomy identifies both of 
them as autonomous, which “seems inappropriate in Harry's case under any reasonable 
understanding of autonomy.”285 Her reason for thinking so is the following: 
[…] Harry might rightly have judged that he is psychologically deeply dependent on his 
mother's approval and therefore decided to follow his mother's advice no matter what the 
consequences. [...] Harry's second-order judgements are made within a context of 
heteronomy – i.e., as a result of an unalterable psychological dependence on his mother 
that he has not questioned or changed.286 
To better understand her objection, it is important to clearly distinguish different orders of 
desires and related decisions here. Employing a Frankfurtian kind of view, in the way both 
Dworkin and Levinson seem to do, one can map Harry's desires/decisions as follows: 
D1  Harry desires to follow his mother's advice, regardless of the consequences. This is 
 a first-order desire. 
D2  Harry decides to give in to D1, because he realises that he is psychologically 
 deeply dependent on his mother. 
Levinson claims that D2 is a heteronomous decision, because it results from the 
dependence on his mother, but this seems wrong. 
It is certainly true that D1 results from this dependence, but less certainly so for D2. The 
way Levinson describes D2 as a decision about D1, it looks much like Harry is aware of 
the fact of his psychological dependence and how it leads to him having D1. If Harry 
reflects about the nature of D1, aware of his deep psychological dependence, and decides 
to endorse this first-order desire anyway, this seems not necessarily to be a problem. He 
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might have realised that the costs to overcome the psychological dependence are high and 
decided not to pay them. If Harry in fact reflects about D1, is aware of the dependency it is 
connected with, and decides to go with it, D2 seems to be an autonomous decision. 
Therefore, under this interpretation, the example above does not show that a weak account 
of autonomy forces us to classify actual cases of heteronomously made decisions as 
unproblematic. 
This might become more plausible if we consider Harry as what Suzy Killmister calls a 
“Woody Allen agent,” an agent who endorses his neurotic first-order desires as constitutive 
of his identity and endorses them as valid reason for action.287 Harry can be well aware of 
the unreasonableness of the desire to do everything his mother says but still accept it as a 
central part of his own self and as such reason-giving to himself. As long as we assume that 
“[a]utonomy is about doing what we take ourselves to have reason to do,”288 acting on 
these reasons is “a form of self-expression, or self-realisation”289 and therefore justified as 
reason. So even if we do not agree with his reasons for it, they are his justified reasons and 
his decision to act on them is an autonomous one. 
But perhaps the malign psychological influence of Harry's mother also extends to the 
second-order reasons on which D2 relies – strict monitoring and repressive influence by 
his mother instilled in Harry the belief that he can only be a valuable person if he always 
does what his mother wants. This might be a case of influence on a person's reflective 
capacities that undermines personal self-determination.290 When Levinson talks about his 
                                                 
287 Killmister 2015. In light of recent claims about Woody Allen’s problematic attitudes toward women and 
potential abuse claims it should be noted that the use of the term “Woody Allen agent” does not imply any 
sympathies for the person himself on my side (neither, I assume, on Killmister’s side). 
288 Killmister 2015, p. 13. 
289 Killmister 2015, p. 10. 
290 See Dworkin 1988, p. 18. 
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decision being “the result of an unalterable psychological dependence [...] that he has not 
questioned or changed,” this seems to indicate that she has the second option in mind.291   
Whether D2 is autonomous in this case depends on a more accurate description of his 
situation than we have been given in this case. It could be as Levinson says and Harry's 
disposition is literally unalterable, or alterable only at unrealistically high psychological 
costs. In this case D2 can be counted as a case of adaptive preferences, to use Jon Elster's 
terminology, where Harry declared the only feasible option as the optimal choice for 
himself in response to the psychological pressure that shaped his decision.292 These are 
cases that are ruled out under an account of proceduralist autonomy and doing so requires 
standards to disqualify cases of adaptive preferences and manipulation from being counted 
as autonomous.293 
The second point of concern for Levinson is that the weak conception of autonomy “allows 
the possibility that people may enslave themselves yet continue to be regarded as 
autonomous.”294 Harry does so, she claims, by effectively giving his mother the control 
over his life, but still is considered autonomous by Dworkin because his decision was 
based on a second-order judgement.  
In the case given by Levinson, it seems D2 has been based on adaptive preferences, Harry's 
decision was not an autonomous one in the first place and the story ends here. We would 
not need to worry that a weak conception of autonomy permits slavery because it was 
already agreed upon that Harry lacked the autonomy criterion. But what if Harry's case was 
just a bit different, and D2 was, after all, the result of an autonomous process? 
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Neither Harry's particular decision to let his mother control his life nor a decision for a life 
that will be in large parts determined by others in general are equal to enslavement. It is not 
unusual for people to choose living conditions like these. “[A] person who wishes to be 
restricted in various ways, whether by the discipline of a monastery, regimentation of the 
army, or even by coercion, is not, on that account alone, less autonomous,”295 as Dworkin 
states. The individual that chose a long-term contract with the army might be limited in her 
life choices for the time spent under this contract, but as the decision to sign it was her 
own, we would say that overall her life is autonomous, although some stretches of it might 
be to a far lesser degree than others. While her life can be counted as autonomous globally, 
for the time of her contract her life is locally less autonomous. 
Even if we assume that Harry means to obey his mother until the end of his (or, perhaps 
more probably, her) life, this does not change anything relevant. Even if his mother should 
demand ritual suicide of him, this would not change the autonomous status of his initial 
decision, provided it really was an autonomous decision (as discussed earlier in connection 
with Levinson's first point of concern). Probably most of us would not agree with Harry's 
decision, but similarly many people also would find the decision to become a soldier or a 
monk disagreeable. Nevertheless, I would want to insist that in both cases the disapproval 
is not based on a lack of autonomy of the decision, but on our evaluation of the reasons of 
the chooser. 
In addressing Levinson's concerns about the shortcomings of Dworkin's proceduralist 
accounts of autonomy at this point I hope to have shown that a weak account of autonomy 
can provide sufficient ground for the idea of freedom and equality that are fundamental to 
political liberalism. In order to make sense of these concepts, we need more than just the 
political autonomy that Rawls refers to, but not as much substantive autonomy as Levinson 
assumes. Indeed, a weak conception of autonomy as the one proposed in this chapter, can 
do just the work it needs to do without becoming a comprehensive, and should therefore be 
acceptable to political liberals. 
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4.9 Conclusion 
I have argued in this chapter that political liberalism does not only involve an ideal of 
political autonomy, but also implies in its very basic assumption some form of individual 
autonomy that can account for basic liberal values such as freedom and equality. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that political liberalism rests tacitly on a substantive 
ethical version of autonomy, only that a very thin conception of autonomy is implicit in its 
most basic commitments. A proceduralist account of autonomy, such as given by Gerald 
Dworkin, can fill this place without burdening political liberalism with assumptions about 
its value. As this thin idea of autonomy is already built into the assumption of persons as 
free and equal, a premise that has to be accepted by all reasonable citizens, it is perfectly 
compatible with an interpretation of political liberalism that aims to be as little 
perfectionistic as possible. At the same time, it allows for a consistent Rawlsian position in 
the debate about autonomy in education. 
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5 Rights 
This chapter takes a closer look at the kind of rights that regulate education in a society 
that is structured according to the principles of Justice as Fairness. Analysing the relations 
of rights in detail here seems necessary if we aim to provide an account of political liberal 
education, as different agents involved in decisions about education might have different 
interests in its concrete implementation. In the case of children’s education, those agents 
are children themselves, their parents, and the state. 
Children themselves can be said to have an interest in education, although this kind of 
interest might essentially be the one of their future selves who will be citizens. Parents 
most probably have an interest in the education of their children, and aspects of this 
interest might collide with the values their children are confronted with at school, or 
perhaps the lack thereof. This might result in a subsequent interest of parents in private or 
home schooling. Then there is the state itself, which can be assumed to have an interest in 
stability and continuity, which in some ways shape the ways education is realised and 
limits the available options. The question of how these various interests are best balanced 
can be, at least to some extent, framed as a question of rights, duties, and liberties. 
It needs to be emphasised that the rights and liberties discussed in this chapter are not prior 
to or independent of the substantive content of political liberalism discussed before, 
political virtues and autonomy. Instead, the rights and liberties of citizens are the political 
means that allow them to exercise their two moral powers as members of a well-ordered 
society – they enable citizens to shape their lives according to their conception of the good, 
and to cooperate with others on fair terms. This implies, as will become clear throughout 
the chapter, that the extent of citizens’ liberties can be determined by reference to the basic 
substantive premises of political liberalism, including political virtues and autonomy. The 
benefit of employing the terminology of rights and liberties is that it helps us to see more 
clearly what kind of freedom each of the parties involved has and where this freedom is 
justifiably limited. 
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5.1 Conceptions of Rights in Political Liberalism 
To develop and exercise their two moral powers, i.e., their capacities for a conception of 
the good and for a sense of justice, citizens will need certain institutional background 
conditions that are specified by a range of rights and liberties. Rights (and, as we will see, 
liberties, if we employ a Hohfeldian terminology here) are part of the list of basic goods 
that the parties in the original position will decide to distribute in a manner, at least 
according to Rawls, that all citizens will benefit as much as possible from these goods, 
regardless of their position in society. We can understand these rights and liberties as 
generated by “role-based desires” (desires caused by having the two moral powers), as, 
e.g., Leif Wenar claims – citizens will have these desires in virtue of being citizens.296 This 
also means that these kinds of rights are not merely legal rights (although they will be 
supported by corresponding legal rights in a well-ordered society), but moral rights that 
apply in a political context.297 
While rights and liberties therefore have an important role in political liberal theory, their 
initial outline comes in very broad strokes in Rawls’ original account. The list of basic 
liberties that the parties in the Original Position will agree upon (such as freedom of 
thought and liberty of conscience) does not give us any instructions about how to proceed 
in cases in which different liberties conflict with each other. Instead, figuring out these 
details is postponed to later, less idealised stages. Rawls’ own example of how this process 
is supposed to work is freedom of political speech. Here we are given a few more details 
about the limitations and comparative weight of rights and liberties. For this reason, 
although not exactly on the topic of education, we will therefore examine in the following 
how Rawls thinks this mechanism works in the context of freedom of speech. 
                                                 
296 Wenar 2013, p. 221. 
297 See Martin 1985, pp. 31-41. The moral rights discussed in this chapter find their legal counterparts in 
constitutional rights. Moreover, there will be a much larger number of legal rights that either cover more 
detailed aspects of these basic rights or are related to matters that basic/constitutional rights are not at all 
concerned with. Various legal regulations regarding consumer rights might be an example for the first 
type, while environmental laws could be an example of the second (at least for Rawls, who does not think 
that environmental policies involved basic rights and liberties, although this is contestable). 
123 
 
One kind of limitation that applies to freedom of speech (and most probably to all liberties 
in Rawls’ view) is a feasibility constraint. Although having unlimited access rights to 
public places and social resources would support our freedom to express our views, it 
seems impossible to grant such extended rights to all citizens. This would be “so 
unworkable and socially divisive that [it] would actually reduce the effective scope of 
freedom of speech.”298 
Furthermore, Rawls claims that 
the basic liberty of liberty of conscience [sic] is also self-limiting. [...] [R]easonable 
regulations would be accepted to secure intact the central range of this liberty, which 
includes the freedom and integrity of the internal life of religious associations and the 
liberty of persons to determine their religious affiliations in social conditions that are 
free.299 
After these considerations, the freedom of political speech can be specified “into more 
particular liberties so as to protect its central range.”300 Rawls’ way of proceeding with this 
example is to find what he calls “fixed points within the central range”301 of the freedom of 
speech by examining historical debates about the constitution of the United States. The 
results of this process (and similar ones for other liberties) can then be turned into specific 
legal rights for a well-ordered society. 
In an attempt to determine what rights and duties are involved in education, I will try to go 
a slightly different way by framing this analysis in terms of Wesley Hohfeld’s scheme of 
rights. Hohfeld offers an analytical framework specifying the formal relations between 
right-bearers and their social environment, which, although originally applied to legal 
rights, can be and has since been applied to moral rights and duties as well.302 
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In common use (and to a large extent in legal discourse) the term “rights” is used to refer to 
various types of rights, which Hohfeld distinguished into “rights,” “privileges,” “powers,” 
and “immunities.” Each of these types of rights has a correlate, of which “duties” are the 
most commonly known and used; the other three identified by Hohfeld being “no-rights,” 
“liabilities,” and “disabilities.” The following table of correlatives might make the relation 
between these terms clearer:303 
right privilege power immunity 
duty no-right liability disability 
While the first row defines different types of legal (or moral) positions held by someone 
commonly said to bear a right, the second row determined which correlative duty-like 
position is held by others who interact with the right-bearer. 
• If A has a right, this means A is entitled either to some good or service X, or to do 
some action Y. B as a duty-bearer would have a duty to provide the good X or not 
to interfere with action Y. 
• If A has a privilege (often called a “liberty” by contemporary Hohfeldians) to do Y, 
B has no right to claim that A ought not do Y and thus B bears a no-right. This does 
not mean that B cannot interfere with A doing Y, as long as B does not infringe any 
rights of A by doing so. 
• For individual A to hold a power in this context means that A can modify 
entitlements which are based on her rights (or that of someone else if A holds this 
power over another person’s entitlements). For example, although A bears a right to 
the exclusive use of a piece of land and B in principle has a duty not to use that 
land, A holds the power to modify her entitlements in such a way that that allows B 
to use the land. B, on the other hand, bears a liability when it comes to entitlements 
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granted by the power of A – B is liable to any changes that A might make to B’s 
entitlement to use her piece of land. 
• An immunity, on the other hand, means that A is not exposed to B exercising a 
power, while this means that B bears a disability to exert her power regarding 
particular rights of hers. An example for this would be a case where A rents out 
housing property to B and at a later revoking B’s entitlement to use the property. If 
B would have no access to alternative housing in that case and would thereby 
become homeless, one might think that these circumstances provide B with an 
immunity to A’s (otherwise legitimate) power to claim her property back from B.304 
Hohfeld’s scheme provides a clear structure and terminology to determine the relations 
between different parties in a normative conflict. Therefore, rephrasing political liberal 
rights in Hohfeldian terms can clarify and perhaps even resolve the conflicts of interests of 
children, parents, and the state in regard to education.  
At this point, it is important to note that Rawls’ usage of the terms "rights" and "liberties" 
differs from the way how Hohfeld and his successors employ these terms. To avoid 
terminological confusion, I will use the terms “rights” and “liberties” in the way Rawls 
uses them, while I will use the term “claim-rights” to refer to Hohfeldian rights, which are 
opposed to duties, and the term “privilege-rights” to what Hohfeld calls “privileges.” It 
appears to me that Rawls uses the term “duty” in a sense equivalent to Hohfeld's, so that no 
distinctive terminology is needed in this case – Rawlsian duties are Hohfeldian duties. 
When writing about people exercising their rights and being prevented from exercising 
them, it often sounds like Rawls uses the term “rights” loosely.305 Central to political 
liberalism are what he calls liberties, which, as we will see, can in many cases be 
understood as privilege-rights, although sometimes they seem qualify as claim-rights. A 
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quasi-formal definition of citizens' liberties (DL) appears in A Theory of Justice. Liberties 
“can always be explained by a reference to three items,” according to Rawls:306 
(DL)  “The general description of liberty, then, has the following form: this or that 
person (or persons) is free (or not free) from this or that constraint (or set of 
constraints) to do (or not to do) so and so.”307 
Agents capable of having these liberties are natural persons, associations, and states, and 
the constraints mentioned “may range from duties and prohibitions defined by law to the 
coercive influence arising from public opinion and social pressure.”308 Rawls himself is 
mainly interested in political and legal restrictions of liberties, that is why he takes liberties 
to be “a certain structure of institutions, a certain system of public rules defining rights and 
duties.”309 
In his discussion of particular political liberties, Rawls also employs the distinction 
between positive and negative liberty.310 At first this might be confusing, as the context in 
which this distinction is usually applied differs from the context in which liberties that are 
under discussion here.311 Looking at the relevant discussion of liberty and liberties by 
Rawls, though, it becomes clear that he seems to take liberties (i.e., particularised liberties 
of, for example, free speech, association, etc.) to be constituents of an overarching 
conception of liberty, and that the distinction of positive and negative liberty can be 
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applied to categorise singular liberties.312 While he thinks that both kinds of liberty are 
relevant, negative liberty (or, in the case of particular liberties something that can perhaps 
be called negative liberties) has more weight and should not be sacrificed for the positive 
liberty of political participation (or other positive liberties). This emphasis on negative 
liberties will be important later, as it adds another layer of protection against perfectionist 
education policies. 
When it comes to the question whether rights and liberties are protecting the agent’s 
interests or the agent’s choices, Rawls gives no direct answer, although it can be 
reasonably inferred that political liberalism would presume an interest-based account of 
rights and liberties. I will say more about this distinction in the next section about children. 
First, we need to return to definition DL, which looks on the surface like the description of 
a Hohfeldian liberty. However, a closer look at Rawls’ description of liberties seems to rule 
out this simple approach: 
A rather intricate complex of rights and duties characterizes any particular liberty. Not 
only must it be permissible for individuals to do or not to do something, but government 
and other persons must have a legal duty not to obstruct. I shall not delineate these rights 
and duties in any detail, but shall suppose that we understand their nature well enough for 
our purposes.313 
A shorter but similar description from Political Liberalism confirms this view: “[T]he basic 
liberties are specified by institutional rights and duties that entitle citizens to do various 
things, if they wish, and that forbid others to interfere.”314 It shows that liberties in the 
context of Rawls’ political liberal theory are something shaped by the restriction that rights 
place on others. 
To get an idea of how to apply Hohfeld's scheme to political liberalism, it will be best to 
look at some example cases of liberties as defined by DL. For the sake of brevity, I will use 
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128 
A for an agent capable of bearing liberties, C a constraint or set of constraints, and P for 
some activity this agent could do: 
 A is free from C to do P 
At the first glance this looks like a plain privilege-right. A has no duty not to do P and any 
other agents bear a so-called “no-right” corresponding to it – i.e., A has no duty to not 
doing P and no duty to stop doing P because some other agent might wish so. 
Nevertheless, things are more complex than that, as becomes evident when we look at one 
of the basic liberties under political liberalism, freedom of speech, as an example. An 
individual A is free to stand on a box and hold a speech about the danger of immigrant 
workers. We can say that A has a privilege-right to do so. This implies, however, that some 
agent B could still try to keep A from doing P by any means that do not violate any of A's 
claim-rights. This latter condition is important to keep in mind – while A's liberty involves 
no duties of non-interference, other rights she bears shield her liberty. B cannot physically 
restrict A in order to keep her from speaking, as B has a duty not to interfere with A's 
claim-right of free movement. So, while B under a duty not to harm A or employ physical 
force in order to keep A from speaking, B could still try to keep A from speaking by 
distracting her or by producing enough noise to drown her speech.315 
It seems that, strictly speaking, the liberty of free speech can be understood as a privilege-
right, but very often when we are talking in common-sense terminology about “the right of 
free speech,” we are referring not only to that privilege-right alone, but also to the 
shielding claim-rights involved and their related duties. Rawls does exactly this when 
discussing rights and liberties,316 and it seems safe to say that most, if not all, Rawlsian 
liberties and rights are complex compounds of privilege-rights and shielding claim-rights 
as well.317 What he calls the right to hold personal property, for example, involves a claim-
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right that correlates with the duty of others not to use one's property without permission, 
but also privilege-rights such as to use one's property in whatever way one seems fit 
(unless, of course, this again is limited by duties against others). In this way, the basic 
liberties and other liberties derived from them can be described in terms of Hohfeld's 
schema, although most of them will not consist of a single claim-right or privilege-right, 
but instead of several of those. 
It will be helpful to keep this in mind as the next sections will try to clarify which claim-
rights and privilege-rights are involved in questions about education and what kind of basic 
liberty they might belong to. To do so, we need to distinguish three parties whose interests, 
and therefore also their rights, are relevant in the discussion of rights in relation to 
education: children, parents, and the state. The latter two are without doubt agents who can 
make use of claim- and privilege-rights, although this is somewhat less obvious in the case 
of children. In the following section I will discuss in more detail what kind of rights the 
state and parents have, as well as arguing that children have certain rights and which of 
these are relevant here. 
5.2 Children 
From a pre-theoretical perspective, we often take children as bearer of rights. One of the 
most prominent examples for this view is the United Nations Convention on the Rights of 
the Child,318 which declares various children's rights, such as a right to life, the right to 
acquire a nationality, and the right to freedom of expression, to name a few. Political liberal 
theory, however, does not explicitly offer any resources to capture this practice. Instead, it 
is concerned with the rights of citizens, which are derived from their two moral powers, 
and it seems implausible to assume that children have full citizen status. At least up to a 
certain age, children lack the necessary capacities to qualify as citizens, and even after they 
developed these capacities they might take time to develop the necessary desires to 
exercise them. Children thus cannot have rights qua being citizens.  
                                                 
318 United Nations General Assembly 9/2/1990. 
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Nevertheless, a political liberal account of education should be capable of embedding a 
pre-theoretical notion of children’s rights, particularly as it is supposed to reflect the state 
of affairs in existing liberal democratic societies. A look at the general discussion of 
children’s rights might help to determine a position that fits well with political liberalism, 
and a suitable starting point is the distinction between will or choice theories and interest 
or benefit theories of rights, as both have very different strategies to account for the rights 
of children. 
Will or choice theorists think of claim-rights as demarcating clear limits within which an 
individual’s choices cannot legitimately be interfered with. These limits hold regardless of 
the content of the individual’s choices, so even if others think that it is an incredibly bad 
choice, they have a duty not to interfere (as long as the choice does not violate anyone 
else’s rights).319 From the perspective of will theories of right, an agent must be able to 
make a claim in order to qualify as a right-bearer at all, which restricts the range of right-
bearers to rational adults. Interpreting this position strictly means that children have no 
rights, at least not at very young age, because they are not able to make reasonable claims 
regarding their rights. Opposed to this are interest or benefit theorists, who think that the 
function of rights is to secure the interest an agent has. Interest theories of rights are 
therefore not reliant on the agent’s ability to make a claim.320 From this perspective, agents 
who cannot make claims do nevertheless have certain rights, such as the comatose or those 
with severe mental disabilities, as we can plausibly assume them to have a range of basic 
interests. For many interest theorists, the same is true for animals. 
If political liberal theory wants to make sense of children’s rights, it seems, then it needs to 
adopt an interest-based account of rights, as it is clear that at least infants cannot make any 
claims that rights could be grounded upon. For some, this might be even a decisive 
argument in favour of an interest theory of rights – taking our pre-theoretical intuition that 
children have rights as correct, Neil MacCormick, for example, argues that therefore only 
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interest theories can reflect these intuitions and hence that only these theories are 
defensible.321 
Adopting an interest-theoretic account, though, would also mean having to address the   
concerns about interest theory that defenders of will theories voice. Interest theory, so the 
objection, leads to an inflation of rights, as not only reasonable human beings but also 
animals and perhaps other entities like ecosystems could be assigned rights. The special 
status of rights as a particular sort of “moral furniture,”322 well suited for their 
characteristic use in moral debate, would get lost for interest theories, as well as much-
needed “analytical perspicacity”323 in the discussion about the nature of rights.  
In the context of rights in political liberalism, this might not be the most pressing concern, 
though. The range of rights relevant here included only political rights,324 and the range of 
right bearers is similarly limited, originally to (adult) citizens and the state. The main 
reason to include children in the group of right-bearers is that they are future citizens 
without whom a stable and just society over time cannot be achieved. Providing children 
with certain rights takes into consideration the moral status they will have as future 
persons, as well as the overarching socio-political goal of stability.  So, while adopting 
either a will or and interest approach to rights does not seem essential, it would add more 
substance to political liberalisms approach to rights and make it overall more robust. I only 
want to briefly sketch two possible routes to achieve this. 
The integration of an account of right-bearers that takes the will theorist’s concern 
seriously could be achieved by assuming that rights are based on interests for those who 
are not able to make proper claims, and for those who can make choices a will conception 
of rights applies, which outweigh interest considerations. To infants, a pure interest 
conception of rights would apply, which would gradually change into a choice rights 
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conception as they grow older and more rational.325 Another way to reconcile interest-
based and will-based rights would be by making a corresponding distinction between 
welfare and agency rights as Harry Brighouse does. With this model, agency rights have a 
particular weight because we assume that an agent’s interest in her agency will outweigh 
her welfare interest in most cases as long as she can realise that agency. For young 
children, who lack the rational and deliberative capacities to do so, only their welfare rights 
will be considered.326 
Regardless which route we prefer, to generate an account of education political liberalism 
needs to find a position on for children’s rights and liberties. If we take the list given by 
Rawls in his discussion of liberties as exhaustive, children should have the status of 
persons, including the rights assigned to persons. And at least in the context of the basic 
institutions of a just society, there are good reasons to accept children as persons. 
Considering the stance of the parties in the original position, it seems that the decision to 
treat children as the bearers of rights, regardless of any metaphysical or other 
considerations about whether they are persons in a more substantive sense, should strike us 
as rational, as long as we take the parties to be interested in the well-being of themselves as 
well as their direct descendants. The same considerations that Rawls assumes would move 
the parties behind the veil of ignorance to establish that each generation has to leave an 
amount of just savings for further generations are at work here – the parties cannot know 
which generation they belong to, i.e., whether they might take the place of a child in 
society.327 
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In the context of political liberalism, the principles of justice are supposed, among other 
things, to supply each citizen with a sufficient amount of primary goods to live a 
flourishing life.328 Rights and liberties (in Rawls’ sense) are part of these goods, and we are 
assuming that children have some of these already at the beginning of their lives (e.g., 
essential rights against harm), while they will gain others at a certain stage (e.g., rights of 
political participation). Other primary goods include opportunities and wealth. Neither do 
children gain these by birth into a liberal society, nor do they acquire them automatically 
when reaching a certain age. Instead they will have to acquire certain knowledge and skills, 
which either themselves become opportunities (e.g., acquiring the skill of quilt making 
might kindle a live-long love for this profession and become itself an opportunity for a 
fulfilling life) or enable persons to make use of opportunities that turn up at some point 
(e.g., job offers requiring certain kinds of knowledge or skills). Moreover, in a market-
oriented economy access to wealth is, at least in part, gained by having knowledge and 
skills that are valuable for the market. While this latter group of primary goods are not 
right and liberties themselves, it can be argued that a bundle of rights and liberties, e.g., 
free choice of occupation and access rights to certain kinds of public resources, is a 
necessary precondition to enjoy these goods. 
Another necessary requirement for making proper use of goods like rights and liberties, 
and for gaining opportunities and wealth as full-fledged citizens later on is an adequate 
education. Therefore, children need at least a sufficient level of education, and due to the 
central role of these primary goods in political liberalism's principles of Justice as Fairness 
it seems plausible to claim that there is indeed a right to education. 
We can even take a further step back and argue with Matthew Clayton that the 
development of the basic capacities of liberal citizens relies, at least in part, on education. 
Clayton thinks that children have a claim-right to what I will in short call a decent 
upbringing (not the best upbringing or optimal parents), that allows them to develop a 
sense of justice and a conception of the good. Others are bound by a moral duty to provide 
children with this sort of upbringing.329 The primary bearer of this duty is not specified, but 
                                                 
328 See Rawls 1971, pp 62f. 
329 Clayton 2006, p.76 and p. 78. 
134 
it seems reasonable to assume, that parents as well as the state both bear this duty. This 
means that parents have a responsibility for providing the child with the means (which do 
not only include material means but education as well) to develop certain basic capacities, 
while the state will provide other means by setting the necessary requirements for 
schooling and education. 
In summary there seem to be good reasons to allocate children at least a limited range of 
rights and liberties under political liberalism, from which we can derive a right for an 
education that provides future citizens with the relevant capacities to flourish in a well-
ordered society. In the next step, we will have a look what rights and liberties, as well as 
duties, are involved on the side of parents. 
5.3 Parents 
Unlike in the case of children, we do not need to argue that parents in general have rights 
and liberties. The relevant question here is, what kind of Hohfeldian rights they have, in 
order to determine the content and extent of the education of their children. Questions in 
this context are, e.g., whether parents have a privilege-right or even a claim-right to choose 
private schooling for their children, to send them to religious schools, or whether they have 
a right to end their children's education after a certain time. In short, how much legitimate 
authority do parents have when it comes to the education of their children? 
In The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls himself does “assume that as children we 
grow up in a small intimate group in which the elders (normally parents) have a certain 
moral and social authority.”330 Still, their authority is limited: as the family is seen as part 
of the basic structure by Rawls, the principles of justice apply to the family as a main 
institution of society. But, as Rawls tells us about the family: 
[P]olitical principles do not directly apply to its internal life, but they do impose essential 
constraints on the family as an institution and so guarantee the basic rights and liberties, 
and the freedom and opportunities, of all its members. This they do, as I have said, by 
specifying the basic rights of equal citizens who are the members of families.331 
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Following the quoted passage, Rawls focuses on the equality of wives which is granted for 
by their basic rights as citizens, while emphasising that the “internal life” of the family is 
in no way influenced by other political principles, e.g., principles of distributive justice. 
While are told nothing more about the extent and the limits of parental authority, this brief 
passage can serve as a starting point for a more thorough investigation. 
Even though children are not equal citizens in the full sense, we have seen in the previous 
section that they do have some claim-rights in the Rawlsian framework (although they 
cannot actually claim them themselves), and that their future access to primary goods has 
to be guaranteed. These rights and entitlements of children limit parental authority, 
although how exactly remains to be seen, and a variety of positions on this question exists. 
A comparison of them will be helpful to tell more clearly what claim-rights and privilege-
rights parents supposedly have. 
Rawlsian in spirit, but in some sense much stricter in the limitation of parental authority, is 
Matthew Clayton. Although he subscribes to a (restricted) right of parents to rear a child, 
this excludes a right of school choice.332 He assumes that parties in a hypothetical choice 
situation would acknowledge that in case they were children, it would not be in their 
interest that the right to determine the content of their education lay exclusively with their 
parents.333 Instead, the authority over the education of children would mainly lie with 
agents external to the family, i.e., with the state. The choice situation which justifies this 
assumption is, according to Clayton, similar to Ronald Dworkin's insurance scheme where 
parties representing members of society allocate rights and duties for citizens according to 
interests and limitation of resources.334 
[G]iven the significant constraints, which, I argue, everyone's interests as free and equal 
persons place on the liberty of others in educating children, and a concern to ensure good 
educational provision for their own childhood, it is likely that parties would choose to 
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allow suitably qualified non-parents to exercise some, perhaps considerable, authority in 
matters of educational provision.335 
Instead of having free choice in matters of education, parents have duties to make 
education accessible to their children, corresponding to children's claim-rights to having a 
sense of justice and an autonomous life. They are not the only bearers of these duties, 
though, as the state as an agent will also be under a duty to provide the necessary resources 
(material and otherwise) that parents are unable or unwilling to provide. 
Drawing furthermore an analogy between the relation between children and parents on one 
side and the relation between citizens and the state on the other, Clayton concludes that the 
restraints of public reason apply to the family in a way similar to political activities in 
greater society – restraints that demand that parents avoid “comprehensive enrolment,” as 
he calls it. This would mean that parents will have to avoid any practice “in which children 
are [involuntarily] enrolled into a particular comprehensive doctrine.”336 The restraint on 
comprehensive enrolment would not only apply to religious doctrines, with the practice of 
baptism being a prominent example, but also to secular comprehensive doctrines – such as 
utilitarianism,337 or, as a more mundane example, veganism.338 
To be fair, Clayton does not demand absolute neutrality from parents when raising their 
children and allows for “introducing children to comprehensive doctrines when the 
ambition is not to make them participants or believers.”339 The moral status of bringing 
children in contact with comprehensive doctrines depends on the parents’ intentions. Only 
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if their aim is “having one's children be part of a comprehensive practice, or having them 
adopt the comprehensive convictions in question,”340 this counts as illegitimate enrolment. 
In contrast, a legitimate case for Clayton is one where parents do “take their children to 
church to enable them to experience the traditions and practices of the church, [but] also 
allow their children genuinely to become familiarized with other religious and irreligious 
traditions.”341 
Clayton's interpretation of public reason combined with parents' duties leads to a strict 
restraint of comprehensive influences on the upbringing and education of children and 
limits the authority of parents to a wider extent than Rawls’ brief account of the family 
does. The restrictions of public reason applied to the upbringing of children would, e.g., 
only leave very limited privilege-rights for parents to choose their children’s school – e.g., 
religious schools were not a legitimate option, as they would not satisfy Clayton’s non-
indoctrination condition. This strict limitation of parent’s privilege-rights rest on Clayton’s 
assumption of a much more substantial conception of individual autonomy underlying 
political liberalism than Rawls’, which is still supposed to be compatible with the ambition 
political liberalism to be non-comprehensive.342 But this seems neither necessary nor 
feasible. 
As I have argued for in Chapter 4, political liberalism works well with a much thinner 
account of autonomy than Clayton has in mind, which in turn requires far less from parents 
in terms of value neutrality. While they will still have a duty to ensure that their children's 
education will prepare them for a life as citizens with the capacity to acquire and make use 
of the basic goods (including their rights and liberties), they will have more freedom of 
choice when it comes to forms of comprehensive education than Clayton would allow 
them. Religious schools would remain an option, as long as their curriculum acknowledges 
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at least a thin idea of autonomy.343 To argue for restrictions of parents’ choices for their 
children on the basis of a more substantive conception of autonomy therefore does not 
seem necessary, at least from the perspective of a political liberal account of education. 
Perhaps the argument against Clayton’s approach can be made even stronger, because an 
upbringing of children without any comprehensive enrolment might not even be feasible. 
In a critique of Clayton’s account, Johannes Giesinger summarises two convincing reasons 
for accepting (reasonable) forms of comprehensive education, both of which are grounded 
in “general conditions of human upbringing.”344 The first reason is that children need a 
particular loving kind of personal relationship with their parents, which is assumed to be 
necessary to develop self-esteem. Self-esteem can be taken to be a part of the more 
complex primary good of self-respect, which children as future citizens are entitled to. 
Furthermore, it can also be understood as a “precondition for autonomous agency,”345 
which is a basic requirement of political liberalism. 
The second reason is that it is hard to see how children create themselves without having 
access to a pre-existing evaluative system they can refer to. To form a moral personality, 
children will need an “initial set of evaluative criteria”346 to start with, which they will 
usually get from the “family culture” they grow up in. Even if it were possible not to 
involve children into comprehensive practices and to convince them that there is a 
reasonable disagreement about their parents’ values, this effort would leave them with a 
normative deficit that otherwise would be less likely to occur: “[c]hildren who are not 
educated in a comprehensive way might be especially prone, for instance, to take up values 
from the mass media, from peers, or religious fanatics.”347 It is indeed hard to imagine a 
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plausible scenario where children are educated by standards of public reason alone and 
then, at a certain age, pick the religious or ethical view of life of their choice. 
That said, both Rawls as well as Clayton can still be accused of not being restrictive 
enough in the case of parental authority. Timothy Fowler does exactly this when he argues 
that neither Rawls nor Clayton's account of parental authority does consider any non-
political aspects of comprehensive doctrines. His reasons are different than the ones I have 
discussed before, though, and certainly worth having a closer look at. 
The problem with the basic Rawlsian version is, according to Fowler, that its concern with 
stability for the right reasons will force political liberalism to ignore unreasonable aspects 
of comprehensive doctrines that are reasonable from a political perspective. As long as it is 
secured that a comprehensive doctrine is reasonable in the political sense, i.e., it accepts 
the content of the overlapping consensus as normatively binding, the state will allow 
parents to pass their particular comprehensive beliefs on to their children. Fowler claims 
that it necessarily has to do so, because 
[p]romoting any set of non-political values will require the state to take a position on 
precisely those controversial issues which Rawls thought to avoid. By allowing parents to 
take the lead, the liberal state is thus seemingly able to bypass this problem by refusing to 
favour any one sets of parent's views above the others. […] The state does not condone or 
condemn any of these different ways of raising children, and thus can maintain the posture 
of neutrality.348 
Indeed, from what we have seen, this seems a plausible interpretation of Rawls’ take on 
upbringing and education. The problem which Fowler sees here is that comprehensive 
doctrines might be politically reasonable but might include beliefs about non-civic aspects 
of life which “are incoherent or that may be detrimental to children's future flourishing.”349 
His concern is that parents who adhere to comprehensive doctrines that are unreasonable in 
what he calls a “metaphysical sense” will be able to pass unreasonable non-political beliefs 
to children which may be harmful. On the surface, it seems indeed that they might have a 
privilege-right to do so. An example for this would be the case of homosexual children 
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brought up in a religious tradition that may inculcate the belief “that all homosexuals will 
go to hell. Such an upbringing would presumably lead to serious distress in children who 
later became homosexual.”350 Nevertheless, so Fowler, this tradition would need to be 
taken as politically reasonable and therefore acceptable for political liberals. 
Even if parents were not morally legitimised to pass on their beliefs to their children in the 
form of enrolment, as Clayton argues, in Fowler’s view they will still remain “important 
role models for children [so that] we might then expect children to hold similar views to 
those of their parents,”351 an effect that will be further amplified by life in a community 
whose members adhere to a particular comprehensive doctrine and where children's social 
experiences are shaped by a particular set of comprehensive beliefs. So, even if Clayton 
tries to exclude intentional comprehensive enrolment, Fowler argues, children will still 
pick up “incoherent, false or dangerous beliefs,”352 and families or the state could not even 
provide guidance to counteract the effects of those beliefs as this would “constitute an 
incidence of adults deliberately shaping the non-political views of children, which is 
explicitly forbidden by Clayton's understanding of the principle of legitimacy.”353  
To fix this fundamental problem political liberalism has with child upbringing, it seems 
that it would have to set more demanding standards of what counts as reasonable, 
including those which evaluate the validity of their non-political beliefs. This would be 
quite a big step from the (relatively) neutral position political liberalism aims to keep, as 
Fowler admits. 
Fowler’s objection to political liberalism relies significantly on the distinction between 
political and non-political unreasonable views. Admittedly, Rawls and other political 
liberals do not, to my knowledge, draw a very clear line between what is political and what 
is not. I cannot give a full-fledged account here of how to do that (perhaps determining 
whether some view is political or not has to be determined on a case-by-case basis, or 
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perhaps it is context-dependent). Nonetheless, I think that it is in principle possible to 
argue that many of the unreasonable views that Fowler is concerned about are no, at closer 
inspection, non-political and can be legitimately restricted by a political liberal state. Let us 
take as an example Fowler’s case of parents who wish to pick a school that support their 
beliefs that homosexuals will end up in hell. Do these parents have a privilege-right to 
make this kind of choice? If two main tasks of political liberal education are to inculcate 
civic virtues and a capacity for weak autonomy, it seems unlikely. 
When it comes to political virtues of tolerance and respect, it seems that someone with a 
firmly held belief about the moral turpitude of sexual orientation will hardly be able to 
respect citizens he thinks of as morally inferior. It seems that educational content which 
would lead to attitudes contradicting political virtues cannot be reasonable and therefore 
not protected by parent’s privilege-right to determine their children’s education. This 
would rule out cases like “homosexuals go to hell,” but still would allow for other cases 
that Fowler could consider harmful – those who only concern the children themselves. Let 
us take for example someone who is brought up to endorse a strictly fruitarian lifestyle in 
such a dogmatic way that she will even stick to it in case it turns out that it leads to relevant 
loss of life quality (e.g., if the fruitarian turns out to suffer from a severe condition of 
fructose malabsorption). 
Considering the requirements of weak autonomy, at least in principle parent’s choices of 
education can be ruled out that would violate the endorsement condition and the 
independence condition (see 4.4) of the future adult citizens that the child will become. At 
a stage where that person is considered an autonomous citizen, she will have to endorse the 
values she pursues, and this endorsement must be free from factors that undermine its 
independence. Educational choices undermining the reflections about that person’s values, 
e.g., by keeping differing views out of her home-schooling programme or sending her to a 
dogmatic fruitarian school (were it to exist) would very likely count as an undermining 
influence and would not be permissible for the political liberal. 
So far, the approaches to raising and educating children under political liberalism discussed 
here were concerned that parents might have too much freedom when it comes to authority 
over their children. In the light of the account of political virtues and autonomy presented 
in the previous chapters, there seem to be plausible arguments against both Clayton’s fairly 
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demanding restrictions of parental authority as well as against Fowler’s concern that 
political liberalism had no means to deal with politically reasonable, but otherwise 
unreasonable views of educating children. 
A political liberal stance on parental rights seems have much in common with the approach 
that Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift take. In sharp contrast to Clayton and Fowler, they 
argue that parents do have significant rights to shape the lives of their children, based on 
the value of the unique kind of “spontaneous, loving, intimate sharing of lives”354 that the 
relationship between parents and children is. While their focus is more on an intrinsic 
value of the parent-child relationship, this view includes also sharing parents’ world view 
or religion with their children. It reaffirms a point I mentioned already earlier in the 
discussion of Clayton’s approach and the arguments against it: that being embedded in a 
family structure355 and sharing their parents’ values is, up to a certain age, a relevant part 
of children’s upbringing. 
An important aspect of the parent-child relationship for Brighouse and Swift is the value 
that raising a child has for parents, and that an important part of this valuable project is the 
passing on of values from parents to children.356 From a political liberal perspective, this 
“family value” can be understood as an important element of the primary good of self-
respect. While certainly not the case for every single citizen, for many citizens having a 
family and raising children will be a major project of their lives, forming their identities 
and contributing significantly to their self-respect. Overly restrictive limits on parental 
authority could easily deprive citizens of this important element and contradict the ideal of 
a fair distribution of primary good. Thus, the liberty that parents should have, according to 
Brighouse and Swift, seems justified from a political liberal perspective as long as it 
enables children to develop into politically virtuous, autonomous citizens. 
This leads to a new concern regarding the education of children. Despite broad parental 
privileges, Brighouse and Swift see a need for limits to parental rights when it comes to 
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equality of opportunity. While parents do naturally have an interest in contributing to the 
well-being of their children, this can easily end up in inequality of outcomes, as children of 
wealthier parents will have access to an education that those from a poorer background will 
not. However, Brighouse and Swift rule out “bequest of houses or other property, or the 
choice of elite private schools”357 as not covered by the condition of spontaneity that for 
them is linked to the particular values of family relations, so that some political restrictions 
might be permissible. Still their general claim remains: “Simply put, familiar relationship 
goods are more important than fair equality of opportunity.”358 This does not rule out that 
in conflicts with other rights and duties, e.g., duties of assistance to the poor in society, 
could override these rights. Brighouse and Swift consider these further questions beyond 
the scope of their work, though. 
One could argue that parent's rights to control the education of their children, through 
choice of school or other education-related activities, conflicts with requirements of 
distributive justice. Fair equality of opportunity is undermined if parents with more 
monetary, but also cultural, capital, can choose to provide better education to their children 
than less well-off parents. The children of the former will have most likely better 
opportunities than those of the latter.359 
Under Justice as Fairness as the assumed core conception of justice for political liberalism, 
this is not by itself a problem. Inequalities are acceptable, as long as the difference 
principle is satisfied, i.e., as long as the least well-off in society will benefit from these 
inequalities. As soon as this were no longer the case, though, parents’ control over their 
children’s education would have to be limited. It is plausible to assume that the right to 
control the education of one’s children is a claim-rights against other citizens, as other 
citizens can reasonably be assumed to have a duty not to interfere with the education of 
other people’s children. Against the state, meanwhile, parents only hold a privilege-right, 
which allows the state to interfere with their control over education if it is demanded by the 
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state’s duty for just distribution of primary goods (more about this duty in the next section 
of this chapter). 
To summarise, my claim is that from a political liberal point of view parents do not have to 
be as strictly limited in their rights over the education of their children as Matthew Clayton 
thinks, and political liberalism also has less problems to address non-political 
unreasonableness than Timothy Fowler claims. The way children acquire their initial set of 
evaluative beliefs and turn into citizens with a healthy sense of self-worth allow for a good 
measure of parental influence on their development, including the enrolment into parental 
comprehensive doctrines and decisions about their education based on comprehensive 
world views. Not only is this justifiable with the good of children in mind, but also when 
considering the significant contribution to their self-respect raising which is experienced 
by many parents through the activity of raising children according to their own values. 
Limits to parental choices about children’s education, as we have seen so far, are set by the 
central aims of political liberal education, such as inculcating political virtues and 
autonomy. 
While parents’ rights concerning the upbringing and the choice of their children’s 
education are claim-rights against most other persons, it seems most plausible to 
understand them only as privilege-rights when it comes to the relation between parents and 
the state, which has to take care of distributive justice. What rights, and more important, 
duties the state has in relation to parents (and children as well) will be the topic of the next 
section. 
5.4 The State 
At first it might seem odd to talk about the rights of the state in a liberal framework. After 
all, an important function of rights, from a liberal perspective, is to protect citizens from 
illegitimate intervention by the state. Nevertheless, there are good reasons for political 
liberalism to assign rights and liberties to the state as well. One reason to attribute claim-
rights to the state lies in the state’s duty towards its citizens to redistribute resources in 
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accordance with, at least under Justice as Fairness, the difference principle.360 In order to 
be able to fulfil this duty, the state will need to have claim-rights entitling it to claim 
ownership over some of its citizens’ resources and redistribute them. Citizens therefore 
must have correlating duties to give up their fair share of resources for redistribution, 
usually in the form of taxes. 
In addition to these redistributive duties, the political liberal state has a duty to provide 
opportunities for education that enables children to make use of the primary goods they 
will be entitled to as citizens. We could also interpret the task of providing opportunity of 
education not as being distinct from but as a part of the state’s redistributive duties – adult 
citizens already have the capacities to make use of their rights, opportunities, etc., so in 
their case the state must provide a proper institutional framework, de facto enabling them 
to make use of these capacities. Children, who are developing these capacities, cannot 
make use of those institutions but instead will need to go through proper preparing 
educative steps first. The preparation for being able to use one’s primary goods can be 
reasonably understood as an integral part of a fair distributive pattern. In any case, whether 
the state’s duty of providing sufficient education is part of a bundle of redistributive duties 
or a category of its own, the political liberal state has some sort of duty to provide 
education. 
A more mundane, but nevertheless not less important aspect of providing sufficient 
education should be mentioned here as well. While goods like food and shelter are not 
explicitly part of the list of basic goods of Justice as Fairness, there is no doubt that they 
are basic requirements of citizens in a well-ordered society as well. It is reasonable to 
assume, as, e.g., Robert Noggle does, that “fully developed moral agents in a moral 
community will be able to use the primary goods of income and wealth to provide these 
goods [i.e., food and shelter] for themselves.”361 Here, as well as in the case of primary 
goods, education at least partially is part of the preparation of children to acquire the 
                                                 
360 We have to keep in mind that other conceptions of justice are possible and permissible in a political liberal 
society (see Chapter 2, Sub-Section 5.1), but it seems plausible to assume that all of them will have an 
egalitarian component that accounts for redistributive schemes of some kind. 
361 Noggle 2002, p. 108. 
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necessary means to afford basic material goods. A state’s duty for providing education can 
therefore also be derived from its duties to distribute primary goods among its citizens. 
Unlike other kinds of redistribution in the case of education the state does not only have a 
claim-right to acquire a part of citizens’ resources for its task. To provide proper education 
for children, it seems necessary that the state also has a claim-right to children’s 
participation in educational processes, at least until they will be minimally able to benefit 
from their share of primary goods and to participate in society. At first glance, the 
correlating duty of participating in this kind of education appears to be located with 
children themselves, but that is not a satisfactory result. If we assume that children, up to a 
certain age, need a fiduciary that claims their rights for them (which are their parents on 
most cases) then we should also assume that duties concerning children’s education will 
apply to parents and other relevant fiduciaries in the same way. In other words, a duty to 
make sure that a child receives sufficient education falls on its parents or other fiduciaries, 
where the latter might also include the state or its actors in some cases.362 
Next to requirements of distributive justice, a state’s duty to provide education can 
plausibly be generated from the requirement for stability and continuity. Together with 
justice, stability and continuity are central aims of the political liberal project (see 2.1), so 
they must play an important part in determining the claim-rights and duties concerning 
education. Citizens enjoying a just and peaceful society will have an interest in its stability 
and continuity, so it is reasonable to assume a duty of the state to realise this aim. We have 
already seen how education can contribute to stability and continuity in Chapters 3 and 4 
by equipping children with the proper political virtues and autonomy to grow into citizens 
that are defined by their two moral powers and that will act in accordance with the 
principles of justice. So, if there is a duty to maintain stability and continuity, it entails a 
duty to provide the necessary education and, in the same pattern as described above, a right 
to enforce participation in this education. 
Summed up, it can be argued that the state has a clearly determined (most likely even over-
determined in the face of the various ways to derive a duty to provide public education) 
                                                 
362 For example, in the case of child-care workers or other government officials who might, in exceptional 
cases, need to override parents’ rights and liberties in regard to their children’s education. 
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claim-right against children, and against parents as their proxies, to participate in 
education, and that children have a duty to participate, respectively parents to make sure 
that their children participate. This claim-right results from two duties the political liberal 
state has, on one hand the duty to distribute resources in a just way, on the other hand to 
maintain stability and continuity. Both duties are supposed to be affirmed by reasonable 
citizens, so that reasonable citizens will also accept the duties concerning children’s’ 
education that follow from those. 
5.5 Conclusion 
As we have seen, education can be framed as the object of claim-rights, privilege-rights, 
and duties. Children have a claim-right to education (up to a sufficient extent) that is based 
on their entitlement to primary goods that will be in part only accessible by an adequate 
education. At the same time, they will have a duty to participate in that education – 
although at a young age, this duty will be owed to them by their parents. 
Parents, as the fiduciaries of their children, have a twofold responsibility. They will be 
responsible for taking care of their children’s rights until these will be able to do this 
themselves, and they also have to make sure that children’s duties to participate in a 
political liberal education will be carried out. At the same time, parents have privilege-
rights when it comes to decide under what customs and traditions, or comprehensive 
doctrine to use Rawls’ terminology, their children grow up. This will include, e.g., the 
choice of school, as long as it meets certain criteria of reasonableness and justice. Finally, 
the state has claim-rights against children and parents alike, which it needs to fulfil its 
duties of justice and to maintain social stability over time. 
Sorting out this configuration of rights and duties is an important step in determining what 
political liberal education can require from citizens and what liberties parents have 
concerning the education of their children. Nevertheless, they are no more than rough 
guidelines, as the claim- and privilege-rights identified in this chapter are based on the 
basic rights and liberties of Justice as Fairness, which are sufficiently broad principles 
rather than concrete rules. They correlate to constitutional rights which, although 
important, are far from sufficient to regulate almost any situation in daily life. 
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In order to find out what concrete regulations can be derived from these broad principles, 
second part of the thesis will analyse three more concrete cases: the role of religion, of 
same-sex relations, and of immigration in education. We will see that different sets of rules 
can be used to regulate the influence of religion on the education of children, which are 
compatible with the rights and duties identified in this chapter. We will also see that, 
depending on how far we think requirements of basic justice reach into concrete 
legislation, very different sets of rules can be the results. 
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Part 2: Application Cases 
In the previous three chapters I have discussed in some detail the main aspects of political 
liberal theory that are of central importance for political liberal education – the role of 
citizens’ political virtues in a well-ordered society, the importance of their capacity for 
certain kinds of autonomy, and the legitimacy of political rights and obligations both 
citizens and the state have in regard to each other. I have outlined what educational aims 
can be derived from central elements of political liberal theory and what restrictions they 
impose on education. For now, let me calls these basic principles of political liberal 
education. If, as political liberals assume, the aspects of political liberalism discussed in the 
first part belong to the core content of the overlapping consensus of a well-ordered society 
which all reasonable citizens endorse, then the basic principles of political liberal 
education must also be acceptable to reasonable citizens.  
Despite the detailed discussion in the previous chapters, those basic principles of education 
remain abstract insofar as only little has been said about how they manifest themselves in 
the concrete political and social institutions of a well-ordered society. What still needs to 
be shown is what implications these central but abstract elements have for more concrete 
educational policies. Accordingly, the aim of the next three chapters, which form the 
second main part of this thesis, is to illustrate how the basic principles of political liberal 
education can serve as guidelines to more practical questions. These chapters discuss 
religion, same-sex marriage, and immigration in the context of education. All three of them 
are, to varying degrees, topics of contemporary political debates in western liberal 
democratic societies, and deep disagreement often characterises public debate on them. At 
the same time, these three topics are also relevant for real-life contemporary politics of 
education. A political liberal approach to education should therefore suggest a principled 
approach to these application areas. 
The insights on how to treat these cases from a political liberal perspective are limited, of 
course. The chapters of the second part of this thesis will offer justification for limitations 
of parents’ (and children’s) freedom of choice in matters of education by reference to basic 
principles of political liberal education. It is important to note, though, that once we have 
determined the rough shape of these restrictions and also what is (in principle) permissible, 
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there remains plenty of room for a wide range of varying realisations of education policies 
– some of which might work better in certain contexts than others. Regional or local 
educational policies, while being within the limits we can derive from political liberal 
principles, could vary to great extent, depending on the ethnical composition and economic 
circumstances of their catchment area. These lead to even more fine-grained question about 
how to structure education which are beyond the scope of this thesis, as are ethical 
questions of every-day educational practice. However, the example cases discussed in the 
following chapters are concrete enough to give an idea of the implications a political 
liberal account of education could have for actual politics on state level and how it can 
provide principled guidelines for real-life policies. 
151 
 
6 Religion 
The relation between liberalism and religion often seems to be an uneasy one. Tensions 
exist between classical liberal values such as autonomy and equality, and the values of 
religious traditions whose holy scriptures proclaim, e.g., inequalities between genders or 
the superiority of the members of one’s own religious community over other members of 
society. These tensions sometimes become especially salient in the context of education, as 
court cases such as Yoder v. Wisconsin and Mozert v. Hawkins illustrate.363 
Most interesting to me in the context of political liberal education are the recent 
contributions to this discussion which focus on the role of religion in public reason.364 Not 
only is public reason one of the central features that distinguishes political liberalism from 
its more comprehensive siblings, but most of the problems that occur in the relationship 
between religious citizens and a liberal democratic education system are application cases 
of public reason. Religious citizens can be reasonable, i.e., agree that a requirement for 
systematic education of children is covered by the principles of justice, but still disagree 
with secular citizens (or even each other) about which interpretations of the principles of 
justice are legitimate, i.e., what set of laws and policies regarding education are publicly 
justifiable. Nonetheless, even if we try to solve disagreements about the correct 
interpretations of the requirement of justice with the aid of public reason, it often remains 
far from evident what the justifiable set of education policies is in a given case. The exact 
application standards of public reason are controversial and depending on what version of 
public reason we choose to apply, we end up with very different sets of policies. 
In what follows I will try to give a plausible, although brief, account of the application of 
public reason to matters of educational policy. It rests on the basic political liberal 
requirements for education that have been explained in the chapters of Part 1, and thereby 
imposes limits on the range of valid reasons that reasonable citizens can use to justify their 
favourite education policies. These limits are less strict than those imposed by many other 
                                                 
363 See 2.3.2 for a detailed description of these cases. 
364 See 2.1.5 for public reason in political liberalism. 
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liberals who discuss education. While political liberal education determines these limits in 
recourse to its basic requirements of citizens’ capacities for autonomy and political virtues, 
these requirements that I have argued for are relatively modest in comparison with those 
stated by other authors such as Levinson, Callan, or Clayton. 
This chapter will take a closer look at the debate between advocates of public reason 
accounts and authors who defend the political position of religious citizens. According to 
many public reason liberals, public reason must exclude explicitly religious reasons of 
citizens as valid justification of their political decisions. In contrast, those concerned about 
the religious integrity of citizens argue that most liberal interpretations of public reason 
restrictions place an unfair burden on religious citizens. Picking up on this debate, I will 
argue that prima facie political liberalism can accommodate religious citizens to quite 
some extent, e.g., by permitting private schools that offer religious education next to the 
required standard curriculum. I will reject, however, the more radical claim that a political 
liberalism committed to public reason understood correctly would have to abolish a public 
school system altogether – and assertion recently put forward by Kevin Vallier.365 
While in principle an education system consisting of a mixture of public and private 
schools is justifiable from a political liberal perspective, there are further factors to 
consider. Depending on the balance of more concrete facts about the particular 
circumstances of a society, private schools might have detrimental effects on the political 
development of citizens. Under different social conditions, though, private schools could 
perhaps be the only alternative to a political climate in education which would alienate 
religious parents from mainstream politics. 
After discussing the problems of private education, I will end this chapter with a section 
about how the political liberal state should proceed with unreasonable religious parents 
who cannot be accommodated in the educational system without giving up basic principles 
of political liberal education.  
                                                 
365 See Vallier 2014. 
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6.1 Public and Private Reasons 
To understand how public reason shapes the set of justifiable education policies, it is 
necessary to explain in more detail the constraints that Rawls’ conception of public reason 
imposes on the citizens of a well-ordered society. 
Public reason demands that participants in political decision processes fulfil what Rawls 
calls their “duty of civility:” they are supposed to make their political decisions based only 
on reasons that are public, i.e., shared by, or at least hypothetically accessible to, other 
citizens. If reasons are based on a particular comprehensive doctrine and are therefore not 
accessible to citizens who are not adhering to that doctrine, these reasons ought not be used 
for the justification of political decisions. Because political decisions usually lead to 
political coercion, decisions based on comprehensive reasons would not be sufficiently 
justified to citizens not sharing that particular comprehensive doctrine.  
This version of the restrictions by public reason, as it initially appears in Political 
Liberalism, seems to imply that citizens with deep religious commitments could not rely on 
religious reasons (alone) to legitimise their political decisions, as these reasons are not 
accessible to their non-religious fellow citizens – and often also not to those holding a 
different religious view. Later, Rawls introduces what he calls “the wide view of public 
political culture.” It allows for reasons originating from the values of reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines to be employed in political discourse, “provided that in due 
course proper political reasons […] are presented that are sufficient to support whatever the 
comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to support.”366 To use Rawls’ own example, 
parties in a debate about the public support of church schools do not have to start off with 
public reasons alone, but instead are allowed to use reasons grounded in their 
comprehensive doctrines. This will allow all participants to explain how their reasonable 
view supports the basic political values of their society, provided they will be able to 
provide public reasons in due time.367 Nevertheless, the restriction of the duty of civility 
stays in place, although in a delayed form. While reasons firmly rooted in their 
                                                 
366 Rawls 1999a, p. 152. 
367 See Rawls 1999a, pp. 153ff. 
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comprehensive doctrine might be a main motivation for these citizens, they would be 
morally required to make a different decision if they were not able to translate them into 
public reasons at the end of the day. 
Rawls himself, as I mentioned earlier, does not give much detail on how exactly religious 
reasons are supposed to be treated. One convenient way of filling in this gap would be to 
fall in line with other proponents of public justification and public reason liberals and to 
assume that a practice of public reason means some strict limitation of the use of religious 
reasons in the public sphere. Robert Audi, for example, stipulates two principles of 
democratic citizenship, a principle of secular rationale and a principle of secular 
motivation, which require citizens to offer adequate secular reasons to justify their political 
decisions and to be motivated by secular reasons.368 From a religious perspective, at least, 
this approach would burden religious citizens considerably. 
Stephen Macedo, who describes himself explicitly as a political liberal in the Rawlsian 
tradition, acknowledges that burdens of public reason indeed exist for religious citizens (as 
much as for other comprehensive beliefs, many secular ones most likely included). Even 
so, Macedo does not think that these burdens could anyhow outweigh the requirements of 
public reason and dismisses worries about them with the claim that “[i]f some people 
nevertheless feel 'silenced' or 'marginalized' by the fact that some of us believe that it is 
wrong to seek to shape basic liberties on the basis of religious or metaphysical claims, I 
can only say ‘grow up!’"369 
                                                 
368 See Audi 2000, pp. 86-100. Like Rawls, Audi accepts religious reasons in political discourse as long as 
public reasons can be given eventually. 
369 Macedo 2000b, p. 35. This sentence is often quoted in the literature about public reason and religion. 
What is usually skipped in quoting this sentence is the relevant original context – an argument against the 
idea that public reason was an undemocratic limitation of free speech. It is this particular suggestion that 
Macedo dismisses this harshly. Otherwise he acknowledges that religious reasons indeed have a place in 
political debate, although the decisive reasons in a debate will have to be those that are public and can be 
shared by all reasonable citizens. See also Macedo 1998, p. 71. In this regard, he is in line with Rawls’ 
later account of religious reasons in political deliberation. However, this still means that religious reasons 
need to be replaced by public, i.e., non-religious ones for citizens to provide public justification. 
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The problem with this seemingly simple and convenient answer to the question of unfair 
religious burdens is that it does not engage very constructively with religious positions. 
The insistence on secular reasons and the claim that these were the kind of reasons which 
democratic citizens plainly must accept suspiciously resembles strategies of 
comprehensive liberals. Therefore, it is worthwhile to have another look for more political 
liberal replies to the worries about unfair burdens for religious citizens. 
6.2 The Burden of Religiousness 
Proponents of religious commitment have offered various counterarguments to the stance 
that religious citizens need to ultimately justify their political choices by reference to non-
religious reasons. Christopher Eberle argues that this requirement for restraint is too much 
of a burden for religious citizens and therefore would already be dismissed in the original 
position.370 Assuming that the parties in the original position have information about the 
psychological costs involved for deeply religious citizens, they would decide against them, 
as they could end up being one of those citizens. This case would be an instance of the 
more general assumption that the parties in the original positions would not choose any 
principles for which the “strains of commitment”371 are too high. It turns out, so Eberle, 
that the duty of civility cannot be justified by means of the original position. 
It is not all that obvious, though, that the restrictions of public reason are too much of a 
burden in the way Eberle claims. Rawls’ duty of civility is not necessarily an unbearable 
burden for all religious citizens but only for a subset of them. Using one of Macedo’s 
metaphors here, the psychological taxation of religious citizens may vary, depending on the 
content of their beliefs. While the costs for citizens with tolerant and ecumenical religious 
views might be low or non-existent, citizens holding more fundamentalist positions (e.g., 
conviction that dissenters will face eternal damnation, the lower moral status of non-
believers etc.) will have to pay a higher price and compartmentalise their comprehensive 
                                                 
370 See Eberle 2002, pp. 140-150. Eberle assumes, plausibly as I believe, that the duty of civility is closely 
linked (or even identical) with Rawls' principle of liberal legitimacy, which itself is one of the principles 
which the parties in the original position would choose. 
371 Rawls 1971, p. 176. 
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convictions to a greater extent.372 In situations that require citizens to give public reasons 
as their motivations, the latter kind of citizens will have access to fewer of those and can 
therefore make fewer legitimate political decisions. 
In terms of educational policies this means that parents whose comprehensive views share 
only few elements with the overlapping consensus in a liberal democratic society will 
sometimes have laws and regulations imposed on them that are not, and cannot, be 
legitimised to them. They might not agree with the content of school curricula that they 
perceive as incompatible with their religious views, despite this content being justified by 
political liberal principles all sufficiently reasonable religious views would agree on. While 
this might be an unfortunate fact of modern life, it is not necessarily a reason for concern 
for political liberals. The exercise of political power must be legitimised to reasonable 
citizens but there is no moral obligation to try and legitimise them to those that are 
unreasonable (or just not sufficiently reasonable) and do not share the basic values and 
principles of the political liberal society.373 
The kind of religious citizens who pay relevantly higher psychological costs are those 
whose doctrines do not share many values and virtues with political liberalism in the first 
place, such as toleration and respect for persons. In terms of political reasonableness, we 
can call these more fundamentalist strands of religious views less reasonable than the 
ecumenical and more tolerant ones. It means that the less politically reasonable citizens’ 
comprehensive beliefs are, the higher their psychological costs to participate in a liberal 
democratic society. They share fewer of their reasons with more open-minded fellow 
citizens, or differently put, fewer of their reasons are accessible to their fellow citizens that 
have different comprehensive views. 
6.3 Religious Reasons as Public Reasons 
Political liberals have good reasons not to follow Eberle’s suggested solution for the 
problem of religious burdens. Rejecting the duty of civility would weaken the practice of 
                                                 
372 See Macedo 1998, p. 72. 
373 See, e.g., Dreben 2003, pp. 323, 328f, Quong 2011, p. 181. 
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public justification in a well-ordered society to an extent that it would become almost 
irrelevant. A well-ordered society of this sort would be less stable for the right reasons, we 
can assume, than one that employs some standards of public reason. 
If we do not follow Eberle and assume that the parties in the original position would indeed 
choose principles that demand some sort of public reason restraint, we are stuck with the 
problem of religious citizens being forced to privatise what for many of them might be one 
of their major life projects. Kevin Vallier calls this the “integrity objection” to liberalism: 
“[p]rivatization is said to require citizens of faith to repress their fundamental 
commitments when participating in politics, thereby forcing them to violate their 
integrity.”374 In contrast to Eberle, Vallier does not try to solve this problem by rejecting 
the duty of civility but he instead suggests widening the scope of reasons that count as 
public. His approach is to replace the accessibility requirement (more details on this below) 
with a requirement for mere “intelligibility.” This strategy has far-reaching effects on 
education – one of the practical conclusions of this recast of public reason standards is, 
according to Vallier, that public schools cannot be justified to all reasonable citizens and 
therefore only an educational system consisting of private schools would be legitimate. 
To understand Vallier’s strategy and its implications for liberal education better, we need to 
take a closer look at what kind of reasons are public reasons for the political liberal and can 
therefore legitimise political decisions. Once I have examined the reasons for his claim 
about the unjustifiability of public schools, I will argue that political liberal education can 
and must indeed justify a public education system. 
For a start, it is necessary to understand the various interpretations of public reason 
standards. According to a common interpretation of Rawlsian public reason, reasonable 
citizens must bring forth reasons that are (at least hypothetically) shared by their fellow 
citizens. Only then do those reasons have a justificatory force legitimising the exercise of 
political power. What exactly it means to have shared reasons, though, is debatable. It has 
been argued that this would require all citizens to endorse the same justifications for a 
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political decision.375 In Vallier’s terms, the reasons that are part of a justification have to be 
“epistemically justified for each member of the public.”376 Under this narrow 
interpretation, reasons can be justificatory “only if each citizen will affirm the reason as her 
own at the right level of idealization.”377 This requirement for shared reasons could be 
satisfied in at least two ways, which both look implausible. 
First, we could assume that the reasoning of citizens on an individual level is sufficiently 
similar for the results of their “internal deliberation” being identical in all relevant aspects. 
Given that these citizens live in a society characterised by value pluralism, this would be 
an implausibly high expectation. Second, the shared reasons interpretation could instead 
require a deliberation process that can only legitimately come to an end when a general 
endorsement of the right justification has been reached. However, this restriction looks 
highly infeasible at the level of idealisation where political liberals locate the well-ordered 
society. The burdens of judgement (see 2.1.4), which are supposed to be part of a 
reasonably pluralistic society, render this interpretation impossible. 
Instead, it is more plausible to interpret the talk of shared reasons in the way of the 
“principle of justificatory sincerity” that Jonathan Quong proposes: 
Each citizen must appeal only to considerations they sincerely believe other reasonable 
citizens can endorse, but different citizens may still endorse the same decision (or different 
decisions) for different reasons.378 
Vallier has a similar interpretation of shared reason, although he calls it the “accessibility 
requirement,” which he thinks is the way Rawls understood public reason. The requirement 
says that although not all citizens share the same reasons, they still share a common 
                                                 
375 See Bohman 1996, pp. 80-83, Dryzek 2000, p. 15. 
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377 Vallier 2014, p. 109. Emphasis in the original. 
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standard of evaluation that they apply to different justificatory reasons. Reasons than 
satisfy these common standards will count as publicly accessible.379 
An objection to the accessibility interpretation of public justification by Gerald Gaus 
claims, though, that these requirements are still too strong to properly take account of the 
idea of mutual respect for citizens. According to Gaus’ conception of public reason, 
justifying reasons are path-dependent. Depending on various internal and external 
circumstances, citizens can therefore generate different, and sometimes contradictory, 
beliefs about political (and moral) situations. Due to their path-dependency, these different 
outcomes should nevertheless be taken as valid public reasons for or against political 
decisions, provided the deliberative process behind them is sufficient.  
The path-dependent nature of human reasoning would also mean that citizen (even when 
moderately idealised) must not necessarily share common evaluative standards as it is 
required by the accessibility reading, despite being sufficiently good reasoners. Insisting on 
an accessible reasons conception of public justification would therefore mean to deny 
(some) citizens the respect they are entitled to as rational and reasonable, and thereby 
competent, moral agents.380 
Vallier picks up on Gaus’ objection to motivate his claims that the appropriate standards for 
public reason must be distinctly weaker than the accessibility standard and settles for 
intelligibility instead. Reasons count as intelligible, and thereby as potentially justificatory, 
if they are epistemically justified in accordance with the evaluative standards of the 
reasonable individual whose reasons they are — even if other citizens do not share these 
standards. Religious citizens, for example, can base their decisions for policies and laws on 
their sacred texts which count as reasons according to their evaluative standards, although 
secular citizens might not share these standards. While this is a permissible interpretation 
of public reason, it does not mean that every subjective epistemic standard automatically 
passes as intelligible: citizens must still be “either rationally entitled […] or rationally 
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required to affirm”381 the reasons they think of as justificatory. While rationally required 
standards are those of sufficient information and inferences, religious texts like the Bible or 
the Koran qualify for Vallier as sources of standards that citizens are rationally entitled to 
affirm.382 
The intelligibility reading of public reason is part of Vallier’s claim that there is no need for 
a consensus of reasons to legitimise political decisions, where citizens must share the same 
evaluative standards. Instead, a convergence of reasons is sufficient, which means that 
neither citizens’ justificatory reasons nor their evaluative standards need to be shared or 
even accessible. What matters is that citizens have standards that, while agent-relative, 
satisfy certain threshold conditions of rationality and that fellow citizens can see the 
validity of these standards despite not necessarily sharing them.383 Political liberalism, 
correctly understood in its aim for neutrality and its respect for value pluralism, would 
imply the intelligibility requirement for public justification. According to Vallier, only this 
conception of public reason provides a maximum of integrity and individual freedom for 
citizens.384 
This line of argument now leads us straight back to education policies. Public education is 
Vallier’s application case to demonstrate what difference the intelligibility standard makes 
for the justification of actual policies. Under the consensus interpretation of public reason 
liberalism, the requirement for reasons that are at least accessible to all citizens alike 
implies a certain kind of civic education which makes future citizens suitable for this type 
of democratic deliberation. Vallier identifies three aims of liberal consensus education: 
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[…] consensus liberal citizens must be (i) sophisticated and fair deliberators who (ii) 
deliberate in shared terms and (iii) assign the aim of creating a shared public culture 
overriding weight with respect to their religious convictions that bear on political life.385 
None of these requirements are necessary for a convergence conception of public 
justification that only relies on intelligible reasons. Accordingly, a publicly justified 
education system under convergence liberalism would look quite different from one that 
must realise the above aims. Instead of supporting public schools, an education system 
under convergence liberalism would consist exclusively of private schools that would, e.g., 
be accessible via a voucher system. Parents could send their children to the school that best 
fits their comprehensive views, be they secular or religious, or so Vallier claims. 
To illustrate how education would need to be justified under convergence liberalism, 
Vallier compares the positions of two example parents, Alvin, who believes in a 
comprehensive religious doctrine, and Daniel, who is a comprehensive secularist.386 The 
incompatibility of their views is supposed to become evident when we look at two 
curricular topics they deeply disagree about – the teaching of intelligent design and sex 
education. By picking these quite different topics as reasons for disagreement, Vallier aims 
to demonstrate how disagreement spreads out over a whole range of curricular topics. If 
parents are to disagree about multiple, often unrelated curricular topics, this would support 
the conclusion that only private schools are publicly justifiable. I will argue later in this 
section that this is only the case at a particular aggregation level of parents’ preferences and 
that political liberals have good reasons to opt for a slightly more fine-grained level of 
preference aggregation. However, first we need more information about the disagreement 
between religious and secular parents. 
In Vallier’s example, Alvin wishes for a curriculum that teaches intelligent design as a 
possible alternative view to evolutionary theory and he also thinks that sex education 
should focus on abstinence, procreation, and the view of sex as a sacred act. Daniel, in 
contrast, thinks that children ought to be taught evolutionary theory “unpolluted by 
                                                 
385 Vallier 2014, p. 230. Vallier sees these requirements as central to, e.g., the work of Macedo and Gutmann 
on political education. 
386 See Vallier 2014, pp. 232-242. 
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nonscientific questions”387 and that sex education should prepare children in time for the 
possible consequences of sexual activity. Obviously, Alvin and Daniel both have strong 
reasons to reject each other’s preferred curriculum but with a scheme of public schooling 
in place there will often be no legitimate way (from the perspective of intelligibility public 
reason standards) to proceed in cases like these. While Alvin and Daniel would both prefer 
having their children educated in schools to having to educate them themselves, they 
would still prefer to educate them themselves when it comes to the topics above, instead of 
having their children attend a curriculum designed after the preferences of the opposing 
comprehensive doctrine. 
According to Vallier, public schools cannot satisfy various contrary demands, like the ones 
of Alvin and Daniel, simultaneously; trying to do so would mean to remove controversial 
elements from the curriculum. Such measures would only lead to a watered-down, 
alternative that would be unacceptable for everyone. Vallier also briefly considers a model 
that would enable parents to opt their children out of the controversial parts of the 
curriculum and either teach their children themselves or send them to private schools for 
these classes. This is, as he himself notes, an unusual proposal and would mean an 
additional burden for religious parents, as they would have to pay extra costs for the 
alternative lessons (in either time or money) while still having to pay for public schools.388 
Public schools also cannot decide to merely go for one of the above options (conservative 
religious or secular scientific). This would mean exerting unjustified coercion on either 
Alvin or Daniel, who both have so-called defeater reasons against the education policies 
they oppose. These defeater reasons are based in their comprehensive views and evaluative 
standards which are intelligible to their fellow citizens; they trump any reasons in favour of 
                                                 
387 Vallier 2014, p. 239. 
388 See Vallier 2014, p. 243. Vallier also briefly touches the possibility of opting out of single blocks that do 
not require the lessons being taught in an alternative form when it comes to teaching of Intelligent Design. 
The concern of the relevant parents would be, as he thinks, that their children “would have to pay the 
social consequences for separating [themselves] from the class” and would be ridiculed by their 
classmates (see p. 239). While this is certainly a possible, it does not necessarily show that partial opt-out 
or separate classes on particular topics is not a viable option. I tend to think that it rather hints at how 
important it is for children to learn to respect religious diversity from an early stage on. 
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a particular coercive political measure, thus effectively making its implementation 
impermissible.389 Vallier’s conclusion is that, assuming a default position against coercive 
laws and institutions, a tax-financed public schooling system could not be implemented 
consistently with the public reason constraint construed in his preferred way.390 
Objections have been given against various parts of Vallier’s argument. One can argue that 
what needs to be justified are not coercive policies themselves, but the reasons for the 
relevant decisions,391 or that convergence (and with it the intelligibility standard) relies on 
controversial epistemological assumptions.392 I will try to avoid these in-depth discussions 
about fundamental disagreements on public reason. What seems helpful in the context of 
discussing education policies, though, are Andrew Lister’s thoughts about preference 
aggregation in public reason. I will take his discussion of the “aggregation problem” as a 
starting point without necessarily endorsing the conclusions he draws from his 
observations.393 
The policy options that Vallier gives us in the context of public education already require 
an aggregation of preferences – while we can identify various positions regarding parts of 
the curriculum (intelligent design/evolution, sex education), the options that Alvin and 
Daniel are deciding about are bundles of more fine-grained curricular policies. The 
ordering of their preferences would look like in the following table. 
                                                 
389 It is worth noting that the concept of defeater reasons requires a presumption in favour of liberty, i.e., that 
any coercion by regulative political measures must be justified to those subject to it. See, e.g., Benn 1988, 
Ch. 5, Gaus 2011 Ch. VI, Section 17.3, Vallier 2014, pp. 30f. Even if often not made explicit, any political 
theory that considers justification of political coercion important relies on a presumption in favour of 
liberty as one of its premises, therefore also political liberalism. 
390 Vallier’s view on decision procedures in public reason is in this regard similar to the view argued for by 
Gerald Gaus in Gaus 1996 and later publications. 
391 See Lister 2013. 
392 See Quong 2011, pp. 265-273. 
393 See Lister 2013, pp. 87-101. 
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 Alvin Daniel 
Allowing Intelligent Design 1 0 (defeater) 
Exclusive Focus on Evolution 0 (defeater) 1 
Permissive Sex Ed 0 (defeater) 1 
Conservative Sex Ed 1 0 (defeater) 
The numerical values represent relative preference ratings of Alvin and Daniel in relation 
to the curricular policies under discussion. A value of 0 means that the person in question 
has reasons not to endorse a policy and would indeed prefer not having any regulations 
rather than the options that are available. There are cases where one or more involved 
parties hold defeater reasons. 
Assumed that these two curricular decisions were sufficient for determining everyone’s 
position on the question of how a legitimate school system ought to be designed, 
aggregation in the way Vallier does it seems permissible. Yet, this is rather unlikely. In the 
next two sub-sections I will take a closer look how his choice of policy aggregation 
impacts the results. I will instead propose a different disaggregation of individual positions 
and then compare a third position to the positions of Alvin and Daniel. My point will be 
that while political liberal education should attempt to accommodate these positions, it also 
must not become a hostage to extreme positions. 
6.4 Disaggregation of Religious Reasons 
In light of what I said about basic requirements of political liberal education in Chapters 3 
to 5, I am sceptical that the reasons Alvin and Daniel have for rejecting education policies 
that oppose their comprehensive views are really defeaters. Although the requirements of 
political liberal education are not as high as Vallier thinks, there certainly are some central 
requirements that reasonable citizens (and reasonable comprehensive doctrines) ought to 
acknowledge. 
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The requirements of political liberal education that I have identified in the first part of the 
thesis regarding political virtues, autonomy, and rights, belong to the normative core values 
of political liberalism, therefore reasonable citizens must agree upon these values, and the 
requirements derived from them, as part of the overlapping consensus. If that were not the 
case, we would have a theory that would no longer be identifiable as (roughly Rawlsian) 
political liberalism.394 It might be sufficient for the overlapping consensus to leave room 
for various, mutually exclusive interpretations of the principles it contains but it must be a 
consensus nonetheless. A political liberal society that would not have a consensus about 
basic principles of education but only convergence can hardly be supposed to be stable 
over time, at least not for the reasons political liberals take to be relevant. 
Rawls himself describes a political conception of justice as consisting of two parts, the 
substantive principles of justice themselves and the “guidelines of inquiry” to “decide 
whether substantive principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best 
satisfy them.”395 Two kinds of political values that relate to these two parts are values of 
political justice and values of public reason. Values of political justice are those of political 
equality, equality of opportunity, and so on, while values of public reason cover political 
virtues such as “reasonableness and a readiness to honor the (moral) duty of civility.”396 As 
I have argued earlier, these values and the necessary skills to realise them for oneself need 
be taught to future citizens. Furthermore, these values are part of the common ground 
reasonable citizens of a political liberal society share.397 Citizens rejecting these values 
themselves or political consequences that directly follow from these values cannot claim 
                                                 
394 Which is not to say that it would not be a plausible, or perhaps even more plausible, conception of 
liberalism. It would just be beyond the scope of this thesis. 
395 Rawls 1993, p. 224. 
396 Rawls 1993, p. 224. 
397 See Quong 2012, pp. 52f. 
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that they have been subject to illegitimate political power. They would be classified as 
unreasonable from the perspective of political liberalism.398 
Considering the requirements of political liberal education, we should check each of the 
aforementioned curriculum options to see whether Alvin or Daniel really have defeaters 
against their implementation, or whether an implementation is legitimised to reasonable 
citizens simply by the fact that these parts of the curriculum are contributing to substantive 
political liberal requirements. 
Allowing intelligent design: Here it is important to determine how intelligent design is 
introduced into the curriculum. If it would enable children (or, more likely, parents) to 
make an exclusive decision either to attend intelligent design classes or evolutionary 
biology classes, Daniel’s reasons would not hold against this case – his children could 
attend the “purely scientific” course and would not have to engage with any intelligent 
design theories. 
However, Vallier concedes that a curriculum of this kind could lead to other, more 
problematic objections. His proposal is therefore only to teach intelligent design as an 
example for the limits of scientific theories and what they can explain. Intelligent design 
could be taught “as part of a theology or philosophy portion of secondary schooling that 
could be legitimately mandated.”399 It is this relatively weak form of intelligent design 
lessons that Daniel resists. 
                                                 
398 This is at least Quong’s interpretation of political liberalism found in Quong 2011, Quong 2012. Public 
reason liberals can disagree with this view; Gaus has notably done so and thinks the result is a sort of 
political liberal sectarianism (see Gaus 2012, pp. 8f) that does not differ much from perfectionism. At this 
point I will assume that Quong’s view is closer to the Rawlsian idea of political liberalism than Gaus’ and 
therefore rely on the premise that reasonable citizens share the core values of political liberalism by 
definition. Nevertheless, other ways of making requirements of political liberalism and public justification 
compatible with each other are possible; e.g., we could think of public reason as one of various values, all 
of which would be sufficient, but not necessary conditions of legitimacy. This would make political 
liberalism a sort of hybrid between public reason liberalism and perfectionist liberalism (Wendt [in press]). 
I do not think that the basic requirements for this interpretation of political liberalism would look much 
different from the one I develop on the basis of Quong’s. 
399 Vallier 2014, p. 237. 
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We need to determine why Daniel’s reasons to reject even this “modest” proposal count as 
a defeater. His reasons cannot be related to some serious risk (of whatever kind) that his 
children would be exposed to by this curriculum. Neither will the theory of evolution be 
withheld from his children, nor will intelligent design be presented in the context of 
biology lessons as a similarly valid theory.400 The only ground on which Daniel could 
present a defeater here would be that this sort of (from his perspective) objectionable 
curriculum would be financed with taxes – he would be politically coerced into paying for 
it, although indirectly. 
Exclusive focus on evolution: This kind of curriculum is rejected by Alvin, who seems 
determined to have intelligent design introduced as part of the curriculum to counter a 
purely scientific evolutionary view that leaves no room for God. 
While it might contribute to a better mutual understanding and perhaps even social stability 
if citizens with different religious or secular views have an insight into each other’s 
comprehensive doctrines (I will say more on this in the following section), it does not seem 
to me that Alvin’s children are at a serious risk by a public school curriculum that does 
teach evolution but does not mention intelligent design. Alvin’s children could be taught 
about intelligent design at home, at Sunday school, or in other ways. As in Daniel’s case, 
the only relevant coercion that is involved here is that this kind of school is financed by 
Alvin’s taxes – although he would prefer, if possible, to send his children to a school that 
does also teach intelligent design. 
Permissive sex education: Perhaps the case for permissive sex education that is favoured 
by Daniel is stronger than the case for an “evolutionary theory only” curriculum. To 
determine whether it is, we need to have some more details on what the content of 
permissive sex education could be. 
Assumed that the reasonable minimal aims of sex education should be the prevention of 
unwanted pregnancies and infection with sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), any sex 
                                                 
400 Vallier’s example avoids the obvious “evolution is just one of many theories” pitfall and acknowledges 
that theories can be better or worse; he also acknowledges that theories of intelligent design are certainly 
bad science (see Vallier 2014, pp. 234-237). 
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education worth its name should enable adolescents to avoid these harms. Any kind of sex 
education curriculum that turns out to be strongly insufficient to reach these goals can be 
ruled out as an inadequate choice. 
Sex education programmes empirically confirmed as effective will include lessons about 
the use of contraception and convey knowledge about sexual risk-taking behaviours that 
might lead to infections with STDs or unwanted pregnancies. It is furthermore important 
for the effectiveness of these programmes that they are based on social learning theories. 
These theories can provide effective teaching strategies, such as personalising the 
information about risk-taking behaviour by presenting it in an accessible context for young 
people, and by also addressing social and media influences.401 
If this is what Daniel favours, it seems primarily an efficient sex education. This is what he 
should expect from public schools. Perhaps, though, he is unhappy with some of the 
measures taught which he might find dishonest or outdated, e.g., strategies of abstinence. 
Nevertheless, there seems to be good evidence that teaching adolescents so-called 
“resistance skills” in order to postpone the first occurrence of sexual intercourse is part of 
an effective sex education, as long as it is combined with other content covering 
information about STDs, pregnancy, and contraceptives.402 Should it turn out that a sex 
education programme that does not include an abstinence strategy is relevantly less 
efficient than others, Daniel’s preferences would be at odds with the primary goal of sex 
education to be efficient. Under these circumstances, I would not take Daniel’s reasons to 
insist on an abstinence-free programme as defeater, as they would undermine the 
effectiveness of sex education for his children.403 
                                                 
401 See Kirby et al. 1994; for similar results see also Cvetkovich et al. 1975, Eisen, Zellman 1986 and Eisen et 
al. 1990. 
402 See, e.g., Ku et al. 1992 and Ku et al. 1993. 
403 It is possible that future empirical research will show that the relation between teaching resistance skills 
and an effective sex education are not causal. In this case, there would be no reason to teach abstinence to 
make a sex education programme successful, and Daniel’s reason would be eligible as a defeater. 
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Conservative sex education: The same arguments that can be made against Daniel’s 
claims work in the same way against Alvin’s claims if his ideal version of sex education 
would miss some of the parts relevant for it to be efficient. If Alvin were, e.g., convinced 
that lessons about the use of contraceptives would lead adolescents to have premarital sex 
and therefore sex education should not include information about the use of contraceptives, 
this would lead to a relevantly less efficient education programme. If, similarly to Daniel’s 
case, Alvin’s reasons would lead to a significantly less efficient sex education, his reasons 
should not count as defeaters. 
In summary, the comparison of Alvin’s and Daniel’s positions towards evolution and sex 
education as part of the school curriculum shows that both topics have a different relevance 
for the discussion of the legitimacy of public education. One might have expected sex 
education has the more relevant topic, but this is not the case. Indeed, Alvin and Daniel 
cannot diverge too much from some of the core standards constituting an efficient sex 
education. If they reject too much of the relevant content of sex education, the kind of 
curriculum they would tolerate equals a position deliberately favouring low-quality or even 
no sex education. This is not a permissible option from the perspective of justice, as 
adolescents as future citizens need access to education that allows them to pursue a variety 
of life projects. Reasonable citizens, so the assumption, will accept that a sufficiently 
efficient sex education must be part of such an education – at least under a conception of 
public reason that uses standards of acceptability. 
In contrast, the disagreement about evolutionary theory and intelligent design might 
generate proper defeaters here. While coercive policies in the case of effective sex 
education are justified by the entitlement of children as future citizens to a self-determined 
life, no convincing reason of such sort can be given in the case of evolutionary theory. It is 
hard to see how Alvin’s or Daniel’s children will be worse off in terms of political liberal 
values if they learn about either evolutionary theory or intelligent design. However, as 
Vallier remarks, both are coerced to pay taxes which support a public school curriculum 
that they find highly defective. It looks as if Alvin’s and Daniel’s reasons to reject a public 
curriculum that tries to accommodate both their views on evolution are therefore potential 
defeaters that are not overridden by considerations for the good of their children. In the 
next sub-section I will discuss whether these defeaters are enough to leave public 
education as unjustifiable. 
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6.5 Public and Private Schooling 
One of the purposes of public reason is to structure public deliberation about policies that 
are not directly covered by the principles of justice, and while the requirement of an 
efficient sex education can be derived from those principles, the form of how evolutionary 
biology and intelligent design ought to be taught cannot. Alvin and Daniel will agree as 
reasonable citizens that redistribution of resources to provide education for children is a 
demand of justice, but they can disagree about how the resources for education are further 
distributed in a particular, more fine-grained context. 
But even though this disagreement is reasonable, it does not inevitably lead to abolishing 
state-run public schools and establishing a purely privatised education system as Vallier 
claims. This becomes clear when we compare Alvin and Daniel’s positions with a third 
position. Assume a third party, Pauline, who is indifferent towards the question whether the 
theology and philosophy section will also cover intelligent design or not, or how exclusive 
the focus on evolutionary theory in biology lessons is. 
Table 1 
 Alvin Daniel Pauline 
Allowing Intelligent Design 2 0 (defeater) 1 
Exclusive focus on Evolution 0 (defeater) 2 1 
What she cares about, though, is that the state offers public education. She believes that 
only public schools will allow her children to experience the diversity and multiculturalism 
of a modern, progressive society. While she would accept a completely privatised 
education system, she would not find home schooling acceptable as she has, like many 
modern citizens, commitments and interests beyond the upbringing of her children. 
Depending on how strong Alvin and Daniel’s concerns about public schools is, the table of 
eligible options could take one of the following forms: either they both still prefer a public 
education system, although flawed in their eyes, to home schooling (see Table 2 below) 
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Table 2 
 Alvin Daniel Pauline 
Public education system 1 1 2 
Privatised education system 2 2 1 
Home schooling 0 (defeater) 0 (defeater) 0 (defeater) 
or they would rather home school their children than sending them to public schools (see 
table below). 
Table 3 
 Alvin Daniel Pauline 
Public education system 0 (defeater) 0 (defeater) 2 
Privatised education system 2 2 1 
Home schooling 1 1 0 (defeater) 
Only the second scenario of Table 3 would lead to a completely privatised education 
system as the only legitimate option, while the first case would allow for either a public or 
a privatised system, or a mixed system of both public and private schools. 
At first it seems that only private schools are a legitimate choice, as in both scenarios, 
private schools are the only option against which no party has any defeater reasons. 
According to a pure public reason liberalism that does not rest on any underlying principles 
of justice, this would be indeed the case. However, political liberalism does, and therefore, 
substantive considerations of justice might alter the balance of defeater reasons as outlines 
above. There are good reasons to assume that professional education can provide a more 
comprehensive education of better quality than home schooling, in most cases at least (see 
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also 4.5 on this). Therefore, the entitlement of children to an adequate education which can 
be derived from the principles of Justice as Fairness provide might cast a different light on 
Table 3.404 Alvin and Daniel’s preferences might be, from a political liberal perspective, 
unreasonable, as both their second preference (home schooling) would be incompatible 
with requirements of justice. 
From a perspective of political liberalism in the more egalitarian sense, in contrast to a 
public reason perspective resting on an intelligibility interpretation, Table 3 might be ruled 
out due to the unreasonable positions of Alvin and Daniel. We then end up with Table 2, 
where “moderate” Alvin and Daniel’s highest preference would still be private schooling 
and their second preference public schooling, while Pauline would still prefer public to 
private schooling. 
Both scenarios would be permissible from the perspective of political liberal education. 
None of the requirements identified in the previous chapters exclude the option of a fully 
privatised schooling system, as long as children will be able to develop the relevant 
political virtues, a capacity for minimal autonomy and later for political autonomy, and the 
prerequisites to make use of the primary goods. While such a system would be 
accommodating citizens with defeater reasons against public schooling, like the versions of 
Alvin and Daniel in Table 3, it would certainly disappoint citizens like Pauline. 
An educational system that accommodates citizens like Alvin and Daniel as well as Pauline 
could also allow for private providers next to public ones. A distribution for educational 
resources could be achieved in various ways, such as a voucher system. Regardless of the 
details of the system, though, the costs of the private and public schooling of children will 
have to be paid for through the redistribution of wealth by the state,405 and meet the 
requirements of political liberal education. 
                                                 
404 As I noted in 2.5.1, variants of political liberalism in combination with other conceptions of justice are 
possible. While they might differ in detail, it is likely that from any of those conceptions sufficiently 
similar requirements for education can be derived.  
405 For an argument against a private school system that is entirely paid for by parents themselves (except the 
very poor) on the basis of mutual respect and equality of opportunity see, e.g., Brighouse 1998b. 
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As yet, it looks like the principles of justice and the standards of public reason permit an 
education system that can either be entirely privatised or consists of two tracks, a private 
and a public one. This range of possible education systems is consistent with the few 
comments about education by Rawls himself. Neither a private nor public a school system 
is excluded by the conception of Justice as Fairness. A systematic education of children is 
providing fair equality of opportunity in a just society by insuring “equal chances of 
education and culture for persons similarly endowed and motivated by either subsidizing 
private schools or establishing a public school system.”406 While Rawls does not discuss 
this topic in more detail, it seems right that neither of these options must to be excluded, 
provided a proper implementation. 
Staying agnostic in regard to the status of educational providers, whether private or public, 
is reasonable. The transfer of skills, knowledge, and attitudes necessary for living in a just 
society is quite independent of the status of the provider, as long as the standards that ought 
to be reached are set by a just state. From a practical perspective, a range of public and 
private schools to choose from might provide children with a better chance of an adequate 
education than a purely state-run system, provided that basic requirements of political 
liberal education are fulfilled.407 As a reminder, these requirements include a sufficient 
development of political virtues in children that enable them to value reciprocity, be 
tolerant, have respect towards their fellow citizens and so on. Schools also have to enable 
the kind of minimal autonomy that would be necessary to develop political autonomy. 
Furthermore, children need to learn about the political rights (and duties) in their society 
and the necessary skills and capacities to make proper use of them. All of these 
requirements can be met (in principle) by private school providers, even when backed by a 
particular comprehensive doctrine. 
We need to take into account as well that an important part of most ethical and religious 
views is to teach children what seems true and important from their respective 
perspectives. Part of almost any idea of the good is its own reproduction by convincing 
                                                 
406 Rawls 1971, p. 275. 
407 For similar views, although not especially in regard to political liberalism, see, e.g., Gutmann 2002, pp. 
41-43. 
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others that it is the right and true doctrine. This might be more obvious in cases of religious 
doctrines, but it seems also true for, e.g., philosophical doctrines – the Millian humanist 
who thinks that individualism is important for a good life might want to convince others of 
this as well, especially if she also thinks that this contributes to overall happiness. 
Restrictions on religious schools on the grounds of being backed by comprehensive 
doctrines would vice versa also apply to schools propagating other more philosophical or 
explicitly secular views. 
As long as schools provide sufficient standards of education in line with political liberal 
requirements, there seems to be no principled reason to exclude private or religious 
providers from the education sector of a political liberal state. With these conditions as 
side-constraints, there is no good political liberal reason not to offer education within a 
variety of comprehensive contexts.408 Similar permission can be made for the school 
choice of parents. Always provided the education they choose satisfies the political liberal 
requirements in terms of virtues, autonomy, and so on, there is no reason why they should 
not have their children brought up in a school that, e.g., is outspokenly secular or openly 
religious. If we think that the relationship between parents and children is indeed a 
particularly valuable one,409 or that it can be understood as falling in the category of the 
means of self-respect, and thus qualify as an instance of this particular basic good of justice 
(as suggested in the previous chapter), it would even be unjust to deny parents this option. 
This (admittedly somewhat extended) discussion of religious reasons as public reasons has 
hopefully elucidated the limits which political liberal education must impose on religious 
claims on education. Political liberal education can allow for private religious schools, 
although it needs not and must not give up the public branch of education, as Vallier 
claims. However, the principled permissibility of private schools still needs to be defended 
against objections resting on more concrete effects that it might have on society. While not 
                                                 
408 A similar claim can be found in Malenfant-Veilleux 2017, which analyses the last education reform in 
Quebec under the aspect of Rawlsian justice (among others). I agree with Malenfant-Veilleux that a mixed 
system of public and private schools must be accompanied by integrative measures (see also 6.3) and a 
sufficient control over taught subjects, the school calendar, evaluation standards etc. to satisfy 
requirements of justice. 
409 See Brighouse, Swift 2006, Brighouse, Swift 2014. 
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illegitimate, religious private schools could contribution to a form of confessional 
segregation of society and thus turn out to be detrimental to liberal stability. On the other 
hand, private schools under official political liberal guidelines might still be the best way 
to accommodate religious parents who would otherwise seek the services of non-official, 
possibly more fundamentalist, institutions to get the religious schooling they want for their 
children. I will discuss these problems in the next sub-section. 
6.6 Problems of Private Education 
Despite the prima facie permissibility of private schools, (at least) two more problems 
might occur that need to be addressed. The first is the concern that an education system, 
while accommodating all kinds of reasonable doctrines, might not foster sufficient 
interaction between children from different comprehensive backgrounds. This “liberal 
silence” can lead to segregation and in the long run to a less stable society. 
The problem of liberal silence is discussed by Kenneth Strike, who focuses on the way 
religion can be taught in a public schooling curriculum.410 The attempt to be neutral about 
religious views can lead, Strike observes, to a practice of bracketing religious content from 
education and focusing it solely on the political (and moral) values of political liberalism, 
which might generate internal problems by itself. This practice can lead to a crucial lack of 
communication between religious and secular citizens because religious reasons are 
supposed to stay outside the public arena, with the result that religious values are not 
discussed in depth in public schools. Under conditions like these, it is likely that children 
from religious backgrounds find themselves separated from those with secular 
backgrounds when it comes to values and the scope of moral convictions. Communication 
between secular and religious children, and eventually between citizens, will therefore lack 
the qualities that seem necessary for political liberalism to work, as Strikes points out: 
When conclusions are visible and the reasons for them are not, people are less able to see 
an issue through the eyes of their opponents. People on the one side will see their 
                                                 
410 See Strike 2007. 
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opponents as ungodly. People on the other side will see their opponents as ignorant and 
unreasonable. The mutual respect required of good citizens is not encouraged.411 
It is possible that this problem is even reinforced by allowing private schools focusing on 
particular comprehensive views. Religious children would be segregated not only from 
secular children, but also from religious children with different faiths. If this were the case, 
these religious groups might suffer the same disadvantageous effects as, e.g., segregated 
immigrants, as described later in Chapter 8.  
The remedy that Strike recommends for public schools would be having a “religious 
dialogue in a way that does not endorse anyone's religion”412 in particular, while still 
endorsing the core norms of liberal democracy. Examples of how to integrate creationism, 
gay rights, and bible studies in common school education illustrate this.413 
This approach looks plausible for public schools without any comprehensive agenda 
backing it. It seems more problematic in a setting that allows for private schools, as these 
will by design educate almost exclusively children whose parents belong to a specific 
religious group. Even if the state requires private religious schools to accept pupils from 
other religious or secular backgrounds, it seems unlikely that more than a handful of 
children with different religious beliefs would attend a school of a particular confession. 
The opportunity for experiencing religious diversity in the way Strike proposes would not 
be given at these schools. 
If the existence of private schools, even in a mixed education system with public and 
private schools, contributes to liberal silence effects, this may be a serious disadvantage 
when it comes to conveying necessary political virtues or norms for future citizens. While 
not the only means to learn tolerance and respect, actual contact with children from 
different comprehensive background in an open, supportive environment would certainly 
be valuable. Public schools without an agenda shaped by a comprehensive doctrine seem to 
be better suited to provide this kind of environment than religious private schools. Even if 
                                                 
411 Strike 2007, p. 696. 
412 Strike 2007, p. 701. 
413 See Strike 2007, pp. 701-708. 
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by the necessary legal regulations religious private schools were forced to also accept 
children from other religious backgrounds, we can strongly assume that a majority of 
parents would not make use of this opportunity. 
Despite this seemingly major drawback of a partly privatised education system, it would be 
impetuous to claim that therefore private schools were ruled out as impermissible. 
Depending on the social conditions found in a given society, enforcing an exclusively 
public education system might surprisingly lead to a decrease in social stability after all. 
An important reason for not restricting the freedom of school choice would be, as John 
Tomasi argues, the perceived legitimacy of the political liberal state. If political liberals 
really care about legitimising the state to reasonable citizens, they should be sensitive to 
how liberal measures might restrict those people that are at the margins of the set of 
reasonable citizens but can still be considered sufficiently reasonable. Taking measures to 
further liberal aims without considering their effects on what the “marginally reasonable” 
perceive as valuable will alienate them from the liberal society and decreases the 
legitimacy of the political liberal state. Unbalanced, broad-stroked liberal policies that 
resemble those of comprehensive liberalism too much could effectively turn reasonable 
citizens into unreasonable ones.414 
It needs to be emphasised that the conception of legitimacy Tomasi has in mind here is one 
of perceived legitimacy. It could be that the political liberal state is perfectly legitimate and 
justifiable to its moderately idealised citizens, although a majority of actual citizens, while 
reasonable in the Rawlsian sense, do not see this due to various biases taking effect on 
their reasoning. Nevertheless, if a political liberal framework for education is supposed to 
be not only an academic exercise but to have a practical value, it is worth taking 
considerations like Tomasi’s seriously. In consequence, it might be a prudent as well as a 
tolerant move to accommodate those at the margins of reasonableness in order to make 
them accept the political liberal state as legitimate. 
In a similar spirit, Harry Brighouse suggests that denying religious schools to citizens for 
whom they seem important might increase the tensions between these citizens and the 
                                                 
414 See Tomasi 2002. 
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state, which would mean a negative effect on social stability. In contrast to Tomasi, 
Brighouse in addition is worried about effects of confessional segregation and liberal 
silence and therefore proposes to counter these effects by actively involving the state in the 
funding of religious schools.415 While Brighouse’s proposal focuses on autonomy as a 
central educational value, arguing that this would increase the chance to “produce 
autonomy-facilitating schools,”416 the same could be expected for political liberal 
requirements of education. Furthermore, he proposes a requirement for religious schools to 
accept children from other religious or secular backgrounds, something which would 
counteract the risk of liberal silence in a segregated education system. 
The expected effects of Brighouse’s proposals will vary, in my view. The state being 
directly involved in religious school funding and therefore controlling their adherence to 
mandatory curricula content and other regulations might be an effective way to ensure that 
basic requirements of political liberal education are satisfied. Requiring religious schools 
to accept children from diverse backgrounds would be more of a symbolic gesture. It 
seems unlikely that many religious parents would send their children to schools run by 
different confessions, no more likely, at least, than secular parents sending their children to 
religious schools. 
Yet, the answer to the question whether private schools should be avoided on the grounds 
of confessional segregation and liberal silence, or tolerated to accommodate the marginally 
reasonable, is context-dependent. In a society that is reasonably stable and has only a small 
minority of marginally reasonable religious citizens, the benefits of avoiding liberal silence 
by not establishing religious private schools might be bigger. However, another possible 
case is a society where a large group of marginally reasonable religious citizens might turn 
their back on a political liberal value consensus if they feel that their religious values 
systematically ignored. In this case, the society in question might benefit more from a 
variety of private schools providing a reasonable civic education next to a religious 
curriculum.417 Even though private schools are prima facie permissible from a political 
                                                 
415 See Brighouse 2005, Brighouse 2006, Ch. 5. 
416 Brighouse 2005, p. 87. 
417 The question of cultural traditions might also play an important part. In societies, e.g., where religious 
schools have a history dating back several centuries and often have a high reputation, it seems likely that 
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liberal perspective, concrete political decisions about their role in an education system will 
also need to be based on concrete facts about the actual socio-political environment.  
While parents who prefer private education might be deeply entrenched in their 
comprehensive doctrines and some of them may be characterised as only marginally 
reasonable from a political liberal perspective, they still are reasonable citizens. What 
remains to be discussed is the relation between the political liberal state and unreasonable 
citizens in the context of education. This will be the topic of the last sub-section. 
6.7 Education and the Unreasonable 
As long as the state provides some sort of quality check to see whether the requirements of 
political liberal education are met by private schools (if these are permitted in a concrete 
case, that is), there are no reasons against parents’ decision to send their children to private 
schools backed by reasonable comprehensive doctrines. The same cannot be said if 
unreasonable doctrines or decisions are involved, either on the side of schools or on the 
side of parents. 
When it comes to a general strategy for handling unreasonable comprehensive doctrines, 
Rawls talks about “containment.”418 Unfortunately, he does not give any more hints about 
what containment as a political measure implies in his view, which allows for a variety of 
interpretations. Marilyn Friedman for example sees in the talk about containment a 
potential approval of the disenfranchisement or silencing of groups in society that are 
labelled as unreasonable according to a standard not justifiable to them.419 These groups 
would not only include extremist minorities, though, but also groups who just happen to 
have substantially different but mostly moderate views about political morality, such as 
utilitarians. 
                                                                                                                                                    
their sudden abolition would outrage not only the religious part of the population but also non-religious 
citizens who consider these traditional institutions important on a more symbolic level. 
418 See Rawls 1993, p. 64, n. 19. 
419 See Friedman 2000. 
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In comparison, Quong gives a more plausible version of containment, arguing that 
unreasonable citizens do not have to fear a blanket withdrawal of political rights or 
liberties. Even unreasonable persons are entitled to the benefits of citizenship. Instead, 
particular rights and liberties are suspended only in the context of an action that counts as 
unreasonable and threatening to the political liberal state. This would be support for 
any policy whose primary intention is to undermine or restrict the spread of ideas that 
reject the fundamental political values, that is, (a) that political society should be a fair 
system of social cooperation for mutual benefit, (b) that citizens are free and equal, and (c) 
the fact of reasonable pluralism.420 
Overall it seems more helpful to talk about (in the political liberal sense) unreasonable 
decisions regarding children’s education than to talk about unreasonable parents. Matthew 
Clayton and David Stevens give as an example the restriction of parents’ liberty of free 
exercise of religion in cases where the education they see as adequate for their children 
does not meet the requirements of political liberalism.421 
To illustrate the divergence between those two standards further, we can imagine parents 
who hold as part of their religious convictions that there is an inequality between genders 
that should be reflected in political life as well, such as, e.g., in a restriction or abolishment 
of women’s suffrage. In a political liberal state, these parents would of course have all the 
rights and liberties of citizens, including the liberty to choose from a range of reasonable 
options of education for their children. However, they could be legitimately denied the 
request for a school that teaches their children in accordance with their unreasonable 
beliefs about inequality. 
There will certainly be parents with strong comprehensive views of this kind who 
nevertheless are reasonable enough to participate in the political liberal society and accept 
the given requirements. Perhaps they compartmentalise some of their convictions and are 
quite unhappy with some conditions in their society, e.g., public schooling. These parents 
would probably prefer an educational system consisting of private schools where children 
are taught according to the religious beliefs of their community (and because they are 
                                                 
420 Quong 2011, p. 299. 
421 See Clayton, Stevens 2014, p. 73. 
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reasonable, they would also grant that other religious communities could have their own 
schools). 
I do not think that these are necessarily cases the political liberal needs to be concerned 
about. Provided that the education of children from unreasonable backgrounds adequately 
respects their parents’ comprehensive views and does not discriminate against them, it 
seems reasonable and legitimate to deny them access to private schools teaching 
unreasonable and illiberal interpretations of certain world views. Although the consensus 
on the principles of justice in a political liberal society, and therefore of the structure of its 
basic institutions, is more than a compromise, as Rawls emphasises, we can easily 
conceive of reasonable citizens that accept a given educational system as legitimate while 
still think that one that would accommodate their comprehensive views better would be a 
more optimal one. Commitment to mutual cooperation in a just society does not always 
have to be joyful and certainly will hold disappointments for citizens.422 
6.8 Conclusion 
This section provided an analysis of the status of religious reasons in a political liberal 
society and an assessment of important limits to what sort of education religious parents 
can claim for their children. It has demonstrated what sorts of burdens religious citizens 
might have to face in a political liberal education system and also to what extent the 
political liberal state can (and should) accommodate their preferences regarding their 
children’s education. 
Political liberals who support views of public justification resembling those of Audi and 
Macedo would likely be unhappy with my analysis, and the same is probably true for 
proponents of strong religious freedom along the lines of Eberle and Vallier. If so, I hope 
this indicates that my sketch of the limits of freedom of religion in educational choice has 
found a plausible middle ground. 
                                                 
422 See Lomasky 1998 for an example of how a comprehensive view can accept reasonable social 
arrangements, although they will seem suboptimal to its adherents. Lomasky’s argument aims at 
libertarians but works for religious views in just the same way. 
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The next chapter changes the focus away from religious reasons and towards sex and 
gender education. Nevertheless, citizens’ religious views continue to play an important part 
here, too, as many arguments against an open and comprehensive sex education seem to 
originate from religious beliefs. 
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7 Same-Sex Relations in Education 
So far, I tried to show that political liberalism can be quite permissive in terms of religious 
freedom. Although political liberalism does not rule out a public schooling system, as 
Vallier tries to argue, it allows in principle for a variety of school forms. This gives 
followers of religious doctrines the opportunity to pick a school where the curriculum also 
covers religious content, if they wish, while comprehensive atheists could choose a school 
that is free from the religious views they detest. 
Still, despite the permissible inclusion of religious contents into political liberal education, 
it is still necessary to set limits to the demands a religious doctrine can make concerning 
the details of educational policies. It became already clear in the discussion of sex 
education in the previous chapter that there are reasons that can outweigh parents’ 
preferences. Such reasons are grounded in the necessary core content of a political liberal 
education: a range of political virtues, the capacity for weak autonomy, and knowledge of 
and capacity for making use of citizens’ primary goods. Due to these requirements, I have 
argued, political liberal education must provide a sufficiently efficient sex education as part 
of its curriculum in regard to topics like STDs and pregnancy. It can be argued, though, 
that sex education should cover more than this and should include topics like same-sex 
relations and marriage. This chapter will focus on the question whether and for what 
reasons same-sex relations, and by extension, marriage, ought to be covered by political 
liberal education.  
Although I established in the previous chapter that reasonable citizens cannot use defeater 
reasons against a sufficiently efficient sex education in schools, religious or conservative 
parents could still argue against the inclusion of same-sex relations as a topic of sex 
education. It is worth examining whether there could be plausible arguments for restricting 
the content of sex education on this more fine-grained level. The arguments that are most 
interesting in this context are so-called natural law arguments. While they are exactly in 
line with conservative Christian notions of homosexuality and same-sex relations, their 
proponents claim that these arguments draw their force from rationality alone, without any 
further need for religious background arguments. If that were the case, the political liberal 
would perhaps have to give in to them. As we will see, it is however far from evident that 
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natural law arguments are based solely on rational grounds and therefore suitable as 
guidelines for political liberal policies.  
The discussion of this chapter starts with a brief assessment of the role of deep religious 
commitments in the debate about same-sex relations. While it turns out that comprehensive 
commitments offer not sufficient justification for a legislation banning the topic of same-
sex relations from a sex education curriculum, the second section of this chapter illustrates 
how natural law theory tries to achieve this aim by claiming that the demand for exclusion 
of same-sex relations as topic is rational. The third section holds that natural law theory, 
despite representing itself as based on pure reason, classifies as a comprehensive doctrine 
and cannot offer any justification to exclude same-sex relations from sex education. The 
fourth section finally spells out in more detail the importance of same-sex relations as topic 
in sex education for homosexual adolescents in terms of autonomy and self-respect. 
7.1 The Tension with Deep Religious Commitments 
Perhaps deeply held religious convictions of parents could be a reason for bracketing 
certain aspects of sex and gender equality in a school curriculum. While they might have to 
accept that a sufficient form of sex education is required from a political liberal 
perspective, the inclusion of same-sex relations as a topic, presenting them as of equal 
value with heterosexual relations or even marriage, 423 could feel like too much of a burden 
for deeply religious citizens. Moreover, the claim that same-sex relationships or marriage 
have the same value as heterosexual relationships could be understood as an inculcation of 
values that are opposing those of certain groups of religious parents.424 In this reading, the 
liberal state would, against its own claims, not be neutral towards reasonable world views 
but instead use its power to teach children view and values that are incompatible with their 
(or at least their parents’) religious convictions. 
                                                 
423 I will use the terms ‘heterosexual’ and ‘opposite-sex’ synonymously in this chapter, as well as 
‘homosexual’ and ‘same-sex’. 
424 Far from being only a theoretical position, this is an argument found in real-life debates about sex and 
gender equality in education, see, e.g., DePalma, Jennett 2007. 
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The rejection of same-sex marriage by religious citizens will usually be based on some 
aspect of their religious tradition that label same-sex relationships as morally bad or 
inferior. Because these objections are directly based on comprehensive views that are not 
shared by all reasonable citizens, however, it makes them unsuitable for justifying 
legislation against same-sex relations, such as a prohibiting public display of affection or 
other restrictions. The question in this case is, however, whether these comprehensive 
views can block any policies in favour of same-sex relations. Concerned religious citizens 
could argue that including same-sex relations in the sex education curriculum is an attempt 
to promote them as valuable life choice. 
The argument that sex education would promote homosexuality, though, would only make 
sense if same-sex relation would themselves be based on a set of comprehensive beliefs. 
We could maybe imagine a comprehensive doctrine that rests on the belief that same-sex 
relations are morally superior to heterosexual relations and should be therefore aspired by 
everyone. But while comprehensive beliefs of this kind might exist and perhaps even 
motivate some citizens to promote the moral virtue of same-sex relations, no such world 
view could justify any same-sex policies of the political liberal state. Such a view would 
hardly be part of the overlapping consensus between reasonable comprehensive doctrines 
and thus could not produce reasons that are acceptable to all reasonable citizens. 
Instead, the reasons for assigning to same-sex relations a similar institutional status as to 
heterosexual relations must be grounded in principles all reasonable citizens in a political 
liberal society agree upon. The relevant principle, in this case, is the equality of citizens in 
terms of rights and liberties. Contrary to potential claims of some religious citizens that the 
political liberal state would promote homosexuality, equal treatment of same-sex and 
heterosexual relations is required by basic principles of justice. In a society that agrees on a 
conception of justice like Justice as Fairness, these principles cannot be overridden by the 
religious sentiments of some of its citizens. However, natural law theorists attempt to argue 
that policies securing the equality of same-sex relations, e.g., by acknowledging same-sex 
marriage, would be a strategy of illegitimate promotion. If this were the case, it would 
indeed be a problem for the political liberal state. How convincing these approaches are 
will be the topic of the next two sub-sections. 
186 
7.2 The Assumed Moral Superiority of Heterosexual Relationships 
Not all arguments against same-sex relations and their institutional recognition are based 
on explicitly religious premises. In particular, so-called new natural law theorists attempt 
to present arguments which do not rely on any theological claims. Although their 
motivation is in many cases clearly a religious one, they try to offer reasons that are 
supposed to be appealing to rationality, independently of any underlying religious 
convictions. 
The central consensus among natural law theorists is that only marital, heterosexual 
intercourse is morally good while other forms of intercourse (extramarital, homosexual, 
etc.) are intrinsically bad. The exclusive moral goodness of traditional opposite-sex 
marriage, whose telos always seems to be reproduction, is assumed to be a natural fact in 
itself and as such evident to human reason. To promote the good and to protect its citizens 
from moral evils, the state must therefore not promote same-sex relations or introduce 
same-sex marriage. While natural law theorists accept that the state cannot legitimately 
interfere with citizens’ private lives by making same-sex relations illegal, they seem to be 
convinced that same-sex relations should at least be discouraged by not giving them equal 
status to heterosexual relations. To justify the political difference between these two kinds 
of relations, various lines of arguments are employed. 
John Finnis, for example, very directly addresses the perceived moral evil of 
homosexuality. The state, whose responsibility it is in Finnis’ view to keep its citizens safe 
from moral harm, has a 
legitimate concern with public morality and the education of children and young people 
towards truly worthwhile and against alluring but bad forms of conduct of life. […] [A] 
life involving homosexual conduct is bad even for anyone unfortunate enough to have 
innate or quasi-innate homosexual inclinations.425 
For further explanation of why homosexual conduct is morally bad, Finnis invokes 
Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Aquinas, among others, to argue for his position, which is 
constituted by the following three claims: 
                                                 
425 Finnis 1994, p. 1052. 
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1. The commitment of two heterosexual partners in “the sexual union of marriage” is 
intrinsically good (and incompatible with non-marital sexual relations). 
2. Homosexual sexual acts are “radically non-marital” (and therefore “unnatural”). 
3. Homosexual acts are, due to their similarity to masturbation, “unworthy of the 
human being.”426 
On this view, it is evident to human reason that opposite-sex marriage is intrinsically good 
and anyone employing their capacities of practical reason must necessarily see this. 
Therefore, “choosing against the marital good is unreasonable.”427 
However, the explanation for the intrinsic value of marriage remains unsatisfactory vague 
throughout Finnis’ writings. It is posited as one several of “basic human goods,” together 
with life, health, knowledge, friendship, and others. The nature of these goods is and the 
fact that they are intrinsically valuable is assumed to be evident to anyone who exercises 
their conscience. Essentially, it is supposed to be knowledge based on moral judgements 
that could (and should) be made by anyone who aspires to be rational and reasonable.428 
Finnis’s use of the terms rational and reasonable here almost sounds like Rawls’, but with 
important differences. For individuals being rational and reasonable in the context of their 
moral judgements means for Finnis that they decide to act virtuously whenever they have a 
choice.429 Rational individuals can determine which acts are virtuous and which are not 
due to their relation to the already mentioned basic human goods. Basic human goods 
therefore seem to be the most basic building block of moral acts in Finnis’ natural law 
approach.430  
                                                 
426 See Finnis 1994, pp. 1062f. 
427 Finnis 2008, p. 393. 
428 See Finnis 2008, p. 389. 
429 See Finnis 1983, pp. 29f. 
430 See Finnis 1983, pp. 50ff, Finnis 1980, Ch. 4. 
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From this perspective, there exists a clear divide between “gay marriage,” which can only 
remain “fictional” marriage, and “real” marriage. The latter is characterised by “the marital 
act [which] culminates in the very kind of activity – ecstatic genital giving and genital 
accepting of semen – that sometimes results in generation.”431 Finnis claims that the 
intrinsic value of marriage is grounded in the combination of mutual love and/or trust and 
the possibility for procreation.432 While the good of “real” marriage is worthy of 
promotion, “fictional” marriage and any non-marital relations are something citizens 
should be saved from. In conclusion, the state must an obligation to save them. Finnis’ idea 
that the state has the authority to discourage homosexual conduct rests on an Aristotelian 
notion of a political society that has to promote that which is “truly worthwhile (including 
moral virtue)” while “hinder the harmful and evil.” Furthermore, the state must “assist 
people with parental responsibilities to educate children and young people in virtue and to 
discourage their vices.”433 
Other natural law theorists, such as Sherif Girgis, Robert George, and Ryan Anderson, 
endorse Finnis’ claims about the value of marriage, although they focus less on the moral 
evil of same-sex relations but emphasising the unique value of procreation and parenting. 
On their view, “real” marriage is likewise characterised by a comprehensive union between 
husband and wife who complete each other by forming a reproductive unity during coitus, 
this kind of unity being of a unique intrinsic value.434 Furthermore, marriage is supposed to 
be the sort of relationship that is “best suited for honorable parenthood – among other 
things, permanently and exclusive.”435 
                                                 
431 Finnis 2008, p. 396. 
432 It is worth noting that even though a heterosexual couple might not have children or might for biological 
reasons not even be capable of having children, they would still fulfil the conditions for proper marriage. 
The reason for this remains unclear to me (perhaps because in nearby possible worlds they could have 
children). I will not pursue this intriguing question further here, as it is not relevant for my argument 
against Finnis’ position. 
433 Finnis 1994, p. 1076. 
434 Girgis et al. 2011, pp. 253ff. 
435 Girgis et al. 2011, p. 256. 
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Girgis et al are concerned that giving same-sex relationships the status of marriage would 
“increase marital instability,” as it would change the basic meaning of the institution of 
marriage. It would be “fundamentally about adults’ emotional unions” only and no longer 
about the seemingly necessary biological-functional union.436 The equal status of same-sex 
relations would also “blur the distinct value of friendship, which is a union of hearts and 
minds,”437 in contrast to marriage. The acknowledgement of same-sex marriage would 
“distort people’s understanding of the kind of relationship that spouses are to form and 
sustain.”438 It would also be detrimental to a good practice of child-rearing, as 
no civil institution would any longer reinforce the notion that children need both mother 
and father; that men and women on average bring different gifts to the parenting 
enterprise; and that boys and girls need and tend to benefit from fathers and mothers in 
different ways.439 
On a political level, same-sex marriage and sex education that supports the notion of an 
equal worth of same-sex and opposite-sex relations lead to the same sort of problem. Both 
are conceived by Girgis et al as a threat to moral and religious freedom.440 The conclusion 
is therefore that marriage should “be regulated for the common good” because it “uniquely 
meets essential needs” of procreation and child-rearing in a way no other form of relation 
does.441 
The phenomenon of “becoming one” and the unity of the heterosexual coitus in regard to 
its procreational function is also emphasised by Patrick Lee as the distinctive and valuable 
feature of “real” marriage. But more than just being functional, the intercourse is said by 
him to “embody” or “actualise” the community of the married partners, thereby 
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instantiating the basic human good of marital union.442 It seems that for Lee any 
intercourse not meeting the biological criteria of involving one male and one female 
partner fails to actualise the community between the participants and remains at best “an 
illusory experience of a union.”443 
Lee thinks that there are at least two reasons why the political community as a whole 
should accept this narrow definition of marriage. The first is the claim that children will 
receive the best care possible by their biological parents, and that children have “a natural 
need for love and care” of their biological parents.”444 The second claim is that “people’s 
sexual passions and energies […] are channelled to an intelligible good.”445 The 
declaration of equality of same-sex marriage would, according to Lee, distort people’s 
view on the good in marriage (the biological unity and the orientation towards becoming a 
family) and instead “send the message that marriage is centrally about the romantic 
attachment and sexual relationship of adults.”446 As with other new natural law theorists, 
central to Lee’s argument for opposite-sex marriage are metaphysical assumptions about 
the nature of marriage as a “multi-levelled, (bodily, emotional, spiritual) personal union 
that is fulfilled by expanding into family,”447 in addition to claims about the beneficial 
effects of opposite-sex couples on the process of child-raising. 
While these examples are far from being an exhaustive survey of the natural law literature, 
they establish some of the key arguments of the movement: a functional definition of 
marriage combined with a Kantian notion of treating others as ends in themselves, which 
in the case of sex is only possible in an opposite-sex marriage. In the view of the new 
natural lawyers, marriage seems to transmogrify instrumental, undignified sex acts into 
something intrinsically valuable. Ultimately, it is this central part of their argument which 
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makes natural law theory irrelevant to questions about the political liberal legitimacy of 
same-sex relations, as the next section will show. 
7.3 Natural Law Theory: A Comprehensive Doctrine 
Political liberals do not need to consider any new natural law arguments against same-sex 
marriage based on the (perceived) intrinsic value of opposite-sex marriage. The question of 
whether the new natural lawyers offer “the most elaborate intellectual case for 
distinguishing between homosexual and heterosexual activity”448 or rest “on bad theology 
as well as bad philosophy”449 (or perhaps both) is simply no reason for concern in this 
context. Although natural law theories avoid openly religious arguments, they are 
comprehensive doctrines. Their accounts of marriage are deeply ethical in the Rawlsian 
sense, and as such there can be reasonable disagreement about the claim that “real” 
marriage can only exist for heterosexual couples who never think about having intercourse 
with anyone else than their spouses. 
One of the main premises of the natural law argument for the unique status of heterosexual 
marriage is rooted in substantively comprehensive metaphysical and religious views about 
the particularly unifying nature of the marital sexual act.450 Regardless of whether these 
arguments are religious or non-religious, it is quite obvious that not all reasonable citizens 
will agree on them. Neither the Kantian notion that sex acts in which we view each other as 
mere means to an end are moral wrongs, nor the view that the biological function of the 
sex act acquires an additional dimension of value when carried out under conditions of 
marriage are necessarily shared by all reasonable citizens of a well-ordered society. 
A different argument found in the natural law repertoire, that good parenting requires 
opposite-sex marriage, might be more relevant for political liberal policies. After all, if it is 
a fact that children are best raised in heterosexual nuclear family constellations, it would 
                                                 
448 Macedo 2003, p. 276. 
449 Koppelman 1997, p. 53. 
450 A likewise substantive defence of this argument against critics can be found in Finnis 1997. 
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seem negligent by the political liberal state not to support these conditions for children. 
Yet, it is not at all settled that this really is necessarily the best way to raise children or that 
there are no other factors to consider next to children’s well-being. 
Extensive empirical research exists on the effects of single-parenting, step-parenting, 
cohabiting but not married parents, etc., indicating that these types of family constellation 
on average decrease children’s well-being overall, e.g., in terms of educational success. 
These studies find that children growing up in a nuclear family are, in comparison, better 
off, mainly due to the economic stability, the amount of time parents spent on their 
education, and the expectations of parents for their children. Important to notice here is that 
this hardly justifies the simple claim that opposite-sex nuclear families are “good” while 
other family structures are “bad” (I will come back to this point shortly) but rather that 
under the given socio-economic structures, nuclear families provide on average the best 
conditions for children to grow up.451 
Similar research on same-sex parenting is far less conclusive, with the available data being 
interpreted positively by some and sceptical by others. For example, a review of empirical 
research literature on same-sex parenting from 2005 concludes, that children assessed in 
these studies showed no significant differences in well-being than children under 
heterosexual parenting. Furthermore, marriage seems to have the same beneficial effects on 
children of same-sex couples as they have on children of heterosexual couples, providing 
an increase in financial well-being and stability.452 However, a more critical review from 
2012 argues that research regarding same-sex parenting is far from conclusive, as the 
sample groups are small and consist mainly of white, middle-class, mostly female 
parents.453 
Any claim by natural law theorists about the advantage of heterosexual families can 
therefore only be assumptive, although the same is the case for the opposite as well. 
                                                 
451 See, e.g., McLanahan 1985, Astone, McLanahan 1991, Blum et al. 2000, Manning, Lamb 2003, Brown 
2004, Brown et al. 2015. 
452 See Meezan, Rauch 2005. 
453 See Marks 2012. 
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Should it turn out that children are on average less well-off under same-sex parenting, it 
would be plausible to assume that the factors involved would be the same as in cases of 
single-parenting and other family structures: socio-economic circumstances in which non-
nuclear family structures carry a heavier financial and, most likely, also social burden. 
Children of same-sex couples might struggle more to adapt socially due to biases of their 
social environment. Even under political conditions where official policies no longer 
differentiate between married and single parents, citizens often retain normative attitudes 
that value traditional families over other forms of parenting, which in turn will shape their 
interaction with children and parents that do not conform to those norms.454 
It seems that in this case, contrary to the claims of natural law theorists, the aim of the 
political liberal state should not be promoting same-sex parenting and simultaneously 
discouraging or discriminating against non-traditional family arrangements, including 
same-sex parenting. Rather, the state’s responsibility would be to shape social conditions 
that provide opposite-sex parents (as well as parents in other family structures) with a 
similar degree of economic stability and opportunities as same-sex nuclear families. 
Similarly, in regard to education policies the political liberal state does not have any 
legitimate authority to prohibit education about same-sex (and other) relations.455 It seems 
quite clear that teaching about non-heterosexual forms of life is permissible. More than 
that, it seems that the inclusion of same-sex relations in a sex education curriculum is even 
required by political liberal basic principles. Two reasons for this are the unjust state of the 
institution of marriage traditionally conceived and the capacity of self-respect of future 
LGBT citizens, both of which are further explained in the next two sub-sections. 
                                                 
454 These effects can be amplified by internalised homophobia of same-sex parents or their children 
themselves. For internalisation of homophobia in regard to parenting see, e.g., Pacilli et al. 2011.  
455 A historical example for such policies would be Parliament of the United Kingdom 1988, Article 28: 
“Prohibition on promoting homosexuality by teaching or publishing material,” cited in Finnis 1994 as an 
example for state policies aim at securing and promoting moral values. Article 28 was repealed between 
2000 and 2003 in the United Kingdom. 
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7.4 Marriage as Unjust Institution 
When discussing same-sex relations in the context of education, it is worth to also briefly 
think about the institution of marriage in the larger context of a political liberal society, as 
it will reveal additional reasons for including same-sex relations in sex education. The 
institutions of marriage as it is currently politically and legally recognised in existing 
liberal democratic societies is problematic from a liberal perspective. Married couples 
often gain economic advantages, such as tax breaks, that unmarried citizens miss out on, 
but marriage often also fosters an economic asymmetry between spouses that can lead to 
dependency and restriction of options of the economically weaker one of them (mostly 
women). Nevertheless, these inequalities are supported by acknowledging and even 
promoting the institution of marriage in its traditional form as politically legitimate. A just 
and fair society would need to overhaul the official institution of marriage to quite some 
degree to throw off the injustices that are currently linked to it. 
One of the most convincing political liberal positions regarding marriage has recently been 
given by Elizabeth Brake. Aside from a thorough analysis of the contemporary institution 
of marriage (focusing on the US and the UK), she argues for a change of the social 
institution of marriage grounded in a political liberal framework of neutrality towards 
conceptions of the good life: 
Under the constraints of public reason, the reasons given for marriage law must meet a 
certain standard. Political liberalism precludes defining marriage law or policy on the basis 
of comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral views.456 
As the institution of the family, and therefore the institution of marriage as well, are part of 
the basic structure of society, these standards must apply to marriage laws as well. 
It is not settled how this requirement can be best realised. Some authors argue that the 
institution of marriage itself is intrinsically problematic, as it implies conformity with a set 
of particular restrictions that ignores the diversity of human relations and could have 
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unwanted side effects, such as an increase in domestic violence.457 From this perspective, 
the institution of marriage should not have a legitimate place in a political liberal society at 
all and any legal framework for it would best have to be abandoned. Alternatively, the 
institution of marriage could be replaced by more appropriate relationship models or 
redefined along various lines. Clare Chambers, e.g., argues in favour of a piecemeal model 
of relationship regulation that would apply to different aspects of relations based on 
bundles of rights and duties and which, at least in some cases, would apply automatically 
to persons that stand in a suitable relationship to each other. Separate regulations would 
apply to, e.g., parenting, sharing of property, and so on.458 In contrast, Brake herself 
favours a model of so-called “minimal marriage.” Like traditional opposite-sex marriage, 
minimal marriage would define a particular kind of relation between people but would 
allow partners to select the rights and duties that apply to their relation. In addition, it 
would recognise all forms of relations as acceptable as marriage in a legal sense as long as 
they are a form a caring relationship.459 
Regardless of the different details of how to reform (or abolish) the political aspect of the 
institution of marriage, Brake, Chambers, and others agree that the institution of marriage, 
as it is traditionally conceived in contemporary Western societies, has its share of 
problems. Developing this discussion in more depth and trying to argue for a definitive 
political liberal position on marriage would lead too far off the course of this thesis, but in 
respect to education it is necessary to take into consideration the (inherent) problems of 
marriage as a concrete political and social institution. 
One could, of course, argue that the idealised well-ordered society which is used to model 
political liberal politics will have realised a more just form of marriage. In that case, the 
status of the institution of marriage will not contribute any further justification for the 
inclusion of same-sex relation in sex education. Yet, if we expect political liberal theory 
                                                 
457 For arguments against the institution of marriage (although not necessarily on political liberal grounds) 
see, e.g., Card 1996, Ettelbrick 1997. 
458 See Chambers 2013, Chambers 2017. 
459 See Brake 2012, Ch. 7. 
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and a political liberal approach to education to provide guidelines on how to shape real-life 
politics then it is sensible to also think about a well-ordered (or perhaps almost well-
ordered) society that has not (yet) reached that stage. 
It is in this pre-ideal political stage where education has a crucial role to play. At this stage, 
the political liberal idea of a more just institution of marriage is something that is likely to 
occur as outlandish and counterintuitive to many average citizens, due to its unfamiliarity. 
A change of attitudes within society towards same-sex relations in particular and marriage 
in general, necessary for realising more just institutions, can to a large extent be facilitated 
by school education. If people are made aware at early stages in their lives of the diversity 
of human sexuality and relations, they will be more prone to agree on the injustice of 
existing institutions and on the need to change them for the better. The need for 
institutional change is therefore a further justification for political liberal sex-education in a 
not-yet-ideal society. 
Aside from this justification gained from the state of non-ideal institutions themselves, 
there are further justificatory reasons that can be derived from citizens’ entitlement to 
primary goods, especially self-respect. In the following sub-section, I will say more about 
this route of justification.  
7.5 Same-Sex Relations and the Primary Goods 
Existing liberal democratic societies nowadays have anti-discrimination laws and other 
regulations to ensure equal opportunities on the job market and before the law for (most) 
LGBT citizens. Nevertheless, even under these conditions there is room for improvement 
in education, particularly in sex education. The shortcomings here are not so much explicit 
discrimination against homosexuality and other sexual orientations by teachers and school 
books, but the informal content of sex education lessons and the social environment of 
adolescents. Analysing the shortcomings of sex education under already benevolent 
political conditions will highlight what sort of shortcomings political liberal education 
should consider. 
Next to the official content of sex education there exists a so-called “hidden curriculum” – 
attitudes and social norms that are conveyed without being explicitly addressed in lessons. 
Part of the hidden curriculum has been for a long time a standardisation of 
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heteronormativity, together with traditional gender roles.460 This includes the practise of 
not addressing non-heterosexual sexuality and same-sex relations in sex education and 
instead focusing on sometimes very narrow definitions of what sexual relationships are (or 
should be, according to the prevalent social norms). Such practises lead to a 
marginalisation of children and adolescents who either have parents or close family 
members in a same-sex relationship, or who are themselves part of the LGBT spectrum. 
This marginalisation, especially at the age when sex education happens, will often lead to 
feelings of insecurity, of powerlessness,461 and, as one participant in a study about LGBT 
topics in sex education described it, of being “freaks...like aliens or something.”462 
For a society which takes a conception like Justice as Fairness seriously, it seems crucial to 
include matters of same-sex relations in sex education. For adolescents to develop their 
capacity for self-respect, which is a basic good that citizens of a well-ordered society are 
entitled to, it is important to find deep-seated aspects of their developing identity 
represented in public life. How people identify themselves by their gender and their sexual 
relations is one of these aspects. It seems therefore to be a matter of justice to represent 
same-sex relations as equal to heterosexual relations in the context of sex education. 
Furthermore, adolescents build up their sexual identities by piecing together descriptive 
and normative bits of information from various sources, including their own family, their 
peer-group, and various types of media. Especially with male adolescents, this often leads 
to an expression of an exaggerated (heteronormative) masculinity in combination with a 
homophobic attitude.463  
When these attitudes continue to motivate forms of heteronormative behaviour as 
adolescents turn into adults, problems for a liberal democratic society result. Citizens 
might be restrained in official roles to act upon homophobic attitudes by the law, e.g., as 
employers or government officials. Nevertheless, if a sufficiently large segment of the 
                                                 
460 See, e.g., Jones 1993, Kehily 2002, Ch. 3. 
461 See, e.g., Fine, McClelland 2006, Gowen, Winges-Yanez 2014. 
462 Gowen, Winges-Yanez 2014, p. 791. Quoted statement of a research participant. 
463 See, e.g., Kehily 2002, Ch.6. 
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population expresses these attitudes, even if only in non-public contexts, this will have a 
relevant impact on people not conforming to heterosexual standards. Homophobia and 
(informal) discrimination will, if it is pervasive enough in society, mean a relevant 
impairment for the acquisition of self-respect for LGBT citizens. Part of a state’s efforts 
toward a just society will also include decreasing social tendencies for homophobia and 
similar phenomena, with one suitable measure being structuring education in a way that 
does not reinforce these tendencies in children and adolescents. While the concrete details 
of measures to change these informal aspects of education are best left to experts in 
education rather than to aspiring political philosophers, this necessarily would have to 
include clear statements about the equality of heterosexual and same-sex relations, and a 
similarly clear message against discrimination in this context. 
The basis for this is not, as it might seem to citizens with particular comprehensive views, 
an illegitimate propagation of a homosexual lifestyle but the provision of a social 
environment in which citizens are treated as equal regardless of their sexual orientation. It 
is to a great extent through this social environment that citizens are able to make 
substantial use of their basic rights. This must be the aim of the political liberal state to the 
same degree as the equality of citizens from various religious backgrounds and the 
freedom to live according to their views. 
Citizens who would disagree on this point can be classified as (partially) unreasonable 
from a political liberal perspective (see 2.1.4), at least in regard to matters of sex 
education. This would allow the political liberal state to override their claims of being 
treated unfair or illegitimately. However, this does not imply that citizens who disagree 
lose their legal or moral status as citizens, but that their disagreement with an equality-
oriented sex and gender education is unreasonable (see also 6.7). Therefore, political 
morality does not require any more justificatory efforts to accommodate those citizens and 
the state can ignore their claims on the grounds of political liberal principles. 
7.6 Conclusion 
While the previous section has identified the freedoms of religious citizens in regard to 
education, this section has identified some of the limits that reasonable religious citizens 
will have to accept. I have hopefully argued convincingly that religious claims against 
“promotion” of homosexuality by the political liberal state misfire, as the political liberal 
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justification for including this topic in the sex education curriculum is not based on 
comprehensive world view about same-sex relations. Further, a brief discussion of the 
approach of natural law theorists to this topic has shown that, despite their avoidance of 
religious justifications, natural law arguments are grounded in a comprehensive doctrine 
similar to religious comprehensive doctrines. 
Next to the defence against claims that same-sex relations would be an unjust infringement 
of some citizens’ world views, this chapter has also presented two positive reasons for 
including same-sex relations in sex education, especially in non-ideal liberal societies. One 
of them is the economic and social injustice that is perpetuated by traditional conceptions 
of marriage, the other the limitation of LGBT citizens to develop and make use of their 
primary goods in a society where underlying resentment and discrimination against them 
exist. 
Resentment and discrimination will also be relevant for the following chapter, although in 
a slightly different context. So far, I have discussed what can be called “intrinsic” problems 
of a political liberal society, which can occur regardless of whether the society is a closed 
society or not. In the next section I will leave the Rawlsian model of the closed society 
behind and discuss some of the problems in education that develop if individuals enter the 
society not only by birth but also by immigration. 
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8 Immigration and Integration 
Immigration is one of the main political topics in the contemporary real politics of Western 
democracies, which also includes questions about how educational policies can (or perhaps 
even must) contribute to integration. A political liberal theory of education aiming at 
providing guidelines for real-world problems should have something to say about how to 
support the integration of immigrants and their children into society.  
However, political liberalism offers no account of migration, as Rawls’ brackets 
immigration as a topic. For the moderately idealised, well-ordered society he famously 
claims: “entry in it is only by birth and exit from it only by death.”464 Starting a theory of 
justice with the premise of a closed society makes it supposedly easier, on Rawls’ idea, to 
identify the relevant details of a conception of social justice. This is a useful strategy for 
answering basic questions about fair distribution of resources and legitimacy of state 
coercion against citizens, yet it leaves other questions unanswered which turn out to be 
pressing ones for contemporary politics – for example, how is a political liberal society 
supposed to treat immigrants? The well-ordered society conceived by Rawls was modelled 
to solve different problems and does not provide any direct guidelines for real-world 
societies on these questions. 
Nevertheless, in non-ideal societies the fact of pluralism is inextricably linked to the fact of 
immigration, and immigration poses its own set of challenges for education as, e.g., 
Victoria Costa correctly observes.465 Contrary to Rawls’ assumption that virtues and skills 
of citizenship are facilitated and fostered simply by growing up in a liberal society, she 
argues that this assumption is too idealistic and that at least when we aim at transposing 
findings from political liberal theory to more realistic settings, we must take into account 
the role schools play in this process: 
One central aim of educational institutions in non-ideal contexts is to foster the wide 
acceptance of common norms, principles and procedures that provide a certain coherence 
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and viability to communal life and allow the different members and groups of society to 
get along together in a democratic way.466 
Even if we concede that children of native citizens might adopt necessary political virtues, 
skills, and knowledge with only minimal support by the educational institutions (which, as 
I argued on previous occasions throughout the thesis, is unlikely), it is still plausible to 
assume that children of immigrants do not grow into their role as liberal democratic 
citizens as easily. At least in cases where their cultural background would establish or 
reinforce certain illiberal tendencies (e.g., beliefs that people can be treated as inferior due 
to their gender or religion, or resentments against basic political liberties as, e.g., freedom 
of expression), it would be a task for the educational system to counter such cultural 
effects.467  
My aim for this chapter is to outline the challenges that the children of immigrants pose to 
a political liberal society and its educational institutions. Some of these challenges overlap 
with the topics of the previous two sections, religious education and sex education. Others 
are uniquely linked to immigration itself and need different answers than a political liberal 
theory of education would give to “home-grown” challenges of a similar kind. 
I will first give a summary of what can reasonably be said about the moral status of 
immigrants in a political liberal society, referring to Rawls’ own work on the relations 
between societies, The Law of Peoples. While Rawls seems to assume that migration will 
no longer be a relevant topic in a realistic global utopia consisting mainly of well-ordered 
liberal societies, I will argue in the second section of this chapter that this assumption 
would be implausible. For various reasons, migration would still happen. 
More important, if a political liberal theory of education aims at offering guidance to real-
life politics, it needs to address contemporary political challenges like immigration and 
integration. For this reason, the third section outlines the differences between the children 
of immigrants and children native to a well-ordered society, and what additional 
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requirements for political liberal education result from these differences – a focus on 
facilitating integration. 
In the fourth section I will explain in more detail, what sort of integration should be the 
focus of political liberal education. After introducing the distinction between civic, social, 
and cultural integration, I will argue that the most important aspect of integration should be 
social integration. While civic integration should be sufficiently covered by the civic 
education curricula provided for native children as well, and cultural integration should be 
of almost no concern for political liberal education (with some minor exceptions), it is 
social integration that need more attention and perhaps additional resources in the context 
of education. 
8.1 Borders in the Realistic Utopia 
A very brief discussion of the role of immigration will be useful to better understand why 
and how immigration in political liberal education is relevant. Rawls’ writings on political 
liberalism cannot give direct guidelines on how a political liberal society should treat 
immigrants, due to the way Rawls initially conceived it: with the well-ordered society 
modelled as a closed society, immigration turns up nowhere as a pressing question of 
justice. Even Rawls’ late work on international justice, The Law of Peoples, is less helpful 
here than one might expect. It extensively discusses the just international relations among 
societies, but it says almost nothing about the place of individuals in his account of 
international relations.468 
It is important to note here, though, that the utopian international world cannot be 
borderless for Rawls. On his view, state borders are not only contingent but necessary, as 
they define a people’s territory which he understands as being that people’s property.469 
Whether this argument for borders is convincing or not, for the moment it suffices to 
acknowledge that bounded national states are supposed to be a fact even under the 
                                                 
468 Unsurprisingly, the almost exclusive focus on The Law of Peoples on national entities and its lack of 
comment on the moral status of individuals in the sphere of international relations has been subject to a 
fair amount of critical scrutiny. See, e.g., Tan 1998, Beitz 2000, Caney 2002, or Glover 2011. 
469 See Rawls 1999b, p. 8, pp. 38-39. 
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idealisation of political liberal theory. At the same time, political liberal theory does not 
give an account of immigration or migration in general because it claims that migration 
does not happen in the international environment it presumes. 
Rawls himself acknowledges that his theory of international justice does not have anything 
to say about immigration, for good reason: “The problem of immigration is not, then, 
simply left aside, but it is eliminated as a serious problem in a realistic utopia.”470 All 
political reasons for migration, such as religious oppression, denial of basic rights, but also 
humanitarian catastrophes like famines (as Rawls argues that they are mostly caused by 
political failure) will not occur in a realistic utopia consisting of well-ordered and decent 
societies – decent societies being those that are not ordered by a liberal theory of justice, 
but are nevertheless tolerable by satisfying certain requirements.471 
However, the next sub-section will show that migration poses a relevant moral problem for 
a “society of peoples,” as there are reasons for migration that Rawls’ framework of 
international relations itself acknowledges. 
8.2 Utopian Migration 
Does it make sense to talk about migration in the context of political liberal theory then? 
Yes, because various causes for migration remain even in a realistic utopia. Even in an 
international community consisting only of well-ordered and decent societies some 
individuals would still migrate for personal reasons – religion, culture, climate, love, to 
name just a few. Rawls cannot eliminate migration as a political factor, even under these 
idealised conditions. 
Furthermore, Rawls’ “society of peoples” does not only consist of these two types of 
peoples. There are also what he calls “outlaw states,” “societies burdened by unfavorable 
conditions,” and “benevolent absolutisms.”472 The politics defining the national states of 
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such peoples are not grounded in liberal principles. Members of burdened societies might 
have only limited or no political and personal rights, and little to no just distribution of 
resources. These kinds of oppression and economic hardship in such states will provide 
excellent reasons for their citizens to emigrate to well-ordered societies with better living 
conditions and could lead to a considerable amount of migration, just like existing liberal 
democratic states experience currently. 
A political liberal state would need to care about immigrants, especially about those from 
burdened societies, and we can make some indirect assumptions about how a well-ordered 
political liberal society might treat immigrants. One claim of The Law of Peoples is that all 
liberal democratic societies will honour human rights.473 We can assume that what Rawls 
has in mind are rights as they have been established in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (UDHR)474 – while sometimes he writes about them as normative principles derived 
from abstract justification, at other times he refers to Human Rights as a time-honoured 
international practice. For lack of more specific information, if nothing else, it seems 
reasonable to assume that rights as they have been stated in the UDHR are relevant for 
Rawls’ ideal political theory as well. Particularly relevant are Articles 13 to 15 of the 
UDHR, which declare a right of everyone to leave their country (13.2), to seek asylum 
from unjust persecution (14), and to some extent the right to a nationality (15). These 
articles imply that at least political refugees have a right to immigration, albeit temporary 
under consideration as asylum seekers. Sometimes, though, there is obviously nowhere 
these immigrants could return to. In these cases, they will become de facto long-term 
residents. 
Assuming that principles similar to the rights declared in the UDHR are relevant for a 
well-ordered society, it seems plausible that a well-ordered society will have its share of 
immigration. Even with strict policies for immigration control, a well-ordered society that 
respects human rights (as Rawls suggests it does in international contexts) must allow 
immigrants from outlaw states or burdened societies, some of who will be likely to stay. 
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This shows that immigration is indeed a relevant topic for a political liberal society.  Even 
for a utopian “society of peoples,” we need to determine to what extent the rights and 
obligations regarding education apply to the relation between the political liberal state and 
immigrants. I will attempt to do so in the next section. 
8.3 Political Status of Immigrants 
To what extent do immigrants differ from citizens when we think about what requirements 
and freedoms apply to them regarding the education of their children? As a first step, it 
makes sense to distinguish immigrants into two categories – those from other well-ordered 
and decent societies, and those from burdened societies and outlaw states. The relevant 
difference between these two groups lies in the development of attitudes and knowledge 
regarding their political autonomy, their political virtues, and their rights and duties in a 
well-ordered society. I assume that the attitudes and the knowledge of people migrating 
from a well-ordered society to another well-ordered society, or from a decent society to a 
well-ordered society, will be sufficiently similar to native citizens of their host society. In 
terms of education, these immigrants are similar enough to the native citizens that no more 
has to be said here than has been already in the chapters before. 
In contrast, immigrants from burdened societies and outlaw states will most likely differ in 
their relevant political attitudes from the native citizens of a well-ordered society. Because 
they did not grow up in a liberal political system, it is plausible to assume that their civic 
education was different from liberal civic education, and it is likely that they had only 
limited (or even none) basic rights like those taken for granted in the well-ordered society. 
In this regard, immigrants from burdened societies differ in a relevant sense from native 
citizen of well-ordered and decent societies. 
It needs to be emphasised at this point that whenever I refer to immigrants (or native 
citizens) in the following discussion, I am not referring to actual immigrants in actual 
societies. Rather, the immigrants I have in mind are in the same way abstracted from their 
real-life counterparts as are the citizens of a well-ordered society in the context of political 
liberal theory. My underlying assumption is that moderately idealised immigrants from 
burdened societies and outlaw states (in the Rawlsian definition) will have a sufficiently 
different cultural and political background from citizens of a well-ordered society. Like 
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these citizens, idealised immigrants still resemble actual persons in regard to their basic 
motivational and epistemic features. However, just as the moderate idealisation of citizens 
themselves, the idealisation of immigrants is an analytic device and certainly not meant as 
a sweeping generalisation applying to real-life immigrants. 
A sensible way of identifying the differences between immigrants of burdened societies 
and children from well-ordered societies is by comparing their knowledge and 
endorsement of central ideas of political liberalism. Doing so allows for some reasonable 
conjectures about requirements of education for their children. In the following, I will 
discuss the relation of immigrants to political virtues, autonomy, and rights, and point out 
the potential differences to native citizens. This comparison will make it easier to 
determine whether and how political liberal education should adjust to immigration 
backgrounds 
8.3.1 Political Virtues 
Chances are good that immigrants (in the way characterised above) will not have the range 
of political virtues the political liberal state requires, at least not to the extent that native 
political liberal citizens do.  The same will be true for their children as well, and even if 
their children are growing up in a well-ordered society, they will do so in a family that 
might not provide the same upbringing in regard to political virtues than families of “native 
liberals.” 
The most central moral deficit for an immigrant of a political liberal society would be the 
lack of a sense of justice, or a sense of justice that responds to substantially different norms 
of justice than those prevalent in the host society. If the sense of justice is one of the main 
defining criteria of political liberal citizens, immigrants with a divergent sense of justice 
might have significant difficulties to become part of the reciprocal political scheme of their 
new society. Furthermore, native citizens might not embrace immigrants as fully equal 
participant in a common scheme of social cooperation, not only due to cultural differences 
but also due to differences in the conceptions of justice they hold. 
It is plausible to assume such a variety in the sense of justice for people from different 
societies. Norms of fairness vary culturally, and although it seems that there are limits to 
that variation, people from different cultures are used to different standards of what counts 
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as fair and what does not.475 Although there is certainly a distinction between conceptions 
of justice and norms of fairness, I take both to be sufficiently related to each other to 
assume that conceptions of justice can vary along a reasonable spectrum between societies 
as well. This variety in conceptions of justice is also reflected in Rawls’ claim that the 
content for the liberal concept of public reason can be determined by a range of different 
conceptions of justice, as long as they satisfy some basic conditions.476 The conceptions of 
justice, though, to which immigrants from burdened or outlaw states are accustomed might 
be only partially acceptable from the perspective of a well-ordered society. 
In regard to education, the sense of justice as a political virtue is particularly relevant (see 
Chapter 3). On the one hand, this is due to the centrality of this political virtue to the 
political liberal ideal of a just and fair society. On the other hand, the sense of justice is 
supposed to be a virtue that develops from childhood onward and is at first developed in 
the context of the family (see 3.1). Provided that this is a plausible account, children of 
immigrants might lack, at least to some extent, the private background to develop a sense 
of justice as required by the political liberal society. It would follow that the civic 
education of immigrant children would have to put more effort into fostering the 
development of their sense of justice than for the children of native citizens. 
8.3.2 Autonomy 
Political liberals ought to be concerned about two different conceptions of autonomy when 
it comes to education, as I have argued in Chapter 4. The first is the conception of political 
autonomy which includes the knowledge about one’s status as a citizen and about the 
related rights, as well as the knowledge how to make use of them. The second is a weak, 
procedural conception of autonomy (see 4.3). Weak autonomy must play an important part 
in political liberal education as well, as it is the basis for a comprehensive exercise of the 
first moral power of citizens to sustain, and if necessary to change, an ethical conception of 
the good. It is also a first necessary building block for more specific conceptions of 
autonomy, such as political autonomy. 
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The notion of weak autonomy which presupposes a general view of human agents as 
causes of events, is probably universal enough that it will be not completely foreign to any 
immigrant. I will assume that this conception is, so to speak, easily epistemically available 
even to people who have not been socialised in a well-ordered society. However, the 
associated requirements of treating others in a certain way due to their status as 
autonomous agents might not be as universally accepted. Even less so, of course, a more 
complex and specific conception of political autonomy which is closely linked to ideas of 
individual rights. Most important in the context of individual autonomy are those rights 
that secure an individual’s position against unjustified demands of other agents – 
individuals as well as associations and the state. These rights (many of which are 
technically liberties, as discussed in Chapter 5) include personal freedom rights, e.g., 
freedom of religion and conscience, freedom of though and speech, or freedom of 
association. But rights connected to political autonomy also include political rights, such as 
equal rights and liberties to participate in the political process and a share in shaping the 
politics of their society. Immigrants from outlaw states or benevolent absolutisms are likely 
to be unfamiliar with having this range of rights, and therefore perhaps also with 
acknowledging these rights when it comes to their fellow citizens. 
Political autonomy is something that children of native citizens need to learn about as well 
as children of immigrants. The implications of weak autonomy, such as the freedom to 
change one’s ideas of the good life, might be in contrast something that is already more 
familiar to native children of a well-ordered society without additional support from 
educational institutions. Even native citizens’ children from very religious or culturally 
segregated backgrounds will usually get enough information about the world outside the 
bubble of their own comprehensive doctrine to realise that these ideas are out there in the 
mainstream society and generally valued.477 In contrast, immigrants with a different socio-
cultural background in which the correspondence between the first moral power and 
autonomous agency is not as clearly formulated and/or valued, might find this view 
foreign. There is a distinct possibility that children of immigrants with this kind of 
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background will lack an element of appreciation in their family environment, even if their 
parents want them to integrate in their new society. It is in these cases, that education of 
immigrant children should put additional emphasis on a weak conception of autonomy (see 
4.3) that seems necessary for the first moral power (which is, in Rawls’ view, one of the 
defining capacities of a citizen). 
For these reasons, political liberal education might have to put some extra effort into 
education for weak autonomy – perhaps even more so as there might be tendencies for 
children of immigrants to search for sources of identity in the culture of their parents, 
leading to crucial misunderstandings and perhaps sometimes even to cultural or religious 
extremism. It seems therefore important for the political liberal state to provide some sort 
of bridges between the original culture of immigrants and the culture of the well-ordered 
society that allow immigrants 
• on the one hand to keep valuable elements of their original culture as meaningful 
parts of their identity and a valuable context for autonomous choice478 and 
• on the other to feel comfortable enough with the culture of the host society not to 
regress into an extreme identification with their original culture and thereby 
increasing effects of social segregation.479 
This means, though, that unlike education for native citizens’ children, education for 
immigrant children has to place additional emphasis on the valuable aspects of their 
cultural heritage, as long as it is compatible with basic liberal principles. It needs to signal 
clearly that identification with culture and traditions of their parents is not only tolerated 
but supported as part of developing a capacity for various forms of autonomy. Education 
for autonomy might therefore require more resources in the case of immigrant children, for 
legitimate reasons. 
                                                 
478 For the relevance of culture as a context for autonomy see, e.g., Kymlicka 1995, Ch. 5, Quong 2006. 
479 See, e.g., Skrobanek 2009. 
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8.3.3 Rights 
When it comes to their rights, the difference between immigrants and native citizens are 
most obvious – immigrants do not necessarily have the same rights as citizens, on a legal 
level as well as on a moral level. How exactly the set of rights of immigrants differ from 
the set of native citizens depends on many varying factors, depending on the particular 
society in question. From a legal perspective, immigrants in real-world societies usually 
lack a whole range of rights that citizens hold, such as the right to vote, at least for a 
certain time after they arrived in a country. These legal rights usually come by acquiring 
official citizenship, which might be open to immigrants after spending a certain amount of 
time in the country and satisfying some minimum conditions.480 However, some rights, 
e.g., a right to life or freedom from torture, which are usually also taken to be human rights 
without binding to citizenship status, would apply to immigrants as well as soon as they 
enter the political liberal state. 
How about moral rights? As many legal rights of citizens are counterparts of the rights 
defined by political morality, we might find something of an analogy here. We remember 
that the system of moral rights chosen in the original position is supposed to enable 
citizens to exercise their two moral powers (see 5.1). Assuming that immigrants also have 
these two moral powers, or at least the capacity for them, and that they intend to become 
fully functional members of their host society, it seems that political morality has to treat 
immigrants (at least legal ones) similar to native citizens. A delay in time, as, e.g., in the 
case of rights to participate in the political process as voter or political candidate might be 
justifiable, as it might take some time for immigrants to integrate into their new society. 
After a reasonable period of time, though, it seems to be legitimate requirement for a well-
ordered society to assign the same rights and duties to immigrants that native citizens have. 
This means that immigrants as parents have prima facie similar privilege-rights to native 
citizens when it comes to their children’s upbringing in their cultural and religious 
traditions, as long as these do not infringe more basic rights. At the same time, immigrant 
parents share the same responsibilities to represent their children as fiduciaries, as their 
                                                 
480 Examples are citizenship tests for foreigners to be passed in order to gain full citizenship, as, e.g., in Great 
Britain, Switzerland, or Denmark. This covers only legal immigrants. The moral status of illegal 
immigrants is certainly more complex and cannot be discussed here. 
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children will have claim-right to education just like the children of native citizens (see 5.3). 
They will also have the same liberties in the regard to a religious (or otherwise particular) 
education of their children as native citizens have (see also Chapter 6). 
In the case of the children of immigrants it is possible, though, that the state can require 
additional educational measures to integrate children of immigrants, and perhaps also adult 
immigrants themselves, into the well-ordered society.481 These extra requirements originate 
from the state’s duty to provide a just distribution of resources as well as stability and 
continuity. In the case of immigrants, who are most likely less integrated into society than 
native citizens, an extra effort might have to be taken to enable them to benefit from the 
goods the political liberal society can offer, while at the same time help them to endorse 
the values of the overlapping consensus at its core. What integration means in more 
concrete terms and what kind of measures the political liberal state might take to foster the 
integration of immigrant children are the topic of the following section. 
8.4 Integration 
The integration of immigrants into a well-ordered society is important from a political 
liberal perspective. Just as the state can make claim-rights against its citizens, it can (and 
should, as we will see) make similar claims against immigrants. At the same time, the 
political liberal state must however also provide adequate opportunities for immigrants and 
their children to integrate. Part of these opportunities for integration are delivered via 
educational institutions. 
The first reason why the political liberal state must care about integration is that it is 
supposed to provide stability and continuity. This means, among other things, also to focus 
on the education of immigrant children. Integration that aims at liberal stability requires 
                                                 
481 For the scope of this thesis, I will bracket the topic of adult education. Nevertheless, it seems to be a 
highly relevant topic for two reasons. First, the same reasons why the political liberal state would help the 
children of immigrants to integrate well into society hold for adults as well. Second, in case of young adult 
immigrants, integration measures will have an indirect effect on the children they might have later in their 
life, providing already a more “well-ordered” family environment and thus increasing the chances of a 
good integration of their children (see the following section). 
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these children to learn how to become members of a political liberal society, quite similar 
to native children. Therefore, their civic education will have to cover the points discussed 
in the previous sections: political virtues, autonomy, and civic rights. However, successful 
integration requires more than (political) assimilation from immigrants’ children alone. It 
demands that native citizens and their children accept immigrants as new partners in the 
scheme of social cooperation they are already part of themselves. 
The second reason for the importance of immigration lies in a just distribution of 
resources. Integration of immigrants might not be that relevant when providing material 
resources or money – the state could subsidise families of immigrants with some sort of 
basic income, for example. Nevertheless, immigrants could continue living in highly 
segregated areas with inferior access to public services and economic opportunities, goods 
which fall into the scope of distributive justice as well. “Soft” goods, like access to 
economic and social opportunities, are not easily provided by the state without a certain 
amount of integration, as they depend on to a significant degree on the reciprocity of 
citizens and their attitudes toward immigrants. The chances for children of immigrants, 
e.g., to find a suitable job often not only depends on their vocational education but also on 
their ability to socially interact in an accepted way with potential employers, as well as on 
employers’ attitudes towards people with a migration background. Both factors can be 
positively influenced by a suitably integrative school education. 
The remaining part of this section will explain in further detail the importance of 
integration for a political liberal society, taking into consideration the reasons given so far 
for why political liberalism must care about integration. It will not give an exhaustive 
answer to the question of how the integration of immigrant children should best be 
supported under realistic, albeit moderately idealised, political conditions. This would 
require much more time and space than is available in the context of this thesis, and an 
amount of professional competence in the field of education that I am lacking. However, I 
will attempt to provide a rough indication of what integrational education in a political 
liberal society ought to aim for. 
For a start, it is important to acknowledge that integration into a new society happens on 
many levels, each of which poses different challenges for both immigrants and the state. 
For the following discussion about integration, a distinction between three different levels 
of integration made by David Miller will be helpful. Miller distinguishes between social, 
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civic, and cultural integration. Social integration involves patterns of behaviour in the 
regular every-day interaction with the members of society. Civic integration covers the 
understanding and adaptation to principles and norms that are essential for being a member 
of the relevant political community. Cultural integration is the most ambiguous of the 
three levels, which either can refer to shared values, shared experiences, a common 
religion, a common geographical heritage, or some other form of common cultural 
identity.482 
For children of immigrants, education plays an important part in integration processes on 
all three levels, although not every level bears the same significance from a political liberal 
perspective. From the strictly Rawlsian political liberal perspective, civic integration seems 
to be what we should be most concerned with because this sort of integration covers the 
endorsement of political norms and development of political virtues as well as knowledge 
of and respect for political rights – the basic capacities for being a functional citizen 
according to Rawls’ own minimal definition of civic education (see 2.3). 
To a large extent, this sort of integration (of children) can be already delivered by the civic 
education discussed in the chapters before. The inculcation of political virtues and a 
knowledge about rights and duties of citizens in the well-ordered society is already an 
essential part of civic education for native children as well (see Chapters 3 and 5). To what 
degree children of immigrants would have an increased need for this kind of education due 
to the lack of political liberal basic attitudes at home in their family is a matter of concrete 
political and social circumstances and too specific for claims made from the philosopher’s 
armchair. My impression is, however, that the part of political liberal education that aims at 
the generation of political virtues in future citizens and conveys basic political knowledge 
about political institutions, rights, obligations, etc., possibly contributes in a sufficient 
manner to the civic integration of immigrant’s children. 
                                                 
482 See Miller 2016, pp. 132f. Miller thinks that only social and civic integration can be legitimately 
promoted by the state (or to some extent even required, mostly in regard to civic integration), but not 
cultural integration.  
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When it comes to social and cultural integration, it is not unlikely that Rawls himself 
would classify these types of integration mainly as a matter of the background culture of a 
society and not of the political sphere. That would be a misleading assumption, though. At 
least social integration is an important matter for the political liberal state, as to some 
extent even a cultural integration might be. When looking at actual societies, we can 
observe that failed social integration entails distributive injustice, without citizens and 
immigrants deliberately contributing to the lack of integrative success. Conditions with the 
potential to obstruct integration efforts are not always obviously unjust political systems 
and laws but can arise from factors which are seemingly unrelated to justice. 
An example for the risks which come with a lack of social integration is the risk of spatial 
and socio-economical segregation. 483 While one does not necessarily imply the other, both 
kinds of segregation often appear together. One possible scenario starts with spatial 
segregation: in a society in which social integration is substantially lacking, immigrants 
might tend to concentrate in neighbourhoods where only few natives live, resulting in 
spatial segregation between immigrant and native communities. This spatial segregation 
subsequently perpetuates social segregation and usually also economic segregation. One of 
the reasons triggering spatial segregation might be a phenomenon which by itself is 
morally neutral – ingroup prejudice or ethnocentrism. These attitudes are not expressed as 
hostility towards other groups in society but rather result in preference for members of 
one’s own group, where group membership can be defined by religion, race, heritage, 
education or other factors.484 Native citizens might prefer the proximity of and social 
interaction with other native citizens, even while not holding any discriminatory attitudes 
toward immigrants. At the same time, immigrants might prefer the community with other 
immigrants who share their cultural background, traditions, and their language. So, even 
                                                 
483 See Anderson 2010, e.g., pp. 46f, 72f. Her focus is on the relation between black and white parts of the 
population in Northern American cities. However, similar patterns of spatial segregation of migrant 
population can be observed in Europe (see, e.g., Musterd, Winter 1998, Arbaci 2007, Tammaru et al. 
2016). While the socio-economic details of the European cases differ from their U.S. counterparts and 
among each other, the broad normative sketch given in this chapter section applies to segregation in 
general, as long as it results in unjustifiable political and distributive inequality 
484 See Brewer 1999. 
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without any outright discrimination happening, even a well-ordered society can have 
segregated communities.485 
The segregation of immigrant communities increases the risk of disadvantageous social, 
political, and economic effects. Access to employment for immigrants becomes harder, 
either due to the brute fact of spatial mismatch (suitable jobs are further away and require 
commuting that is costly in terms of time and money), or due to the lack of cultural and 
social capital that provides easier access to employment.486 Insofar as segregation of 
immigrant communities also results in a deficit in language skills compared with native 
citizens, this also has a negative impact on immigrants’ overall economic opportunities.487 
The distributive inequalities resulting from these conditions are hardly justifiable in a 
political liberal society. 
Adequate political liberal education policies would need to counter these disadvantageous 
effects of segregation. One direct measure would most probably to provide adequate 
schools which are easily accessible from segregated communities, so having children 
attending school is neither too costly in terms of money or time. Alternatively, if schools 
are not readily available in these areas, the state would need to provide transport 
opportunities for children from segregated immigrant communities to available schools.488 
                                                 
485 To some degree, in-group prejudice will have an effect on citizens as well, of course. Members of 
religious communities might prefer people with similar religious convictions, for example. Nevertheless, 
at least as long as they are reasonable, in-group members share a common political culture, and at least to 
some extent a social background culture with their “out-group” fellow citizens, which is not the case for 
recent immigrants. 
486 See Anderson 2010, Ch. 2.  
487 See, e.g., Chiswick, Miller 2002. 
488 What measures would be effective in a given context is an empirical question beyond the means of this 
thesis and is likely to differ due to historical and current socio-political circumstances. To give an 
example: according to some empirical studies, transport might be only the second-to worst solution 
though. Research on ‘desegregation busing’ practices in the U.S. found various disadvantageous effects: 
mandatory busing in the U.S. caused resentment and lead to compensatory actions by its opponents, such 
as moving so different places and sending their children to different schools (see, e.g., Lord, Catau 1976). 
However, it might be argued that the problems with school transportation, especially in the U.S., might be 
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Perhaps this would even be the preferable way to proceed, as this would facilitate multi-
cultural schooling – something that could help to foster integration and counter another 
array of disadvantageous effects of segregated immigrant communities. 
Next to economic disadvantages, segregation of immigrants can also have a negative 
impact on social cohesion. Continued segregation can lead to the development of 
stereotyping and ethnocentric attribution errors that can turn into a threat to the aspired 
social cooperation between immigrant and native groups in society. Native citizens might 
develop a stereotypical perception of immigrants that is based on a lack of experience with 
their living conditions. They might (wrongly) attribute the poor socio-economic conditions 
of immigrants to generalised perceived character traits of immigrants rather than to 
segregation and institutional failures.489 These psychological mechanisms are likely to 
have detrimental effects on the trust between native citizens and immigrant groups and will 
therefore make it more difficult to uphold a stable scheme of equality-based reciprocity and 
cooperation.490 Citizens could be less willing to participate in just redistributive schemes, 
as they would doubt the legitimacy of immigrants’ entitlements under such schemes. 
To offer a remedy to these negative effects of segregation on social cohesion, political 
liberal education policies could promote ethnically diverse schools and classes, that 
facilitate interaction between immigrants’ and native citizens’ children. Details of such 
multicultural schooling attempts will depend much on the concrete circumstance, yet it 
                                                                                                                                                    
grounded in a more pervasive underlying problem of racism (see, e.g., McConahay 1982, Orfield 1995). 
Aside from resistance from certain social groups, evidence suggests that having to use school transport 
might leave the students affected by this policy in a worse-off position. Students who used school 
transport tend, for example, to have a decreased feeling of belonging (Anderman 2002). This observation 
might fit in with the previously mentioned need to affirm the cultural heritage of immigrants (8.3.2), as the 
experience of bussing might convey an impression of displacement and forced integration. In short, even 
seemingly harmless topics like transport by school buses might offer a bundle of normative and 
administrative challenges that will have to be solved in the concrete contexts in which they occur. 
489 See Anderson 2010, p. 46. Similar psychological mechanisms can distort migrants’ social perception as 
well. See Weber 1994 for the function of ethnocentric attribution in terms of protection and enhancement 
of the self-image of groups. 
490 See, e.g., Gibney 1999, Pevnick 2009 for the importance of trust for egalitarian welfare states. 
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seems safe to say that sending ethnically diverse children to the same school by itself will 
not achieve much. Empirical studies about interethnic contacts in school contexts show 
that actual multicultural education is important, as are overarching class and school 
identities that can bridge ethnical differences of students. Educational institutions must not 
only be open to a diversity of students, but also actively provide a framework in which 
children can develop tolerance and respect for various world views.491 Basic requirements 
for such a framework are for example that 
• schools provide sufficient opportunities for people to get to know each other, 
• schools provide a context in which various ethnical groups have a similar social 
status, 
• that this context is one of cooperation rather than of competition, 
• and that the contact between ethnic groups is actively supported by teachers and 
school administration.492 
Comprehensive literature on integration in schools exists which provides more specific 
guidelines, based on empirical data, most of which should also be adequate in the context 
of political liberal education.493 
To some degree, political liberal education already satisfies the requirements of integration 
in schools due to its responsibility to contribute to the stability of a pluralist society, as the 
                                                 
491 See, e.g., Thijs, Verkuyten 2014 for a meta-study of the contemporary literature on this topic. 
492 See Allport 1954. 
493 See, e.g., Breton 1964, Angrist, Lang 2004, Mouw, Entwisle 2006, Hortas 2008, Kristen 2008, Crul, 
Holdaway 2009, Söderström, Uusitalo 2010, Alba et al. 2011, Alba, Holdaway 2013, ten Teije et al. 2013. 
What becomes clear from the literature about integration in schools is that the success of integrative 
measures varies by context. It depends on factors like the characteristics of the ethnic groups involved, but 
also on structural factors such as parent’s familiarity with school system and the available choices of 
schools. 
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previous chapters have shown. However, greater efforts might be necessary in the case of 
immigrants who are not familiar yet with the core norms and values of a well-ordered 
society, or whose comprehensive views might differ relevantly from those of the well-
ordered society. 
Certainly, there will always be hard cases where it remains prima facie unclear whether 
immigrants would have to adapt to certain requirements or not. Sometimes there are good 
reasons not to insist on one or several aspects of integration although the demands the state 
could make would be justified. This could be due to historical circumstances or due to the 
fact that abandoning a particular set of socio-cultural attitudes would be an extraordinary 
burden for a particular group of immigrants.494 A fine-grained discussion of those cases is 
beyond the aims of this section, but it would closely resemble the already active discussion 
of legal exemptions for adherents of various cultural and religious traditions.495 Much of 
what has been said there would be relevant for discussions about immigration into a 
political liberal society as well. 
What we have (likewise) seen so far is that the political liberal state has an obligation to 
care about social integration and to actively facilitate it by providing adequate 
infrastructure and education policies. This does not seem necessary and perhaps not even 
permissible when it comes to cultural integration, the last and most vaguely defined kind of 
integration discussed here. I generally agree with Miller that the state cannot make many 
demands in regard to cultural integration. From the political liberal perspective, there are at 
least two reasons not to interfere with issues of cultural integration. 
First, there seem to be no aspects of cultural integration that are relevant from a perspective 
of political morality. Without question the political liberal state must require immigrants to 
adapt their attitude towards equality if their hereditary culture supports unequal treatment 
women, homosexuals, or particular cultural groups. However, I take these to be aspects of 
                                                 
494 This seems to be mainly a hypothetical consideration, as I do not have any real-life examples of such 
cases. Nevertheless, they are possible and therefore a potential challenge for the immigration policies of a 
well-ordered society. 
495 For various arguments for and against exemptions from laws grounded in cultural and religious traditions 
of citizens see, e.g., Kymlicka 1995, Barry 2001, Kymlicka 2001, Quong 2006, Billingham 2017. 
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social integration that must be targeted by integrative measures in the realm of education 
and in other areas. Beyond that, there is no justification for the state to require giving up, 
e.g., customs of diet, clothing, or entertainment determined by immigrants’ culture. There 
seems no reason to require the political liberal state to interfere. 
Second, in the absence of pressing reasons such as requirements of justice it looks very 
much as if it is impermissible for the political liberal state to interfere with the culture and 
traditions of immigrants. Just as the state is supposed to be neutral toward the conceptions 
of the good of its citizens, the same is supposed to be the case for immigrants who, or at 
least whose children, are supposed to become full citizens. Culture and traditions are the 
framework for immigrants’ conceptions of the good which, if reasonable, provide a 
legitimate context for them to exercise their capacity for a conception of the good, i.e., to 
exercise their autonomy (see 8.3.2). It would be almost contradictory if the political liberal 
state, constructed to accommodate a society characterised by value pluralism, would deny 
immigrants who are supposed to integrate and become citizens themselves, the freedom of 
following their own (reasonable) conception of the good.  
This has been only a rough sketch of how a well-ordered society ought to support 
integration through its educational institutions. Nevertheless, it has given plausible reasons 
to justify certain requirements of the state in regard to political and social aspects of 
integration. It also provided reasons for the state to provide adequate opportunities for 
immigrants to acquire the necessary skills, knowledge, and attitudes. Moreover, it became 
clear that the political liberal state cannot make any requirements on cultural integration, at 
least not when we understand the distinction between social and cultural integration in the 
sense Miller does and which I used in this discussion. 
8.5 Conclusion 
In Rawls’ original vision of the realistic utopia there is no room, or so it appears, for 
immigrants. But even in a world mainly consisting of liberal democratic societies, people 
will migrate. More importantly, if political liberalism wants to be of any use as a guide for 
contemporary politics, it also needs to address contemporary political challenges, one of 
which is immigration and integration. 
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This chapter gave a brief account of the education and integration of immigrant children in 
a well-ordered society by making use of abstraction and moderate idealisation. I have 
explained the potential deficits in regard to political virtues, autonomy, and the knowledge 
of political rights and liberties that children of immigrants might have. Furthermore, I have 
argued that these deficits ought to be addressed by political liberal education in order to 
contribute to successful integration. 
The dimension of integration that seems most important to focus on is the one of social 
integration. The requirements for civic integration are more or less covered by standard 
civic education, and cultural integration has only very limit relevance for the political 
liberal state. Major differences between immigrant and native children in a well-ordered 
society which are relevant from the perspective of stability as well as from the perspective 
of distributive justice, are mainly a matter of social integration. Here, political liberal 
education will have to implement additional strategies and spend additional resources to 
support long-term integration of immigrants into a liberal democratic society. 
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9 Conclusion 
We have reached the end of this thesis. Let me therefore give a quick summary of its main 
findings and conclusions. I started with a preliminary assessment of how much Rawls 
himself writes about education in his various works and what aspects of his political theory 
presuppose a certain kind of education of citizens. Although the direct mentions of 
education that Rawls makes in his writings are few, relevant elements of his political 
liberal theory require a certain groundwork to be laid by education. 
Part 1, the first of two major parts of the thesis, had a look at the relevant core concepts of 
political liberalism in an attempt to determine how and why these concepts are relevant for 
education. It also highlighted the possible implications of a commitment to the core 
concepts for a theory of political liberal education. In the chapters of Part 1 I have argued 
that the relation between political liberalism and education is not a one-way street. Central 
notions of political liberalism, such as virtues, autonomy, and rights need to be interpreted, 
perhaps even recast, in order to contribute in a useful way to a political liberal account of 
education. 
In regard to political virtues I identified two problems, one of them internal to political 
liberal theory, the other one external. The internal problem results from grounding political 
virtues in the Aristotelian Principle, which can be understood as a comprehensive view that 
is not necessarily shared by all reasonable citizens. In addition, or alternatively, the 
Aristotelian Principle can be taken as a justification for perfectionist policies, something 
that political liberalism also should try to avoid. The external problem is connected to the 
idea that political virtues are stable character traits. This view on virtues is contestable in 
the light of empirical research that suggests that ethical behaviour of persons does not so 
much rely on character traits, but on context-dependent factors. A political liberal theory of 
education should have the resources to offer a response to this situationist challenge. 
My proposed solution for both problems is to abandon the Aristotelian Principle and 
instead endorse a Humean conception of virtues, which is mainly agnostic about the 
motivational forces behind virtuous behaviour. It allows for character traits as well as for 
external motivations, such as social norms, to be the motivation for being a good citizen 
without making contestable claims about the exact psychological mechanisms involved. 
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This update provides political liberal education with a more naturalistic and at the same 
time less controversial account of political virtues than the one originally employed by 
Rawls. 
My investigation into the role of autonomy in education also revealed a need for the 
revision of Rawls’ claims about autonomy in political liberalism. Although political liberal 
education might focus mainly on the political autonomy of citizen, political autonomy 
depends on other, more basic conceptions of autonomy that are not merely political in the 
Rawlsian sense. This underlying conception of autonomy is one that is rooted in persons 
capacity for agency. Although not purely political, this underlying conception of autonomy 
is compatible with political liberalism’s claim for neutrality, or so I have argued. It is a 
weak, procedural conception of autonomy which is so general that it is not part of any 
particular comprehensive doctrine but a necessary condition of the modern view of persons 
that is part of any liberal democratic political theory. Therefore, accepting it as a basic 
component of political autonomy does not threaten to shift political liberalism into a more 
comprehensive direction. Adopting the conception of weak autonomy allows us to make 
sense of teaching political autonomy as it develops from a more basic notion of autonomy. 
Compared to the chapters about political virtues and autonomy, the assessment of the role 
of rights in the context of political liberal education is the least revisionary part. Instead of 
changing or adding to Rawls’ theory, I merely traced Rawls’ notion of rights (and their 
implications) in the context of political liberal education in an attempt to make it easier to 
determine what sort of obligations and rights the state, parents, and children have. For the 
purpose of this exercise, I rephrased relevant claims about rights and freedoms that can be 
found in A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism in terms of a Hohfeldian scheme of 
rights and liberties.  
Part 2, the second major part of the thesis, applied the findings from the first part to what 
can be called contemporary applied problems of liberal political theory. Religion, same-sex 
relations, and immigration provide test cases on which I demonstrated what a political 
liberal theory of education can say about less abstract challenges in political liberal 
education. 
In regard to religion, I engaged with the claim that a truly neutral political liberal society 
would need to abolish public education due to reasons of fairness and personal liberty. 
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Although I objected to this strong claim and showed that this is not the case, the following 
discussion also revealed the limits of the opposite claim that private and religious schools 
are not permissible in a liberal egalitarian society. In this context, it turned out that political 
liberal education can be more permissive than many political liberals concede. A political 
liberal account of education does not need to prohibit private schools or religious schools 
in principle – although the prima facie permissibility of, say, private schooling might be 
limited or cancelled out by particular socio-political contexts, e.g., under circumstances 
where private religious schools would contribute to social polarisation. 
The role of same-sex relations in education is examined as another real-life example in the 
next section of the thesis. From a political liberal view, same-sex relations need to be part 
of a sex education curriculum. I defended this position against claims that this position 
would ignore general human values as well as against the objection that including same-
sex relations in the curriculum would be a promotion of a certain way of life, both claims 
made by natural law theorists. Rather, my position is that including same-sex relations in 
political liberal sex education means providing basic goods for future citizens of diverse 
sexual orientations. 
Against the convention to consider the society of political liberalism as closed, in the final 
applied chapter of this thesis I argued that we need to modify this model if we want to get 
some useful guidelines for real politics. Looking at the question of how political liberal 
education could and ought to deal with immigration (albeit on a fairly abstract level), I 
showed that political liberalism has the resources to develop a meaningful position on this 
topic. 
In discussing the different aspects of political liberalism and the various challenges of 
liberal education, I was (hopefully) able to provide the reader with a plausible account of 
political liberal education. While it certainly does not cover all possible questions on how a 
political liberal state should design its education policies, it provides guidelines and 
examples from which answers to further and more concrete questions can be derived. This 
was the main aim of this thesis.  
Beyond this aim, I think this thesis has demonstrated something more. The modifications 
and amendments I proposed in the first part are not arbitrary but arose in response to 
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problems of a particular context of application, namely education. To facilitate a plausible 
political liberal account of education, political liberal theory seemed to require certain 
adaptations, at least that was my impression when starting the project, and this impression 
remains. Political liberalism is ideal political theory, supposed to generate abstract 
principles from which we can device more concrete rules and solutions for moral 
challenges. It strikes me as misguided, though, to take ideal political theory as it stands as 
an unalterable fixed point from which we must try to construct solutions for pluralistic 
societies. By proceeding in this way, we would arrive at inconsistent or simply unfeasible 
solutions for concrete political problems. 
Instead, as the line of reasoning in this thesis suggests, we should aim for what we could 
call a special version of reflective equilibrium. Instead of taking all aspects of our theory 
for granted, we should try to match the abstract building blocks of our ideal theory with the 
restrictions and requirements of the more concrete fields of application. Sometimes we will 
find, as I did in the first part of this thesis, that there are good reasons to change parts of the 
theory to meet the demands of the application case. 
This approach will not convince everyone. Those who think that political philosophy has to 
determine what is just or right, regardless of feasibility, will disagree with my view. 
However, it seems fair to assume that this is not the idea behind political liberalism. While 
Rawls clearly saw himself committed to ideal political theory, his work and the work of 
political liberals that followed him always aimed at something that is supposed to be a 
realistic utopia. If political liberals want to uphold their commitment to that realism, 
however remote, they will sometimes need to make changes to their theory, just as I did in 
the case of education. 
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